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Abstract
The global financial and economic crisis of 2007-2008 pointed out the importance of de-
signing new theoretical instruments to face the important macroeconomic challenges which lie
ahead. The crisis has been particularly severe and prolonged in the European Union, generating
political conflicts within countries of the union and a widespread disappointment among the
European citizens. Brexit, voted by British citizens, is a clear outcome of the negative spirit
spread in the European Union after the crisis. Other issues like immigration and the growing
inequality contributed an increase in skepticisms towards the Union.
In this thesis we try to address these problems by using methodologies that are grounded on
a “bottom-up” approach, denoting the importance of considering the emergence of the aggre-
gate economic behavior from the interaction of heterogeneous economic agents. We apply this
“bottom-up’ methodology both for designing a macroeconomic multi-country model and for
studying the bank credit allocation in Spain from micro data about the balance sheet of Spanish
companies.
The work on the multi-country model allows us to examine the macroeconomic implications
of joining a union for two countries in different economic scenarios. We want to understand
under what conditions it is convenient to form a union and what are the potential dangers or
drawbacks. Our main conclusions are that the performance of the union is in general superior
to the one of isolated countries, but in some cases, the union can exacerbate the inequalities
among countries. In the absence of any mobility regulation, for instance, the inequality among
countries can reach very high levels, undermining the whole performance of the union. We find
that centralized fiscal policy in the union can alleviate this problem.
The empirical work analyzes the balance sheet of medium and large enterprises in Spain, at-
tempting to understand how total bank credit, in terms of loans to firms, is allocated in the
economy. Since the Spanish financial system consist mainly of banks, similar to the rest of
Europe, we aim to study if this allocation can have macroeconomic effects over the business
cycle or even over the medium-run. We find that the distribution of bank loans is more un-
equally distributed amongst firms than any other measure such as total assets, sales or number
of employees. Big companies get the biggest share of the loans. We also discover that this in-
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equality increased during the economic boom in Spain between 2000 and 2007, and that bank
loans have been extremely concentrated to big construction firms, weakening the resilience of
the whole economic system that eventually collapsed. We perform both a descriptive and a
micro-econometric analysis using firm-level data to test our hypothesis.
Overall, this thesis is a joint work. It consists of theoretical and empirical parts where my
contribution to each of them can be summarized as follows: 1) The theoretical part (chapter
two): multi-country model design 40-50%, multi-country model implementation 70%, experi-
ments design and implementation 60%, and data analysis of results 90%; 2) The empirical part
(chapter three): experiment design 50%, and data analysis (descriptive and econometric) 90%.
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Resumen
La reciente crisis económica y financiera mundial de 2007-2008 señaló la importancia de dis-
eñar nuevos instrumentos teóricos para hacer frente a los importantes desafíos macroeconómi-
cos que tenemos ante nosotros. La crisis ha sido particularmente severa y prolongada en la
Unión Europea, generando conflictos políticos dentro de los países de la unión y una decepción
generalizada entre los ciudadanos europeos. El Brexit, votado por los ciudadanos británicos,
es un claro resultado del espíritu negativo difundido en la Unión Europea después de la crisis.
Otras cuestiones como la inmigración y la creciente desigualdad contribuyeron a levantar los
escepticismos hacia la unión.
En esta tesis tratamos de abordar estos problemas utilizando metodologías basadas en un en-
foque "bottom-up", que denotan la importancia de considerar la formación del comportamiento
económico agregado a partir de la interacción de los agentes económicos heterogéneos. Apli-
camos esta metodología "bottom-up" tanto para el diseño de un modelo macroeconómico
multinacional como para el estudio de la asignación de crédito bancario en España a partir
de datos microeconómicos sobre el balance de las empresas españolas. El trabajo sobre el
modelo multinacional nos permite examinar las implicaciones macroeconómicas de unirse en
una unión para dos países en diferentes escenarios económicos. Queremos entender en qué
condiciones puede ser conveniente formar una unión y cuáles son los peligros potenciales o los
inconvenientes. Nuestras principales conclusiones son que la performance de la unión es en
general superior a la performance de los países aislados, pero en algunos casos la unión puede
exacerbar las desigualdades entre los países. En ausencia de cualquier regulación de la movili-
dad, por ejemplo, la desigualdad entre los países puede alcanzar niveles muy altos, socavando
el desempeño económico de la unión. Encontramos que una política fiscal centralizada en la
unión puede aliviar este problema.
El trabajo empírico analiza el balance de las medianas y grandes empresas en España, tratando
de entender cómo se asigna el crédito bancario en la economía, en términos de préstamos a
empresas. Sabemos que los préstamos bancarios son la principal fuente de financiación para
las empresas en España (y en Europa) y es interesante estudiar si esta asignación puede tener
efectos macroeconómicos en el ciclo económico o incluso en el crecimiento a medio plazo.
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Encontramos que la distribución de los préstamos bancarios a las empresas es más desigual-
mente distribuida que cualquier otra medida de tamaño para las empresas, por ejemplo, los
activos totales, las ventas o el número de empleados. Las grandes empresas obtienen la mayor
parte de los préstamos. También descubrimos que esta desigualdad aumentó durante el boom
económico de España entre 2000 y 2007 y que los préstamos bancarios se concentraron ex-
traordinariamente en las grandes empresas de construcción, debilitando la resistencia de todo
el sistema económico que finalmente se derrumbó. Realizamos un análisis descriptivo y un
análisis econométrico para proporcionar nuestros resultados.
En general, esta tesis es un trabajo conjunto y consiste en partes teóricas y empíricas. Mi
contribución a cada una de ellas puede resumirse de la siguiente manera: 1) La parte teórica
(capítulo 2): diseño del modelo multinacional 40-50%, implementación del modelo multina-
cional 70%, diseño e implementación de experimentos 60%, y análisis de datos de resultados
90%; 2) La parte empírica (capítulo 3): diseño del experimento 50%, y análisis de datos (de-
scriptivo y econométrico) 90%.
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Chapter 1
Approaching complex economies from
the bottom up
1.1 General context, motivation and objectives
Modern economies are large and complex systems composed of many individuals that mu-
tually interact. In the macroeconomic literature, “individual” may refer not only to single
inhabitants or households but also to companies, banks, governments, or any other institutions
characterized by autonomous decision making. One of the main property of the economic sys-
tems is that they consist of various types of “individuals”, or agents, which are highly heteroge-
neous. For instance, if we consider firms as a type of agent, we can find empirical evidence that
the distribution of firms according to their size is significantly skewed, and it exhibits the Pareto
distribution in its upper tail (Simon and Bonini, 1958). Another example is the dispersion of
income and wealth of households, measured by the Gini index, which shows a high degree
of inequality among them (Gottschalk and Smeeding, 2000). Economists mostly use the term
“heterogeneity” to refer to the multiple dimensions according to which economic agents differ.
We can define two different approaches that have been used in the economic literature.
The first one can be described as “top-down” approach, while the second one as “bottom-up”
(Sabatier, 1986; De Grauwe, 2010). The top-down approach is characterized by representative
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agents that fully understand the economic system. These agents are capable of representing the
whole system in a scheme that they can store in their mind. Depending on their position in the
system, they can use this scheme to take decisions or to optimize their own private welfare. In
general, top-down models are characterized by rational expectations of agents, and by systems
at the equilibrium that are hit by exogenous shocks. This method usually assumes that the
policy makers are the key actors neglecting interactions among other agents.
On the contrary, the “bottom-up” systems are populated by individuals who do not under-
stand the whole system. Each individual knows only a small scheme of the whole, and these
systems function as a result of the application of simple and well-known rules by individual
agents. Thus, the central theme of this approach has been to understand how aggregate eco-
nomic properties arise from the actions and interactions of heterogeneous agents.
This work tries to contribute to the “bottom-up” stream of literature, both from the theoretical
and empirical perspectives.
The “bottom up” approach is based on two pillars. The first pillar is based on the com-
plex interaction among agents, which is crucial since it is not possible to explain the aggregate
dynamics simply as a compound of the behaviors of individuals. In fact, the interaction is a
type of externality, and the aggregate outcome is different from the arithmetic sum of its parts
(Gallegati and Kirman, 2016). This issue has become more evident to the whole economic
community after the big financial crisis of 2008. The second pillar is represented by agents’
heterogeneity, which has been a common subject of research in last years, emerging after the
seminal work of Gabaix (2011) and his formulation of the “granular” theory. The author shows
that, if the distribution of firms’ size is fat-tailed, as it is documented empirically, idiosyncratic
firm-level shocks can explain an important part of aggregate movements. In particular, he finds
that the idiosyncratic movements of the largest 100 firms in the US explain about one-third of
the variation in output growth. Therefore, his “granular” theory suggests that macroeconomic
questions can be clarified by looking at the behavior of large firms in the upper-tail of dis-
tribution, rather than taking a median representative firm which in the case of fat-tail cannot
represent the entire distribution.
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In this thesis we use the bottom-up approach in both the theoretical and empirical fields,
showing how macroeconomic outcomes emerge from the complex interactions of individuals at
the bottom level. In the theoretical part of the thesis, we develop an agent-based multi-country
macroeconomic model in order to design computational experiments which tackle some of the
important economic questions that are currently debated, especially in the European Union
(EU). Although the outcome of the model emerges from interactions and heterogeneity among
agents we do not explicitly define the level of heterogeneity. In fact, we set-up the model with
homogeneous agents, for instance, all firms in our model are identical at time t = 0, and still, the
heterogeneity of agents endogenously emerges over time due to their bounded rationality and
interactions. This property finally drives dynamics in agents’ distributions, and thus, different
levels of heterogeneity1. On the other hand, in the empirical section we focus on the Spanish
economy, investigating the determinants of bank credit allocation and its impact on the business
cycle.
1.1.1 “Bottom up” and agent-based modeling
The pre-crisis research agenda of theoretical macroeconomics was to improve the consen-
sus among different macroeconomic schools (Classical and New Keynesian) and to refine the
DSGE models further. DSGE models are micro-founded, i.e. the behavioral equations describ-
ing the economy are derived from a utility maximization problem at the micro level, assuming
that agents have rational expectations (RE), that is, agents either use the full information set
or uniformly distributed incomplete information set to compute the expected values of relevant
economic variables. In this way, expectations are consistent with the model itself and decisions
can be taken rationally. The last key assumption of DSGE models is that the representative
agent behaves approximately the same way as the remaining distribution of agents in the econ-
omy (the median is representative of the entire distribution). This is the representative agent
assumption by which the micro and the macro levels of the model are connected, and coordi-
1The mechanisms that generate household heterogeneity have also been investigated in different versions of
a canonical business cycle model. For instance, Krueger et al. (2015) study what mechanisms are suitable for
generating an empirically plausible wealth distribution and argue that the wealth distribution can matter for the
macroeconomic response to business cycle shocks.
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nation failures are minimal (see the examples of Real Business Cycle models: Kydland and
Prescott, 1982; Prescott, 1986; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; or the examples of New Keynesian
models: Galí and Gertler, 2007; Smets and Wouters, 2007; Bernanke et al., 1999).
The crisis has however modified the planned research agenda and has led to an intense de-
bate about the modeling tools currently available. Following the crisis, there have been many
conjectures for the possible origin of instability. Most suggestions focus on concepts like col-
lective behavior, lack of trust and psychological components in agents’ behavior (Corsetti et al.,
2010), incomplete information sets (Boz and Mendoza, 2014; Gerba et al., 2017), contagion
and network domino effects (Battiston et al., 2012), portfolio selection, liquidity crises, and
leverage effects (Geanakoplos, 2010; Adrian and Shin, 2010). In general, one common stance
among many scholars is that We need to better deal with heterogeneity across agents and the
interaction among those heterogeneous agents (Trichet, 2010). Therefore, using alternative
modeling approaches, such as agent-based models (ABM), the optimization assumption is not
necessary and it thus allows for capturing more complex interactions between agents.
The model that we design in this thesis has been conceived to capture the heterogeneity of
agents at different levels and adopted to address some of the present challenges of the European
Union. In particular, it accounts for the heterogeneity of households and firms at the individual
level, and for different available technologies among countries at the aggregate level. Thus,
using this model, we can study the performance of monetary unions that allow for labor mo-
bility, international trade, and international financial markets. In particular, the focus of our
investigation is to discover when it is beneficial for two countries to form a union considering
that they can have similar or different productivities. Furthermore, we test the effectiveness of
monetary policy in a monetary union. Finally, we design a simple fiscal redistribution mecha-
nism, testing whether stronger fiscal integration may improve the performance of the monetary
union.
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1.1.2 “Bottom up” and empirical research
Lack of regulation can exacerbate fluctuations in financial and business cycles. One recent
example is the Spanish economy where a lack of regulation in the construction and housing
industry led to an accentuated economic growth mainly driven by the fuel in credit and lend-
ing conditions. It is well known that Spanish firms finance their production and investments
through bank loans and that credit markets are in general characterized by significant frictions.
Therefore, in this empirical study, we use the bottom-up approach to investigate the lending
standards of banks prior to the bust in 2008. We want to understand if the loan allocation
structure undermined the stability of the whole economy, contributing to the financial crisis.
This work is related to the seminal paper of Gabaix (2011) and its granular theory that states
that the behavior of a small number of large firms may significantly affect the entire economic
system. In this respect, the study focuses on the large and medium sized companies in Spain
and examines the relation between firm size and loans allocation. We consider the balance
sheet evolution of these companies over time (in particular their liability structure) along with
other account statement entries, in order to figure out some potential relation between credit
distribution among firms and the overall economic performance.
1.2 Structure and contents
This thesis is organized in two main chapters.
Chapter 2 presents what we call "the first pillar" of the bottom-up approach which embodies
the model design and the theoretical analysis. The aim of the analysis is to address several
important challenges that are relevant for the leading economies and in particular for the EU.
Thus, in this chapter we mainly focus on the migration challenges of the union examining the
impacts of different labor market policies on the economic performance; we investigate further
integration of a monetary union proposing a deeper fiscal integration in terms of fiscal transfers
among countries; we also test whether fiscal transfers can reduce inequality in the union and via
what channels; finally we investigate what policies may prevent the sovereign debt crisis in the
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union. To address the relevant issues, we use a multi-country model that is an extension of the
Eurace agent-based model (see Teglio et al., 2012). We design a flexible modeling framework
that can host many different countries. In particular, the model is designed as a monetary union
of countries with international labor market, international trade, and international financial
market. The chapter reports three computational experiments where we investigate: 1) the
benefits and costs of joining the union when countries are identical; 2) the benefits and costs
when the countries differ along their productivity levels (e.g., one high-tech and one low-tech
country); 3) we test whether fiscal transfers among countries are beneficial in a heterogeneous
union.
Chapter 3 is "the second pillar" in our bottom-up analysis and presents a micro-econometric
analysis. Inspired by the Spanish experience we examine the role that bank credit to firms
played during the boom period, during the crisis of 2008, and in the subsequent years. This
study uses a large panel data set with yearly balance sheet and income data of the big and
medium size Spanish companies during the period 1999−2014 to investigate the relation be-
tween bank loans and total firm assets. The study involves a descriptive and econometric
analysis. In the econometric analysis, we estimate an empirical model using the parametric
two-step Heckman selection model, and confirm the results with the semi-parametric selection
(Matching on Unobservables) estimation. We chose the selection models to account for the
present selection mechanism in the lending procedure between banks and firms. Overall, pa-
per’s findings raise queries about the correct channeling of bank credit into the economy and
about its consequences.
6
Chapter 2
Eurace open: an agent-based
multi-country model
2.1 Introduction
The global economic and financial worldwide crises, whose genesis is often associated with
the collapse of Lehman Brothers (the largest corporate bankruptcy in U.S. history), had a perva-
sive impact on all the leading economies in the world. However, the place where it might have
been more disruptive has been the European Union (EU), which revealed a structural fragility
and inadequacy to tackle some of the main challenges ahead. The crisis on the middle east and
the high migration flows into Europe is another example that contributed to reveal the weak-
ness and the lack of coordination among countries in the EU. The geographical, cultural, and
economic diversity of the countries of the union has not been harmonized in a well balanced
and integrated project, and the whole union risked the collapse faced with these shocks and
in particular handling the financial, sovereign debt and immigration crisis. The north and the
south of Europe, with Greece and Germany as representative countries, started a confrontation
that put Europe in danger. Threatening anti-European winds begun to blow, putting at risk
the permanence of several countries in the union, finally claiming the first victim: the United
Kingdom. A frequent topic during the years of the crisis, which nowadays seems temporarily
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abandoned, has been the two-speed (or multi-speed) Europe, whose basic ideas is that different
parts of the EU should integrate at different levels depending on the political and economic
situation in each country. The north vs. south or core vs. periphery are typical examples which
have been proposed and discussed.
Furthermore, the very weak fiscal integration in the EU does not allow for a common “federal”
policy strategy but often, fosters conflicts among its member states, which pursue short term
individual goals at the expense of one common goal in the union. Prioritizing the individual
goals creates a competitive environment between countries and leads to further confrontations
and sub-optimal outcomes. For instance, high unemployment rate in southern “periphery”
countries results in a huge waste of human resources and the social welfare loss for the entire
union. The European Central Bank (ECB), which is actually the only supranational institu-
tion able to take effective decisions, is not able, alone, to conduct economic policy in Europe;
both because monetary policy is not enough, if not accompanied by integrated fiscal strategies
(more coordinated than the mechanical Maastricht fiscal constraints), and because the ECB
safeguards the security of the banking system, which is not the only actor in the economy. In
the Spanish case, for instance, as we contribute to show in the second chapter of this thesis,
there has been a clear conflict between the interest of banking system and the interest of the
households, and we think that the Bank of Spain (and probably the ECB) did not put enough
effort into guaranteeing households’ rights with proper regulations and controls. On the top of
this, there is also an intrinsic issue related to a common monetary policy in a union of countries
which have several heterogeneities.
Since the EU is continuously facing challenges in the last decade, it is important to inves-
tigate under what conditions is it optimal for a country to join a monetary union and what is
the optimal design of the union to maximize social welfare. Indeed, several streams of liter-
ature tackled this important topic from different perspectives (a complete literature review is
provided in the next section), but the peculiarity of our work is to start from a well-established
agent-based modeling technique for a single country model and extend it to a multi-country
framework. We are not devising a simplified setting, dedicated from the beginning to exam-
ine stylized open economies, but we start from complex single country descriptions, which
have an intrinsic value, trying to understand what happens when these countries join in union.
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Certainly, this approach has both advantages and limitations. On the one hand, it allows for a
realistic analysis of the problem, as agent-based models mimic with greater detail and realism
the functioning of modern economies. On the other hand, the complexity of the model and
its computational nature makes it difficult to trace the causal relationship in the system and it
comes at the expense of transparency. One way to overcome this is to take the model to the
data.
In this chapter we are taking our first steps into this complex field, trying to formulate some ba-
sic questions and to give them some appropriate answers. The first research question we tackle
is under what conditions it would be convenient for two identical countries to join a union. To
answer the question, we design a setup with four identical countries, two isolated and two in
a union. We study how mobility of workers can affect the economic performance of the union
and of its members. Our most important result is that the economic performance of the union is
nearly always better than the performance of the individual countries. However, lack of labor
regulation (or frictions) can destabilize the union during crises, creating permanent unbalances
which undermine economic activity in the member countries.
The second research question is whether ex-ante productivity heterogeneities amongst mem-
ber states can weaken the performance of the union, or even create unfavorable conditions for
joining the union in the first place. This question resembles the Germany-Greece issue, or any
other where the productivity gap between countries is high. Further we investigate is it conve-
nient for the high productivity country to form a union? And what about the low productivity
one? Is there a threshold in productivity gap after which the union does not work? What about
the distributional effects of the union?
These are some of the questions we aim to answer in this chapter, finding that high productivity
gaps, combined with low mobility frictions, can bring about massive migrations that can rise in-
equality and harm the performance of the union. Finally, we design a stylized fiscal integration
mechanism that we call “fiscal pool”, consisting of a centralized deposit account where mem-
ber countries of the union are obliged to put a part of their budget surplus (if any). On the other
hand, countries that need to finance budget deficit can ask (and obtain) money from the fiscal
pool. We show that this simple transfer mechanism can improve the conditions of the “poor”
country of the union allowing higher government provisions to its citizens and consequently
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give them greater incentives to stay in the country. The governments also finance their budget
deficit raising new public debt, but the austerity policy limits it. If sovereign debt reaches a
level that is greater than a policy given threshold, the governments enter austerity regime re-
ducing their public spendings and consequently households’ well-being, since public transfers
and benefits are part of households’ disposable income. Therefore, when fiscal transfers are
available, countries can use funds from the fiscal pool to finance their public expenditures, in-
stead of raising new debt, and potentially avoid austerity measures. Conversely, without fiscal
transfers, union countries can only finance their budget deficit through new public debt. This
may lead to austerity measures that would reduce government spendings and thus households’
income. Finally, lower incomes would increase the likelihood of migration since households
are not willing to stay in their countries if they can find better earning opportunities abroad.
The outflow of workers also acts as a sort of accelerator mechanism. With a lower amount of
production factors (workers) the economic activity declines, and so tax revenue, which may
force the government to raise new public debt and even further decrease public expenditures.
2.2 Literature review
Agent based models (ABMs) are a tool that facilitates the analysis of economic crises, given
that they can easily address non-linearities such as liquidity problems, bankruptcies, domino
effects, systemic risk, speculative bubbles, and credit crunches (see e.g. Raberto et al., 2012).
For instance, Delli Gatti et al. (2010) propose a network based accelerator where small local
shocks can trigger large systemic effects, because of contagion and default cascade mecha-
nisms, showing that not only can a firm’s bankruptcy spread to other firms directly through
the market for trade credit, but also indirectly weakening the banking sector (bad debt), thus
constraining the supply of bank loans. Riccetti et al. (2013) enriched this framework with the
analysis of the leverage cycle, following the recent literature on leverage (Adrian and Shin,
2010; Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Fostel and Geanakoplos, 2008) that shows the impor-
tance of changes in leverage during an economic cycle as amplification mechanism of shocks.
Other agent-based models, such as Iori et al. (2006) or Battiston et al. (2012), focus on the
interbank market. Those papers allow to understand that in a banking system composed of
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homogeneous banks, the interbank market unambiguously stabilizes the system, but, with het-
erogeneous banks, knock-on effects become possible and the interbank market plays an am-
biguous role. Indeed the increasing connectivity of the interbank network implies a more severe
trade-off between the stabilization effect of risk diversification and the higher systemic risk as-
sociated with potential bankruptcy cascades triggered by stronger connectivity.
Financial markets have been the first research domain where agent-based micro-models have
provided meaningful results starting from late 90s. While the efficient market hypothesis is un-
able to catch many interesting stylized facts, agent-based micro-models have provided some
insights on volatility clustering and fat tails of return distributions. Following the pioneering
Santa Fe Artificial Stock Market, SF-ASM (LeBaron et al., 1999), several artificial stock mar-
kets have been developed over the last years. For instance, Lux and Marchesi (2000), Chiarella
et al. (2002), Kirman and Teyssiere (2002), LiCalzi et al. (2003), Chiarella et al. (2009) and
Tedeschi et al. (2009) are examples of agent-based micro-models able to explain the influence
of traders’ behaviors on the persistence of asset price volatility. The models cited above have
looked at the effect of coordination of traders’ strategies via market-mediated interactions (for
example when agents follow common chartist trading rules). Collective behavior nonetheless
could reflect the phenomenon known as herding which occurs when agents take actions on the
basis of directly imitating each other. The studies on herding effects have focused on how herd-
ing can lead to large price fluctuation and on its role as a source of volatility clustering (Stauffer
and Sornette, 1999; LeBaron and Yamamoto, 2008). Differently from the Santa Fe model, the
Genoa Artificial Stock Market (GASM) (see for details Raberto and Cincotti, 2005), being
populated by nearly zero-intelligence traders with limited financial resources, focuses more
on the market structural properties than on the agents’ behavioral features. In particular, the
GASM, by successfully reproducing the main financial stylized facts, demonstrates that budget
constraints and market micro-structure properties, such as the clearing mechanism, are at least
as important as the traders’ behavioral features in explaining the emergence of the statistical
properties of financial time series.
Besides agent-based micro-models that are widely used in studies on financial (stock) mar-
kets and specifically traders’ behavior and coordinations, De Grauwe and Gerba (2017) use
11
a behavioral bounded rationality macro-model including financial frictions on the supply side
to study how imperfect credit and stock markets affect allocations on the production side of
the economy. They found that when behavioral aspects are jointly included with supply-side
financial frictions in a standard financial accelerator model, the transmission of shocks is sig-
nificantly intensified via the stock prices mechanism. A sharp increase in stock prices not only
allows firms to increase their credit and capital demand but also can reduce the input costs for
firms. Conversely, a sharp drop in asset prices can limit the supply of credit to firms, raise their
production costs, and reduce the supply of capital and their production capacity (or productiv-
ity) over time.
Among the present agent-based macro-models, see e.g. Popoyan et al. (2017); Gaffeo et al.
(2011); Gabbi et al. (2015); Gualdi et al. (2015); Wäckerle et al. (2014); Riccetti et al. (2013),
it is worth citing the Keynesian model by (Dosi et al., 2010), which has been recently used
to test different fiscal and monetary policy scenarios (Dosi et al., 2013, 2015, 2016). Results
show that the introduction of constrained fiscal rules mimicking the Stability and Growth Pact
or the Fiscal Compact worsen the performance of the economy as well as public finances, while
the best policy mix able to stabilized macroeconomic fundamentals is the combination of an
unconstrained fiscal policy with a dual-mandate monetary policy, targeting both inflation and
unemployment. Among other agent-based studies on the recent crisis, Assenza et al. (2015)
focus on the emergence of a crisis from micro behavioral interactions, while Klimek et al.
(2015) focus on crisis resolution mechanisms, finding that there are no economic conditions
under which a taxpayer-funded bail-out outperforms the bail-in mechanism with private sector
involvement.
Summing up, agent-based models are a promising way to develop an alternative micro-
founded theory both for descriptive and normative (policy) purposes1, taking the Lucas critique
(see Lucas, 1976) seriously. ABMs have the advantages of flexibility and modularity in model
building and dispense with theoretical consistency requirements. The ABM approach avoids
the oversimplification of the optimizing agent assumption by relying on a more coherent de-
scription of agents’ behavior, which is based on heuristics and behavioral patterns instead of
1See for instance Dawid and Fagiolo (2008).
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rationality, as pointed out by the increasing literature on behavioral economics (Kahneman and
Tversky, 2000; Gigerenzer and Selten, 2002; De Grauwe and Gerba, 2015). ABMs also easily
allow for adaptive rules and learning (Simon, 1979; Kirman, 2011).
The Eurace agent-based model that we use in this work provides a rich scenario of interac-
tions between real and financial variables. It is a large-scale agent-based model and simulator
representing a fully integrated economy consisting of three economic spheres: the real sphere
(consumption goods, investment goods, and labor markets), the financial sphere (credit and
financial markets), and the public sector (Government and Central Bank), see Cincotti et al.
(2012). Following the standard agent-based approach, Eurace economic agents are character-
ized by bounded rationality and adaptive behavior as well as pairwise interactions in decen-
tralized markets. The balance-sheet approach and the stock flow consistency checks have been
followed as a key modeling paradigm in Eurace. The computational results show the real ef-
fects on the artificial economy of the dynamics of monetary aggregates, i.e. endogenous credit
money supplied by commercial banks as loans to firms, and fiat money created by the central
bank (Cincotti et al., 2010; Raberto et al., 2012). In particular, Eurace shows the emergence
of endogenous business cycles which are mainly due to the interplay between real economic
activity and its financing through the credit market, thus shedding light on the relation between
debt, leverage and main economic indicators (Raberto et al., 2012; Teglio et al., 2012). More-
over, Eurace shows that a quantitative easing monetary policy coupled with a loose fiscal policy
generally provides better macroeconomic performance in terms of real variables, despite higher
wage and inflation rates. In particular, the government is able to finance budget deficit through
the quantitative easing mechanism without increasing tax rates, which retains the economic
activity at the higher level, however, at the expense of higher wage and inflation rates (see e.g.
Cincotti et al., 2010). The Eurace model has also been employed to test regulatory policies pro-
viding time varying capital requirements for banks, based on mechanisms that enforce banks
to build up or release capital buffers, according to the Basel III regulatory framework and the
countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) principles. Cincotti et al. (2012) have shown that the
dynamic regulation of capital requirements is generally more successful than fixed tight cap-
ital requirements in stabilizing the economy and improving the macroeconomic performance.
It affects the economic performance in the medium-long run reducing the financial fragility
13
(or systemic risk) in the economic system and potentially prevents triggering chains of firms
insolvency bankruptcies.
Due to emergence of new challenges in the European Union such as immigration crisis, fur-
ther integrations, spatial inequality, sovereign debt crisis, etc., agent-based models have started
to incorporate a spatial dimension. A new wave of agent-based models have shifted the fo-
cus of the analysis from closed to open economies allowing for an international dimension
in the agent-based literature. Recent works explore how policies affect convergence and the
economic performance of countries in the union using a multi-country model with heteroge-
neous economies. On the one hand, Dawid and Neugart (2011) use the Eurace@Unibi model
to study the convergence between the two regions with different productivity levels including
the physical capital mobility, the labor mobility, and international trade. They found that dif-
ferent labor market policies may impact the convergence between the regions. Using the same
model, Dawid et al. (2014) extend the analysis by studying how policies aimed at human cap-
ital and adoption of technologies may impact the convergence between regions with different
productivity levels. They advocate that the government may use above mention policies to en-
courage convergence, however, necessarily taking into account the labor market policies. On
the other hand, Caiani et al. (2017) use a multi-country model, to study how the contractionary
and expansionary fiscal policies can impact the performance of the countries in the union. In
particular, they show that the increase in the maximum deficit-to-GDP ratio (expansionary pol-
icy) improves the dynamics of GDP, labor productivity, and employment, however, at the cost
of a higher level of public debt and inflation.
The model that we present in this work is similar to the model given by Dawid and Neugart
(2011) and Dawid et al. (2014). We have expanded the original Eurace model (given by Teglio
et al., 2012; Cincotti et al., 2012; Raberto et al., 2012) to a multi-country setting. Our model
can accommodate N heterogeneous economies (countries) allowing for a Monetary Union, in-
ternational trade, international stock market and labor mobility. Our analysis focuses not only
on the setup with countries that exhibit different productivities but also on the setup with iden-
tical countries. The main difference with the previous literature is that we do not allow for
the technology growth. Thus, in the case when countries have different but constant produc-
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tivity levels, we study the optimal policies to adopt given the constant productivity gap among
countries. This assumption is inspired by the empirical evidence which shows that countries in
the union have not converged on average (Sondermann, 2014; Tsionas, 2000). We study how
various fiscal and labor market policies may affect the dynamics of each country in the union
and on aggregate. We propose redistribution of income in the union via a fiscal pool, showing
that the pool is beneficial for the union and in particular for the low productivity country in the
presence of large productivity gap. In the analysis, we assess major economic aggregates such
as GDP (per capita), consumption (per capita), sovereign debt (per capita) and its structure,
government expenditures, unemployment rate, inflation, etc.
The agent-based model and the analysis that we provide in this study focuses on economic
and integration issues as well as policy analysis within a setup that is inspired by the European
Union. However, the paper contributes not only to the literature on heterogeneous agents but
also to the literature on Optimal Currency Areas (OCA), international trade and the economic
effects of migration especially in the context of the EU Eastern enlargement. Therefore, al-
though the aim of this paper is the policy analysis in the monetary/political union using the
agent-based model, we also show how our work links to the standard literature related to inter-
national trade, integration, and migration.
The OCA theory investigates the costs and benefits of being in a common currency area.
Some of the most important criteria for this analysis, which is also essential for our work,
include labor mobility, wage and price flexibility, the effectiveness of monetary policy, correla-
tion and variation of shocks and synchronization of business cycles. According to this theory,
factor mobility (especially labor mobility) is an important adjustment mechanism in the ab-
sence of exchange rates and when prices and wages are rigid (Mundell, 1961). Furthermore,
De Grauwe (2003) shows the importance of the labor market institutions in the integration
process, emphasizing that countries may have different labor market centralization. He uses
the theory of Bruno et al. (1985) and explains that in the centralized labor markets with the
centralized wage bargaining (labor) unions a supply shock will not produce an excessive in-
crease in nominal wages since the labor unions know that the increase in nominal wages will
lead to higher inflation without affecting real wages. Moreover, Calmfors and Driffill (1988)
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show that a similar result comes from highly decentralized labor markets where wage bargain-
ing is kept at the firm level. For instance, if a supply shock hits the country, the excessive
nominal wage increase would have a direct effect on the competitiveness of companies. How-
ever, labor markets with an intermediate labor union centralization have a different approach
to supply shocks. In this setting, a labor union expects that the increase in wages will have
only a small effect on inflation, so it starts the bargaining process. Since all labor unions do the
same, they finally end up with higher inflation than expected and consequently with lower real
wages. De Grauwe (2003) advocates that different labor market institutions may be costly for
the countries in currency unions.
Our model incorporates identical labor market institutions among countries in the union with
highly decentralized labor markets2. However, if firms increase labor demand to augment their
production capacity due to a positive demand shock, they will compete for workers in the labor
market by increasing nominal wages since 1) they will aim to attract more workers, and 2) the
increase in wages for those who hire new workers will not affect the production costs in the
same proportion3. Our results suggest that in the case of asymmetric shocks, labor mobility
helps to restore equilibrium in the system, always providing lower unemployment rates in the
economies. Nevertheless, new equilibrium may not be efficient, given that the performance of
the total union is worsening when the labor force is fully mobile, and the countries in the union
are identical. In this case, countries tend to polarize regarding the total population, reaching
a new stable path which is characterized by the extremely unequal distribution of households
resulting in the suboptimal use of the production factors. On the other hand, the moderate labor
mobility is beneficial for the union with heterogeneous countries and mainly for small and less
productive economies.
Diverse shocks that may hit the members of common currency areas can be also mitigated
through the fiscal integration between countries. Kenen (1969) emphasizes that the fiscal trans-
fers between regions can absorb the impact of asymmetric shocks. We also perform a fiscal
policy experiment in the last part of the paper showing that financial transfers in the mone-
2The study of the impact of the labor market institutions on the performance of the Monetary Union is beyond
the scope of the present study, and it may be the subject for the future research.
3Fixed (capital) costs per unit of production typically decrease with higher output.
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tary union mitigates diverse shocks and reduce inequality between the high-tech and low-tech
countries. However, while the integrated fiscal policy may have a positive impact on the per-
formance, Corden (1972) argues that countries in the monetary union lose direct control over
the monetary policy and exchange rate. This means that if a country undergoes a negative
demand shock, it will not be able to efficiently use its monetary policy and exchange rate
mechanism to facilitate the adjustment of relative wage and prices. Therefore any adjustment
will be conducted through increased unemployment, reduction of nominal wages and prices
or fiscal policy measures. Our results show that the union central bank is not able to attain
the inflation target. This outcome emerges due to incompatible monetary policy. For instance,
when a country in the union undergoes a negative demand shock the labor market adjusts in
the short run, while the price adjustment takes a longer time to reach a new stable path. During
the price adjustment period, the monetary policy is less effective in reaching the inflation target
due to the temporary divergence in prices over countries since the union central bank always
considers the average inflation level among countries. Thus, countries suffer from the unsuited
monetary policy. Regarding the independence and efficiency of monetary policy in common
currency areas, the general theory states that the higher the association of shocks among the
countries the lower the costs of losing independent monetary policy are (Alesina et al., 2002).
The international trade literature point out the issue of endogeneity vs. specialization.
Frankel and Rose (1997) explain that rising the trade volume among countries in the mone-
tary union can have two side effects. On the one hand, it can cause industrial specialization
among countries in the goods in which they have comparative advantage, leading to industry
specific shocks and asynchronous business cycles. On the other hand, increased trade may gen-
erate a higher correlation between countries’ business cycles if intra-industry trade accounts for
the most of the trade, resulting in common demand shocks, which is the authors’ standpoint.
Frankel (1999) also emphasizes that neither openness nor income correlation is fixed over time
and that they can change in response to the endogenous and exogenous factors. The author
argues that the income correlation is likely to increase over time once the country is in the
monetary union. In our model, we do not allow for the industry specialization among coun-
tries since all firms produce homogeneous products, hence the intra-industry trade accounts
for all trade. We design a perfect international goods market showing that the trade improves
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the synchronization of business cycles over time even in the absence of the labor mobility. In
particular, we show that the union members exhibit higher synchronization in outputs, unem-
ployment rates, wage, and prices.
The economic implications of labor mobility have been addressed meanwhile by many schol-
ars. Empirical and theoretical studies which are focused on the labor market effects of immi-
gration find that immigrants lower the price of factors that are a perfect substitute, and increase
the price of factors if they are complements (Okkerse, 2008). Thus, in general, immigration
slightly lowers wages of less-skilled workers and earlier immigrants (see for instance Jaeger,
1995, Sarris and Zografakis, 1999, Orrenius and Zavodny, 2003 and Greenwood et al., 1997).
Furthermore, Gross (2002) provides the evidence that in the long run immigrants create more
jobs than they occupy, thus unemployment lower permanently. Complementary to this, the
probability that immigrants will rise unemployment is zero in the long run, and negligibly low
in the short term (see the evidence for the US and Canada Marr and Siklos, 1994, for the EU
Simon et al., 1993 and for Australia Gang Tian and Shan, 1999).
In our model workers are always perfect substitute. Moreover, we do not address effects of
labor mobility on different labor market segments assuming that firms hire workers regardless
to their education level. Thus, given the downward nominal wage rigidity, real wages may
decrease in the net receiving country in the short term due to the inflation effect, while in the
long-run immigrants create more jobs than they occupy, lowering the unemployment rate and
pushing the nominal and real wages up.
Further effects of labor mobility on macroeconomic aggregates were widely examined in the
theoretical literature using the computable general equilibrium (CGE) framework, especially
in the context of the EU Eastern enlargement. This type of macroeconomic modeling enables
the analysis of the interaction between migration, capital movements, and trade which is quite
similar to our study. The primary focus of the CGE literature is on the changing skill compo-
sition of the workers via migration assuming that labor moves from a sending to a receiving
country, while in our model the workforce is meant to fluctuate in both directions. Irrespective
of countries differences in productivity and size we may observe net sending or net receiving
countries as an emerging result of individual decisions. Overall, the CGE literature finds larger
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implications of migration on wage and unemployment than those found in the empirical liter-
ature. Notably, the negative effects of immigration, in particular for low-skilled workers, are
outweighed by positive and strong effect coming from the integration of goods markets (e.g.
Baldwin-Edwards, 1997). Therefore, most of the models predict that the EU Eastern enlarge-
ment results in higher wages and lower aggregate unemployment in both receiving and sending
countries which is in line with the results that we provide in this paper. Besides, CGE models
predict that GDP will increase in the receiving country and the total EU. This effect is even
amplified if the trade creation between existing and new member states is taken into account
(Boeri and Brücker, 2005). However, the gains in aggregate and per capita income might be
reduced due to labor market rigidities. Baas and Brücker (2008) analyses possible diversion
effects due to transitional periods in labor mobility. In particular, Germany has kept restrictions
on labor mobility with new member states after the EU Eastern enlargement in 2004, while the
UK has opened the job market. The authors show that the closure of labor markets in Germany
has diminished the GDP effect, while the opening of the UK labor market has resulted in larger
GDP.
Nevertheless, our study suggests that a completely open and flexible labor market may
worsen the economic performance of a union in aggregate and its members, especially if we
consider the setup with two identical countries in the union. The discrepancy between our re-
sults and the evidence from the previous literature emerges mainly due to different modeling
setups. While the CGE literature imposes global-institutional and asymmetric constraints on
the job market, we impose local restrictions on the households’ behavior. Thus we analyze
what the impact of labor rigidity/flexibility on the economic performance having symmetric
labor market policies among countries is.
In general, international migration leads to the more efficient use of human capital and hence,
should increase global output. Many studies advocate that the gains from opening labor market
can outperform those from a further liberalization of international goods and capital market
(Boeri and Brücker, 2005). However, an important issue for the evaluation of migration impacts
is the adjustment of other markets in the economy. Namely, while many studies assume that the
capital stocks are fixed over time, some empirical evidence shows that capital-output ratio and
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hence, the capital intensity of production remains constant in the long-run (Kaldor, 1961). In
fact, in our model, both outcomes might endogenously emerge and may have several different
implications on the global result. If a net receiving country is not able to maintain the capital-
output ratio while a net sending country wastes capital stocks due to the outflow of workers the
total union will operate in the suboptimal distribution of employees with the lower aggregate
and per capita production. Contrary, if the net receiving country manages to maintain the
capital-output ratio, the whole union will operate at the higher output level. In the following
sections, we present the model as well as analyze and discuss the results in details.
2.3 The model
The agent-based multi-country model presented in this paper is given in discrete time t =
{1,2, ...,T}. The time unit t represents one iteration and it is a proxy for one working day4. The
model consists of a set C of heterogeneous countries where each country has the government
{g|g ∈ G} : G ⇐⇒ C, a set Hg of Households {h|h ∈ Hg}, a set Fg of consumption goods
producers − firms { f | f ∈ Fg}, a single capital producer (k), a set Bg of commercial banks
{b|b∈Bg}where we set for simplicity ∀g =⇒ Bg = 1, the central bank (cb), the Union central
bank (ucb), and the statistical office (stat). The agents demand and supply real assets, financial
claims and monetary flows interacting on five markets: the consumption goods market, the
labor market, the financial market (bonds and shares market), the credit market and the physical
capital market. The summary of agents’ interactions is provided in table 2.1.
The model is designed as a credit economy where firms and the financial system are the
engine of the model dynamics. Firms produce durable, homogeneous consumption goods em-
ploying physical capital and labor. The purchase of physical capital is investment and it is
determined by the expected demand of consumption goods and the expected profitability of
the project (Net Present Value investment function). Physical capital is infinitely supplied, and
its productivity is constant over time implying that the model has constant productivity growth
at zero. Therefore determining country-specific productivity levels as an initial condition pro-
4In the model one week has five days, one month has twenty days while one year contains twelve months.
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Table 2.1: Interaction Matrix
F CP HH Bank CB GOV STAT
F CAPITAL LABOR loans
transfers,
subsidies
macro data
CP
capital-bill
(money)
HH
vacancies,
wage,
shares,
dividends
shares,
dividends
shares,
dividends
unemploy-
ment
benefits,
transfers,
subsidies,
bonds,
bond
coupons
macro data
Bank
interests
and
principals,
deposits
deposits loans macro data
CB
interests
and prin-
cipals,
deposits
interests
and
principals,
deposits
macro data
GOV tax tax tax loans macro data
STAT Fs’ data CPs’ data HHs’ data
Banks’
data
CBs’
data
GOV’s data
Table 1. Agents in rows demand real assets (denoted in capital letters); financial assets and their related mon-
etary commitments (denoted in bold and italics respectively); and money and data flows (given in small caps).
Agents in columns supply corresponding real assets, financial assets and their related monetary flows as well
as money and data flows.
vides constant productivity gap among countries in the model. This assumption is the opposite
of the one used in studies on convergence where different regions in the union are assumed
to converge in productivity over time, and where policies may foster the convergence (Dawid
et al., 2014). Therefore, here we examine what policies should be adopted in the Union to
sustain having the everlasting productivity gap.
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Firms participate in all markets. They buy physical capital from the capital goods producer,
hire workers participating in the labor market, demand new bank loans on the credit market,
issue new shares on the financial market and finally sell their products on the consumption
goods market.
Firms require labor to fulfill their planned productions. They post vacancies on the labor
market and set the wage offers to hire new workers. The model assumes a downward nominal
wage rigidity which means that employers are unwilling to reduce salaries in nominal terms,
while in real terms wages can decrease; on the other hand, employers increase the wage offers
depending on demand and supply on the labor market. For instance, an excess in labor sup-
ply will force firms to raise wages to attract new workers. This will, in turn, have a positive
feedback on the unit production costs and consequently drive higher prices. Companies finance
their investments through internal funds, bank loans, and new equity shares following the peck-
ing order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984). However, they can be rationed on the credit and
capital markets. On the one hand, the credit allocation rule in the model is built upon Basel II
and Basel III accords and in particular the rationing on the credit market is the result of firm
financial fragility and bank capital requirements. On the other hand, issuing new equity on the
financial market is uncertain and depends on households’ expected profitability of investing in
new shares.
Firms produce homogeneous consumption goods, set firm-specific prices based on the unit
production costs and deliver the products to all malls within the union.
Households supply labor to firms and the government and receive monthly wage if they are
employed or receive unemployment benefit otherwise. Unemployment benefit is lower than
wage, thus households always prefer to work than to be unemployed. They also receive other
incomes such as government transfers, bond coupon payments as well as the dividend pay-
ments. The government provides monthly lump-sum transfer to all residents and pays monthly
bond coupons to the bond holders, while firms, the commercial bank, and the physical capi-
tal producer pay dividends to their stakeholders. All households are endowed with an equal
amount of the government bonds and stocks at time t = 0. However, they can either trade with
the government bonds and the firm and bank stocks on the secondary market or buy new bonds
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and firm stocks through an initial public offering on the primary market. The commercial bank
and the physical capital producer do not issue new equity shares, and the households do not
trade with the stocks of the physical capital producer on the secondary market, implying that
all households always hold an equal and constant number of capital producer’s stocks. Con-
sequently, since the capital producer does not employ any inputs while providing equipments,
all its earnings after paying tax is redistributed back to the households in equal shares. House-
holds’ disposable income can be consumed, invested on the financial market or retained on
their payment account without earning any interests on the balance.
The capital producer supplies infinitely physical capital to all firms in the economy. It creates
new physical capital without employing inputs in the production process. Thus, having no
production costs its gross profit is equal to its revenue which is given as: ∑ f K f ,t ·PKt , where
K f ,t is the amount of physical capital provided to firm f , and PKt is the capital price given as:
PKt+1 = θ · PKt ·
p¯it
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+(1−θ) ·PKt · pit12 , (2.1)
where θ ∈ [0,1] is the parameter that accounts for the trust in the central bank announcements,
p¯it is the yearly inflation target announced by the central bank at time t, and pit is yearly in-
flation at time t. The capital producer pays the capital tax and redistribute its net profit to the
shareholders in terms of dividend payments.
The artificial economy is further composed of one commercial bank which represents the
banking sector, the government, the central bank and the Union central bank. The bank issues
new loans to firms following the endogenous money creation principle and charge the risk-
based interest rate above the policy rate. Profit is then either redistributed back to households
in terms of dividend payments or accumulated to recapitalize the banking sector if the value at
risk (risk-weighted assets portfolio) is over the policy threshold. The monetary policy is con-
ducted by the central bank or the Union central bank, in the case of the currency union. Both
institutions are modeled as the lender of last resort, and their main tasks are to set the bank
capital requirement, to establish the interest rate using the Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993a) and to
maintain the payment account of the government and commercial banks. The Government cre-
ates country-specific fiscal policies, hire public workers and redistribute income. It collects the
V.A.T and capital tax, sells bonds on the financial market and finally pays the unemployment
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benefits, public wages and lump-sum transfers. The transfers are provided to all households
that reside in the economy and they represent a proxy for public goods.
Each agent has its balance sheet where all physical and monetary stocks are recorded and
updated at the moment of their transaction. Agents’ balance sheets ensure that the model is
stock and flow consistent at any point in time. The detailed overview of agents’ balance sheets
is given in the table A.1 in appendix A.
2.3.1 From a single to multi-country setting
Before we describe economic agents and their behaviors, it is worth mentioning several gen-
eral features of our multi-country model. As we mentioned before, we designed a flexible
multi-country agent-based model following the Eurace framework. The model can host N
heterogeneous countries that can run independently, as closed economies, or in Unions. The
countries may differ in many characteristics. For instance, quantitatively, they may have a
different number of households, a different number of firms or banks. Whereas, qualitatively,
countries can have a different household population structure in terms of their education lev-
els or their consumption preferences and constraints; banks may have different credit granting
mechanisms; firms may differ in their innovation strategies, physical capital producers can pro-
vide machines with different productivity levels and at the same time determine a productivity
level of a country, and finally, each country can have unique or common fiscal and monetary
policies. These are some of the features that may be used to capture the heterogeneity among
countries. However, note that any behavioral role or interaction of the agents that we will de-
scribe in the next section can be a country specific.
The Unions can integrate countries at different levels: 1) international goods markets, 2) in-
ternational labor markets, 3) international financial markets, where stock and bonds can be
traded by all the citizens of the Union, 4) a common monetary policy (monetary Union). We
can simulate any combination of independent countries and Unions whereas the Unions can
be characterized by any number of the four cited properties. We present the example of one
possible configuration of the model in figure A.1 in appendix A. However, in this study we
use the setup with four countries. The model in this paper is designed as a monetary union of
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two countries with international labor market, international trade, and international financial
market; and another two independent countries that are always identical to the union members
and serve as control states.
In the following section we describe in details agents’ behaviors and interactions.
2.3.2 Firms
Firms employ physical capital K and labor force n to produce homogeneous durable con-
sumption goods. We denote by q f ,t real monthly output generated by firm f at time t. The
consumption goods are freely traded among countries in the union such that firms deliver their
products to all malls within the union, while households shop only in the country of residence.
Each country g has one representative mall; therefore, g indicates a country, the government, a
mall or a country specific market.
The production is modeled using the standard Cobb-Douglas production function with a
positive firm-factor productivity (FFP) A and the constant returns to scale5 given as:
q f ,t =A f ,t · (n f ,t)α · (K f ,t)β . (2.2)
Firms solve the production planing problem with stochastic demand and stock-out costs.
Their production plans depend on the expected demand and the level of inventories inherited
from the past. We denote the total production plan of firm f at time t as q˜ f ,t , the stock of
inventories of firm f at mall g at time t as I f ,g,t , and the expected demand of firm f on the
market g at time t as Et [q f ,g]. Firms form beliefs about future demand based on past sales and
after taking into account the current stocks they calculate market specific planned production
such as: q˜ f ,g,t = Et [q f ,g]− I f ,g,t . Since the production is centralized in the country of origin,
firms calculate the total planed production summing up all positive market specific planed
outputs: q˜ f ,t = ∑g q˜ f ,g,t . However, the final output is still uncertain and depends on firms’
production capacity and available funds. If companies are not able to produce the planned
quantity with the current capacity, they will seek for additional workers and investments in
5α+β = 1.
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new physical capital. On the one hand, the number of new employees will be determined on
the labor market, and it will depend on the aggregate demand and supply for labor, which
means that firms not only bargain with workers but also compete with other companies on the
market. On the other hand, firms’ investment decision is built upon the Net Present Value
(NPV) calculation which states that firms will choose the amount of investment that maximizes
the present value of all future returns. Nevertheless, the selected investment will be realized if
firms have sufficiently available funds. In the case when they are financially constrained, i.e.
they do not have sufficient internal resources, and yet they are rationed either on the credit or
financial markets, investments will be adjusted accordingly.
The number of workers needed to achieve the production plan is derived from the equation
(2.2) and it is given as:
n˜ f ,t =
(
q˜ f ,t
A f ,t · (K f ,t)β
) 1
α
, (2.3)
where A f ,t is the FFP calculated as:
A f ,t = min[s¯ f ,t , γ f ,t ], (2.4)
where γ f ,t is the productivity of firms’ physical capital, while s¯ f ,t denotes the average specific
skill of workers in the firm f . Note that in the absence of technology growth the productivity
of firms’ physical capital becomes country specific such as γ f ,t = γg, which means that all
companies in the country use physical capital with equal productivity, where γg represents the
technology frontier of a country g. The final number of vacancies that the firm f will post is
given as a difference between the number of employees needed to fulfill the production plan
and the current number of workers (n˜−n).
Investment
Firms’ investment decision is in the first place determined by the amount of physical capital
K˜ f ,t required to achieve the production plan for the given number of workers n f ,t , and it is
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derived from the equation (2.2):
K˜ f ,t =
(
q˜ f ,t
A f ,t · (n f ,t)α
) 1
β
. (2.5)
The difference between the desired amount of physical capital and the current capital stock
∆K˜ f ,t = K˜ f ,t −K f ,t is the maximum amount that firms are willing to invest. Therefore, using
the investment upper limit, firms determine the grid of visible investment values iã such that
0≤ iã ≤ ∆K˜ and maximize their NPV function with respect to iã.
The NPV function takes into account the discounted values of the future cash flows6 gen-
erated by the augmented production capacity, and the present cost of investments (pKt,g · iãf ,t),
where pKt,g is the actual capital price at time t in the country g. In particular, the NPV function
is given as:
NPV (iã) f ,t = (1− τctg,t)
N
∑
m=1
E¯t [Pf ,m] ·∆q f ,t,m
(1+ r f ,t12 )
m · (1+ τ¯vatf ,t )
− pKg,t · iãf ,t , (2.6)
where the cash flows are discounted over the future N months7; r f ,t is the yearly loan interest
rate for firm f at time t; τctg,t is the corporate tax rate at time t in the country g; τ¯vatf ,t is the
weighted average Value-added tax rate across the countries; E¯t [Pf ,m] is the weighted average
expected price level for firm f at time t in the future month m; and ∆q f ,t,m is the additional
amount of production in the future month m given by the capital investment iãf ,t after taking
into account the capital depreciation rate ξ , i.e.,
∆q f ,t,m = A f ,t · (n f ,t)α ·
(
K f ,t · (1−ξ )m+ iãf ,t
)β
−A f ,t · (n f ,t)α · (K f ,t)β . (2.7)
Each firm calculates the net present value of the future investment taking into account firm-
specific as well as country-specific variables. Therefore, an exporter who is planning to invest
in new capital should calculate the weighted average tax rate τ¯vatf ,t and the weighted average
expected price level E¯t [Pi] across the countries using the country-specific weights λ f ,g,t ∈ [0,1],
such that the equality ∑gλ f ,g,t = 1 holds. However, for simplicity we set the weights for the
domestic market equal to one and the foreign market equal to zero, since the tax rates are
6Revenues corrected by the amount of tax.
7N is the number of months for which the new capital investment will depreciates to the 1% of its value.
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identical in all countries, as well as the Union countries have the common monetary policy and
the barriers free international goods market.
The weighted average Value-added tax rate is given as:
τ¯vatf ,t =∑
g
λ f ,g,t · τvatg,t , (2.8)
where for the domestic weights equal to one we have that ∀ f ∈ Fg =⇒ τ¯vatf ,t = τvatg,t .
The weighted average expected price level is calculated as:
E¯t [Pf ,m] =∑
g
λ f ,g,t ·Et [Pg,m], (2.9)
where for the domestic weights equal to one we have that ∀ f ∈ Fg =⇒ E¯t [Pf ,m] = Et [Pg,m],
where Et [Pg,m] is the expected price level in the future month m in the country g given as:
Et [Pg,m] = Pg,t ·
(
1+
m ·Et [pig,t+1]
12
)
, (2.10)
where Pg,t is the price level in the country g at time t, and Et [pig,t+1] is the expected inflation for
the next month in the country g at time t which is calculated as a linear combination between
the inflation target announced by the central bank and the current inflation, i.e.:
Et [pig,t+1] = θ · p˜ig,t +(1−θ ) ·pig,t (2.11)
where p˜ig,t is the inflation target announced by the central bank in the country g at time t, pig,t
is the current inflation in the country g at time t, and θ ∈ [0,1] is the trust in central banks’
announcements.
It is worth noting that there is a sort of asymmetry in the way demand for capital and labor
is determined. The asymmetry in input demand has been modeled to capture the different way
firms usually manage the two production inputs in reality. In particular, labor can be consid-
ered as a flow variable for firms, whereas capital is a stock component of the balance sheet. In
our model, we assume that companies fire and hire employees with no cost, while investments
are irreversible meaning that firms cannot re-sell the physical capital stock. Consequently, we
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define labor demand, i.e. demand for the flexible input, as a function of short-term sales ex-
pectations, while physical capital demand, i.e. demand for irreversible investments, is modeled
based on the opportunity cost of physical capital and the upper bound determined by expected
sales (see equations 2.3, 2.5, and 2.6).
Also, note that investment decision indirectly takes into account labor costs. The channel is
established through the price level, and the expected inflation since firms’ specific prices are
the function of the unit production costs (mark-up pricing rule explained in the section 2.3.2)
which, in turn, depend on the number of employees and wage. Thus, the higher the labor costs
are, the higher the price level (inflation) and investment demand are - ceteris paribus.
Nevertheless, simultaneous and optimal determination of labor and investment demand, as in
a standard general equilibrium setting with the production plan and the cost minimization ob-
jective, would not be practicable in an agent-based model. The reason is the uncertainty about
the effective level of input acquired following the market interactions with other agents, i.e. the
hiring process in the labor market, workers turnover, and the outcome of the financing process
in the credit and stock markets. For instance, in the case firms are rationed in the credit and
stock markets, they need to revise their plans by scaling down investments and productions,
i.e. the number of employees. Therefore, from a firm perspective, with imperfect information
and foresight about future market outcomes, it is better to determine the “optimal”, or more
correctly said “satisfying” levels of labor and physical capital independently from the uncer-
tain market outcomes (see equations 2.3, 2.5, and 2.6). The possible final result of these two
independent decisions is higher production capacity with respect to the one required by short-
term sales expectations, a spare capacity that however could be behaviorally justified to face
the uncertainty of the labor/credit/stock market outcomes. Finally, the process of substitution
between the two production factors, in the spirit of the Cobb-Douglas production function, does
not occur in one single step as in a general equilibrium setting but is realized in the disequi-
librium simulation process through the continuous unfolding of labor and investment demand
decisions and market outcomes.
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Financing and bankruptcies
Firms demand liquidity to pay salaries, taxes, debt installments, debt interests, dividends
and physical capital bills (investments). They give priority to the internal financing over the
external funds following the pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Therefore they
demand new bank loans and issue new equity shares only after its internal funds dry up. Nev-
ertheless, the external resources are uncertain implying that firms can be rationed on the credit
and financial markets which not only can reduce the planned investments, but also cause finan-
cial crisis and bankruptcies. The credit and financial market mechanisms will be described in
details in the later sections while for the time being, we focus on the bankruptcy mechanism.
Rationed firms face the financial crisis. We distinguish two types of crisis: 1) when firms’
liquidity is sufficient to cover their financial payments, i.e., taxes, debt installments, and inter-
ests, then the payments are executed, and the dividend payments and the production schedule
are rearranged to take into account the liquidity constraints; 2) otherwise, if the firms cannot
pay their financial commitments, they go into bankruptcy.
The model incorporates two types of bankruptcies: illiquidity and insolvency. On the one
hand, illiquid firms are not able to fully pay their financial commitments; however, they still
own positive equity which enables them to survive. They become inactive for at least six
months destroying all inventories and firing all workers. In this period they try to raise addi-
tional liquidity issuing new equity shares on the financial market. If after six months there is
enough liquidity they become active again; otherwise, they still stay inactive until cash reaches
the target level. On the other hand, insolvent companies not only have no enough liquidity to
pay their financial commitments but also negative equity. Therefore, they are fully liquidated
and replaced by new businesses. An insolvent firm fires all workers destroys all inventories and
removes all shareholders meaning that all shareholders lose their shares. The new company in-
herits the physical capital, liquidity and the part of the debt of bankrupted firm. The total debt
of the new corporation is calculated as:
Dnewf ,t = A f ,t ·δ , (2.12)
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where A f ,t is the total assets inherited from the old company which sums up the total value of
physical capital and payment account; and δ ∈ [0,1] is an exogenous parameter that determines
the amount of debt that will be inherited by the new firm. The rest of debt (D−Dnew) is written-
off and represents a bank loss and the negative shock to the banking sector. In general, banks
and shareholders take the all bankruptcy burden. The new company further determines its
target equity such as:
E˜newf ,t = D
new
f ,t · ε, (2.13)
where E˜newf ,t − (A f ,t −Dnewf ,t ) is the amount of new equity shares that should be raised on the
financial market, and ε ∈ [0,1] is an exogenous parameter that determines the target leverage
ratio of new companies. The new company stays inactive for at least six months. In this period
it tries to reach the target leverage ratio issuing new equity shares on the financial market. If
after six months the company has sold enough equity shares it becomes active; otherwise, it
still stays inactive until the leverage ratio reaches the target level.
Pricing and consumption goods supply
Firms set prices based on the unit production costs and the expected price growth using the
mark-up pricing rule. The prices are given as:
p f ,t+1 = θ ·Et [p f ,t+1]+ (1−θ) · (1+µ) · (1+ τ¯vatg,t ) · c f ,t , (2.14)
where θ ∈ [0,1] is the Central Bank (CB) trust parameter, µ is the mark-up rate, τ¯vatg,t is the
weighted average V.A.T rate given in the equation (2.8), implying that the cost of tax is passed
on to the consumers, and c f ,t is the unit production cost for firm f at time t. The firms make a
linear combination setting the weights θ between the price based on the unit production costs
and the expected price calculated as:
Et [p f ,t+1] = p f ,t ·
(
p˜ig,t
12
+1
)
, (2.15)
where p˜ig,t is the inflation target announced by the central bank in the country g at time t.
It is worth mentioning that there is a sort of indirect stickiness of price through wage and
CB inflation target, however, since the price is a function of unit costs it can change in both
directions depending on the production volume.
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Firms update their prices always after the production takes place and then they distribute the
product to the malls. However, the produced quantity can deviate from the planed one due to
the fluctuation of workers or rationing on the credit and stock markets, in which case the malls
will be delivered with a proportional share of the planned deliveries given as:
qgf ,t =
q f ,t
q˜ f ,t
· q˜gf ,t , (2.16)
where qgf ,t is the delivery of firm f to the mall g, q f ,t is the total produced quantity of firm f at
time t, q˜gf ,t is the planed delivery of firm f to the mall g and q˜ f ,t is the total planed delivery of
firm f at time t which is given as:
q˜ f ,t =
N
∑
g=1
q˜gf ,t , (2.17)
where N is the number of countries in which the firm f is going to deliver its products. All
products are delivered to the malls without additional cost. In general, we assume frictionless
consumption goods market, i.e. there are neither transaction costs nor trade barriers.
Firms record all transactions on their balance sheets ensuring the stock and flow consistency
of the model. At the end of the month, they also calculate income statements and pay dividends
if the net profit is positive. The following subsection presents the behaviors and interactions of
households.
2.3.3 Households
Households are simultaneously taking the roles of workers, consumers, and financial market
traders. Each household is endowed with a general skill level which represents the general
education degree that is exogenously given and it is constant. We denote the education degree
with edu such that edu ∈ [1,5], where 1 stands for the lowest while 5 reflects the highest
education level. Households are also endowed with the specific skill level denoted as s, which
is the function of their general education degree and employer’s productivity given as:
sh,t+1 =
 sh,t +(γ f ,t − sh,t) ·ζ (eduh) i f γ f ,t > sh,tsh,t otherwise , (2.18)
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where sh,t is current household’s specific skill level, γ f ,t is the productivity of employer f , and
ζ (eduh) is the adjustment function which is increasing in the education level edu. Therefore,
working in a more productive company (or a country) households update their specific skills,
while in the case of unemployment or employment in a low productive company (or a country)
the households never lose their specific skills, thus there is no forgetting effect.
Labor market
Each household can offer one unit of labor per month. The supply of labor is inelastic, given
that wage offer w is equal or higher than households’ reservation wage w¯. The reservation
wage is set to the latest received salary payment once households lose their jobs. However,
it decreases during the unemployment period by the constant daily rate δw up to the level of
the unemployment benefit assumed that the unemployed households are looking for new jobs
every day.
On the international labor market firms and the government post vacancies that are available
to all households in the union. Each company determines wage offers for each education degree
such that it is an increasing function of edu, while the government defines an identical public
wage for all general skill levels. The market is modeled with frictions. First of all, households
do not have perfect information about job offers on the market since they observe only a subset
of all posted vacancies. Furthermore, we assume mobility frictions which are the results of
households’ mobility aversion and other barriers to the labor movement such as geographical
distance, migration costs, housing shortages, etc. The mobility friction is captured by monetary
costs that households add to their reservation wage to compensate the unwillingness of moving
and other mobility barriers. Therefore, the reservation wage is always adjusted for the mobility
friction rate ρ in the case of a job offer from abroad. The job acceptance rule on the labor
market is given as: w f ,edu,t >= w¯h,edu,t i f homecountryw f ,edu,t >= w¯h,edu,t · (1+ρ) i f abroad, (2.19)
where all households reside in their home countries at time t = 0. Given the role, we assume
that households strictly prefer to live in their home countries since they always account for the
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mobility cost if job offers are from abroad. For instance, if a household from the country of
origin A moves to the state B consequently becomes the resident of the country B. However, if
she loses her job, she still stays in the country B receiving the unemployment benefit and the
transfer payment from the government of the country B. On the job market, she always takes
into account the mobility costs for the job offers from all countries but the country of origin A.
Income and payments
Total household’s monthly gross income yh consists of salaries or unemployment benefits,
dividend payments, bond coupon payments and government transfers given as:
yh =
 wh+ yGT g+∑g nB
g
h · cBg+∑e neh ·de i f employed
uh+ yGT g+∑g nB
g
h · cBg+∑e neh ·de i f unemployed
, (2.20)
where wh is monthly salary; uh is the monthly unemployment benefit payment; yGT g is the
government lump-sum transfer payment; nB
g
h is the number of bonds from country g that is
owned by household h implying that households can buy bonds from different countries on
the international financial market; cBg is the bond coupon of bond issued by country g hence,
∑g nB
g
h ·cBg denotes the sum of all bond coupon revenues by household h; e stands for the equity
share issuer that can be a firm, a commercial bank or the physical capital producer; neh is the
number of equities held by the household h, and de is the dividend payment per equity paid by
the equity issuer, thus ∑e neh ·de is the sum of all dividend revenues by the household h.
The international financial market allows households to buy and sell the shares of all enter-
prises and the government bonds of all states within the union no matter in which country they
reside or from where they are coming. However, the government g only pays unemployment
benefits and transfers to its residents regardless their nationality. For example, if a foreigner
loses her job in the foreign country, she will still stay there and receive unemployment benefit
and government transfers. In general, households migrate only in the case of accepting a new
job in another country. The transfer payments and unemployment benefits are endogenously
determined and depend on the economic conditions in the country. While the transfers are
calculated as the 50% of average wage in the economy, unemployment benefits are given as
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the maximum of the mean salary and last household’s wage, increasing the income for those
whose salary was below the average in the country.
Households pay income tax and capital tax on their gross earnings. The total tax payment
mτ of the households h is given as:
mτh = τw ·wh+ τc ·∑
e
neh ·de, (2.21)
where τw is the income tax rate and τc is the capital tax rate. All taxes are paid to the gov-
ernment of the country of residence no matter if households are domestic or foreigners. As a
result, households’ monthly net income yNET h is given as:
yNET h = yh−mτh. (2.22)
Each household makes the decision how to allocate its disposable income. It can either con-
sume, invest in the financial market or retain the part of the revenue on the payment account
without earning any interests. In the following subsection, we present households’ consump-
tion and investment-saving decisions.
Consumption choice
Consumption-saving decision is modeled according to the theory of Buffer-stock saving be-
havior (Carroll, 2001; Deaton, 1992), which states that households consumption depends on a
precautionary saving motive determined by the target level of wealth to income ratio ω¯ 8. For
example, consider a household h receiving a gross money wage wh and having the disposable
income yNET h. Consider also the financial wealth Wh of the household h which includes its
asset portfolio valued at the most recent market prices, as well as liquidity on its payment ac-
count Mh. Following the buffer stock theory of consumption, if Mh > 0 then the household sets
the consumption budgetBh in the following month as:
Bh = ¯yNET h+φ
c · (Wh− ω¯ · ¯yNET h), (2.23)
8The wealth to income ratio is given as ωh = Wh¯yNET h , where Wh is the total wealth of household h, and ¯yNET h is
the quarterly average net income of the household h. The target level of wealth to income ratio ω¯ is constant and
set to the ratio of the initialized wealth to the wage reservation value.
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where ¯yNET h is the quarterly average net income, φ
c is the constant Carrol consumption param-
eter which sets the speed of the budget adjustment, and ω¯ is the target wealth to income ratio.
However, the planed consumption budget has a floor limit to ensure the minimum monthly
consumption of households. Moreover, if households are not liquid, i.e. Mh < 0, then they also
sets the consumption budget to its minimum level such as:
Bh = 0.5 · yNET h. (2.24)
The rationale of the rule is as follows: if the present wealth to income ratio is higher than
the target one, i.e., Wh/ ¯yNET h > ω¯ , then a households h spends more on its consumption in the
following months in order to decrease its wealth and return to the target wealth to income ratio.
Therefore households tend to smooth their consumption to the level that is defined by the target
wealth to income ratio.
Households visit their local mall in the country of residence once per week. They define
their weekly consumption budgets dividing the budgetBh on four equal parts. The purchasing
decision mechanism assumes the bounded rational behavior of households, and it is designed
as follows: households randomly select a basket of products and attach purchasing probabilities
to each visible choice. Since all the products are homogeneous, the purchasing probabilities
depend solely on prices such that: the probability of choosing a product is higher if the price
is lower. Households then rank the basket of goods according to the purchasing probabilities
and aim to spend the entire weekly budget. They buy as much as possible of the first two
listed products rolling over the remaining budget to the following weeks if any. The remaining
consumption budget of the last purchasing week is retained in the payment account and used
for the consumption-saving in the next month. The following subsection presents households’
investment decision on the financial market.
Investment-saving decision
A part of the disposable income that households do not consume, they either invest in the
financial market or retain on their payment accounts without earning any interests. House-
holds invest on the financial market buying government bonds and tradable shares issued either
36
by firms or banks. Note that households also hold the shares of physical capital producers;
however, they are not tradable and the capital producers do not issue new equity stocks. The
households portfolio allocation is modeled according to the preference structure based on a key
prospect theory insight, i.e., the myopic loss aversion, which depends on the limited foresight
capabilities characterizing humans when forming beliefs about financial returns. Benartzi and
Thaler (1995) showed that loss aversion combined with mental accounting, i.e., frequent eval-
uation of portfolio, can explain the equity premium puzzle. That combination has been dubbed
myopic loss aversion. In practice, each household forms beliefs about future asset returns
considering its forward and backward horizons. The main idea is that households are able to
foresee the trend of assets only for a short interval, no matter if they plan to hold their assets for
a longer period. We distinguish the three stylized behavior in the beliefs formation: random,
chartist and fundamental. Therefore, expected return Et [Ret+1] for each stock issued by the
e-th enterprise, are given by a linear combination of the three terms: expected random return
Et [RRet+1], expected average past return - chartist return Et [RCet+1], and expected fundamental
return Et [RF et+1]. Using the expected returns households determine their utilities for investing
in each stock employing a risk averse utility function. The utilities are then normalized together
with the risk-free bank’s interest rate and mapped into assets weights using a linear transfor-
mation. Once the assets weights are available, the households can build their desired portfolio
and make buying or selling orders. All the orders are submitted to the clearing house which
collects them together determining the clearing price for each asset. For the details about the
financial market mechanism see Benartzi and Thaler (1995) and Raberto et al. (2008).
The number of daily participants on the financial market is uncertain. While the govern-
ments and firms attend the market every time they need to raise new liquidity, the number of
households is determined by the daily participation rate as well as households’ wealth. Every
day a randomly chosen subset of household is assigned to be active as traders on the financial
market. Their assignment is based on a daily participation rate that is set to the 10% of the total
population. However, only those that have enough cash finally take part in the trading implying
that households do not (fire) sell their assets in the case of limited liquidity.
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2.3.4 The banking sector
The commercial bank offers basic checking accounts to depositors paying no interests on the
balance. The depositors of the bank in the country g are firms, the physical capital producer,
and households that reside in the state g. If a household h moves to another country she closes
her current payment account and transfers the money to the newly open bank account in another
union country without any cross-border barrier. The bank supplies the medium term loans to
the private sector (firms) and charges the risk-based interest rate. It demands the liquidity
from the central bank and pays the referent interest rate r on the central bank debt (see the
graphical presentation of banks’ balance sheet in the table A.1 in the appendix for details). The
bank redistributes profits to its shareholders in terms of the dividend payments following the
monetary policy regulation which will be explained in this section below. In the following, we
present the credit allocation role and monetary policy regulations used in the banking sector.
The bank provides new loans to firms if the risk-reward profiles of the loans are acceptable.
The reward is the interest paid by the borrowers while the risk is defined as the likelihood
of borrowers’ default. The bank uses the following likelihood function P(.) to access the
probability of default:
P(LR f ,t) = ab · (LR f ,t)κb , (2.25)
where LR f ,t =
D f ,t
A f ,t
is the leverage ratio of firm f at time t calculated as the current debt to as-
sets ratio. Borrower’s probability of default is computed along the lines of the Moody’s KMV
model (Saunders and Allen, 2010), where the rationale is that the likelihood of the default
increases in the debt to total assets ratio. The parameters ab and κb are set to 2.5 and 3 re-
spectively, thus the particular cubic function is an approximation of the Basel II internal ratings
approach as it is shown in Yeh et al. (2009).
Given the loan request ˜`f ,t by a firm f at time t, the bank calculates the probability P(.) that
the firm will default taking into account the augmented amount of debt and assets i.e., the new
leverage level such as:
LRnewf ,t =
D f ,t + ˜`f ,t
A f ,t + ˜`f ,t
, (2.26)
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hence, using the equation (2.25) the bank calculates the probability of the default P(LRnewf ,t ) for
the given new loan amount ˜`f ,t . The bank is a price setter on the credit market. It sets the
risk-based interest for each requested loan taking into account the credit worthiness of firms
such as:
r fb,t = rg,t +P(LR
new
f ,t )b,t ·σb, (2.27)
where rg is the base interest rate set by the Central Bank in the country g at time t, and
P(LRnewf )b ·σb is the risk spread determined by firm’s credit risk P(LRnewf ,t ) at time t and the
parameter σb ∈ [0,1] which sets the spread sensitivity to the credit worthiness of the firms.
The bank is allowed to lend money only if it fulfills the regulatory capital requirement. The
regulation is inspired by Basel II accords and states that the bank must hold a minimum percent-
age of the risk-weighted assets portfolio in the form of equity capital as a buffer for possible
loan write-offs and equity losses. We denote this minimum percentage as ψ ∈ [0,100] and
we call it the capital requirement. The risk-weighted assets portfolio (total value at risk) is
calculated as a sum of all loans weighted by the probability of firms’ default given as:
A¯b,t =∑
f
P(LR f ,t)b,t ·L fb,t , (2.28)
where L fb,t is the total loan that is given to the firm f by the bank b. Nevertheless, in the case
of the one representative commercial bank, the total value at risk represents the systemic risk
in the economy. Therefore, taking into account the capital requirement regulation the credit
allocation rule is given as:
` fb,t =

˜`f ,t if ψ ·Eb,t ≥ A¯b,t +P(LRnewf ,t ) · ˜`f ,t ,
ψ·Eb,t−A¯b,t
P(LRnewf ,t )
if A¯b,t +P(LRnewf ,t ) · ˜`f ,t > ψ ·Eb,t > A¯b,t ,
0 if A¯b,t ≥ ψ ·Eb,t .
(2.29)
In particular, the equations (2.29) states that the bank b at time t can grant the requested amount
of loan ˆ`f ,t only if it does not push A¯b,t above the Basel II threshold; otherwise it either provides
the reduced amount of credits or does not lend at all.
Granting the new loan ` fb,t to the firm f at time t inflates the banking system since it generates
new bank assets and new deposits at the same time. Hence this process is called endogenous
money creation.
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The bank further collects the interests on loans, pays the capital tax to the government which
is the only cost for the bank and pays dividends out of its net profit. The dividend payments are
determined following the capital accumulation rule. The rule enables the self-recapitalization
of the banking system and it is the only recapitalization mechanism since the bank does not
have access to external funds, i.e., neither issues new equity shares nor corporate bonds. Note
that additional central bank debt increases liquidity but not the capital base (equity) - see the
table A.1 in the appendix. The bank determines the total dividend payments as:
db,t = η(ψ,Eb,t , A¯b,t) ·Net Pro f it (2.30)
where η(ψ,Eb,t , A¯b,t) is the dividend rate given in the form of a step function of capital re-
quirement, net worth and the value at risk on the interval [0,1]. For instance, the bank sets
the dividend rate η(.) = 1 if ψ·Eb,tA¯b,t > 2, which means that if the capital buffer ψ ·Eb,t is more
than twice as the total value at risk A¯b,t , the bank redistributes all its net profit to the sharehold-
ers without accumulating capital. The dividend rate decreases and consequently the capital
accumulation increases when the capital buffer to total value at risk ratio becomes smaller.
2.3.5 The union central bank and the central banks
Mimicking the Eurosystem, the central bank offers the commercial banks and the govern-
ment two standing facilities: 1) Marginal lending facility to obtain overnight liquidity from the
central bank paying the facility rate; and 2) Deposit facility to make overnight deposits with
the central bank without earning any interest on the balance. The central bank provides uncon-
ditional infinite standing facilities and sets the marginal lending facility rate for all borrowings
as a part of its monetary policy. The rate is denoted as rg, and at the same time represents the
referent interest rate in the country g.
The central bank sets the monetary policy quarterly defining the referent interest rate rg
and the capital requirement ψg explained in the previous section. However, in the case of the
monetary union, the monetary policy is set by the Union Central Bank (UCB) such that ru and
ψu apply to all countries in the union.
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The UCB sets the interest rate ru following the Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993b):
ru = NFR+ p¯i+ ι · (p¯i− p˜i)+κ · (υ˜− υ¯), (2.31)
where NFR is a Natural Fund Rate, p¯i and υ¯ are the average inflation and unemployment rates
among all countries in the union respectively; p˜i is the inflation target announced by the UCB
or the central banks; υ˜ is the natural unemployment rate; ι and κ are positive parameters
which reveal the trade-off between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing the welfare-relevant
output gap. In the current study we set κ = 0 assuming the "divine coincidence", i.e., that
stabilizing inflation is equivalent to stabilizing the welfare-relevant output gap (see Blanchard
and Gali (2005) for details). Note that the central bank in the country out of the union sets
the country-specific reference interest rate rg following the same rule presented in the equation
(2.31), however using p¯i = pig as well as υ¯ = υg. The capital requirement is set as a constant
for simplicity as: ψu = ψg = ψ .
2.3.6 The government
The government hires workers and pays public wages W , creates fiscal policy and redis-
tributes income. Public employees do nothing and receive a monthly salary that is yearly
aligned to the average wage in the economy. However, the public wage may increase on a
monthly basis depending on the current demand and supply on the labor market. For exam-
ple, if the government requires public workers when there is no available labor force on the
market it will increase the public wage offer to enhance its competitiveness. Nevertheless,
public salary can also be reduced due to government’s austerity policy as well as due to the
yearly adjustment to the average wage level in the state. Each country has a number of public
employees nG which is a fraction ν of the total number of households N. This fraction ν is
set to 0.2 and it is constant. Therefore, if the total population of the country does not change,
also the number of public employees does not change (nG = νN). The government also pays
unemployment benefits UB and provides lump-sum transfer GT , to all residents. Hence the
public expenditures are given as:
Gg =Wg+UBg+GTg. (2.32)
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Public transfers (GT ) are an amount of money proportional to the total labor income that the
government redistributes to the households, and they are intended to proxy the welfare system
of western economies. In the model, the government does not buy any goods directly from firms
but always acts on aggregate demand with the intermediation of households, i.e., controlling
the monetary transfers to households, which is, in turn, reflected on their demand for goods.
This modeling assumption is not only common in the agent-based related literature but also
can be supported by empirical evidence. Regarding theoretical studies, Dosi et al. (2015, 2013,
2010) assume that the government pays a subsidy to unemployed workers, that is a fraction of
the current market wage. Further, the model developed by the Bielefeld group is very similar
to ours concerning public spending (see Dawid and Neugart, 2011; Dawid et al., 2014). While
the recent work of the Ancona group assumes that: Government public expenditure takes the
form of a lump-sum transfer which is equally distributed among households, thus providing
additional purchasing power (see Caiani et al., 2016). Concerning empirical evidence, the
government expenses in the US9 show that in the last years the spending on human resources
has been around 73%, that added to the national defense gives around a 90% of the total public
spending. Summing the net interest payments, they go up to 95%. Therefore, although we
do not claim that the direct consumption of the government is not worth to be considered, for
the time being, we simplify the government mechanism assuming the expenditures given in
equation 2.32.
The government plans a yearly budget, taking into account expected income and expendi-
tures. It generates revenue collecting taxes and raising new debt, i.e., issuing new perpetual
bonds GBD and taking new loans GL. The tax income is strictly preferred to the debt since
it is for free. Nevertheless, issuing new bonds is strictly preferred to raising new loans since
bond coupons are with fixed interest rate while loans account for the variable reference interest
rate and it is ambiguous. Therefore, if the planned budget balance is positive, the government
first repays its loans, and the rest of the money keeps on its payment account without earning
any interests on the balance. Otherwise, the government targets a number of bonds that will
be issued to cover the planned deficit and to convert its debt loan into bonds. Bonds, with a
9Source: www.whitehouse.gov, in particular in Table 3.1—OUTLAYS BY SUPERFUNCTION AND FUNC-
TION of the document https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/budget/fy2018/hist.pdf
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fixed bond coupon rate, are sold in the financial market at a preferential price which is lower
than the current bond price. If the government does not manage to sell bonds on the market, it
asks new loans which are provided as the marginal lending facility by the central bank. Total
sovereign debt is calculated as SD = GBD+GL, where GBD is the total issued bonds evalu-
ated at face value and GL is the total lending facility with the central bank. The government
also has financial expenditures which are presented as bond coupon payments BCP and total
interest payments on loans LIP. Therefore the total government spending is given as:
T GEg = Gg+BCPg+LIPg. (2.33)
The government uses the level of public expenditures G to create its fiscal policy, while
the tax rates are assumed to be fixed and equal in all countries. Fiscal policy is a function of
sovereign debt to GDP ratio. Thus, depending on the level of the ratio the government creates
either expansionary or contractionary fiscal policy. The policy rule states that if sovereign
debt reaches its critical level, that is higher than yearly GDP, the government is compelled to
apply austerity measures reducing the public expenditures G by the annual rate of 5%, which
is seen as a contractionary fiscal policy. If the total sovereign debt is in between the interval
60%− 100% of yearly GDP, the public expenditures stay unchanged. Finally, if the total
sovereign debt is less than the 60% of yearly GDP the government applies expansionary fiscal
policy increasing the public expenditures by the annual rate of 5%.
Governments of countries belonging to a union face additional decisions related to the mi-
gration flows which can raise or decrease the population of the country. It is knows that gov-
ernments can show rigidities when they have to downsize the public sector, and we take into
account this specific factor in the model. We introduce a parameter χ which accounts for the
rigidities of the government when adapting the number of public employees (nG) to the total
population N. Therefore, a country could face an increase or a decrease in its population and
a gap between the target level of public employees and its current level (∆nG = nG−νN). If
∆nG is positive it means that there is an excess of public employees and the government has
to fire them. The quantity that is fired monthly by the government is χ ·∆nG. So, if χ = 0 the
government is completely rigid and never fires public employees, while if χ = 1 the govern-
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ment immediately fires all the public employees in excess. The values in between account for
different scales of rigidity in the public sector. It is worth noting that, after a sufficient period
of time (or asymptotically), if χ 6= 1, the level of public employees should converge to the
target one. On the other hand we do not suppose any exogenous rigidity when ∆nG is negative.
In this case the government tries to hire the needed workers in the labor market; nevertheless,
rigidities could be endogenous because the government could be rationed.
2.3.7 The fiscal pool
In the case of countries belonging to a union, we design a fiscal instrument that we call “fiscal
pool” with the aim to create a simple integrated fiscal system within the union. The fiscal pool
mechanism works as follows.
Every country that runs a budget surplus in any given year, has to deposit a fraction of this
surplus to a “fiscal pool” account by the union central bank (UCB). The UCB has been chosen
just for technical reasons, because it is the only super-national agent in the system. This choice
has no particular political meaning, in the sense that we do not suggest that the UCB should
keep the fiscal pool money, but it could also be another ad-hoc institution. When a country of
the union needs to finance its budget deficit, it can ask money to the fiscal pool. In this way, the
country does not have to issue new bond, raising debt. The money taken from the fiscal pool
should not be repaid, but every country has the obligation to contribute to the fiscal pool when
running public surplus. If the total amount of “fiscal pool” money requested is higher than the
available one, each country will be rationed according to its size and the money requested.
In the following sections we introduce the computational experiments as well as analyze and
discuss the results in details.
2.4 Results
In this section, we present the results of computational experiments, which are designed to
study the macroeconomic implication of forming a union of countries. We aim at understanding
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when it is convenient for two countries to join a union where consumption goods can be sold
in an international goods market, workers can be hired in an international labor market, and
stocks and bonds can be traded in an international financial market. To reach this goal, we
design a set of experiments with different scenarios that will be explained in the next section.
2.4.1 Computational experiments (simulations)
The computational experiments presented in this work are always designed with four coun-
tries. Two of them belong to a monetary union, and two of them are completely isolated. The
general methodology of our work is to compare the performance and/or characteristics of the
countries in the union with the performance and/or characteristics of the countries out of the
union. This procedure, which uses to some extent the isolated countries as control groups,
allows us to understand which are the particular advantages or drawbacks of joining a union.
We present three distinct computational experiments.
In the first one (section 2.4.3), the four countries are all identical at the beginning, being
the only difference the fact to belong to a union or not. Therefore, we have two countries that
belong to a union and two countries that are isolated. The union is a monetary union, where
the central bank sets a common monetary policy, and it is characterized by a frictionless in-
ternational goods market, i.e., households can buy products from both countries without any
additional cost, and they are indifferent. The union shares a common financial market where
households can buy assets from each country. We study different scenarios concerning house-
holds’ mobility, letting the mobility frictions (represented by the parameter ρ of equation 2.19)
vary between a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 1.8 with a 0.2 step. When ρ = 0 households
are completely indifferent between working at home or abroad, while when ρ = 1.8 they have
a strong preference for working at home. In the middle, we have intermediate cases. We also
differentiate two cases, concerning the rigidity of the public sector. In the first case, we sup-
pose a total rigidity of the public sector, which never fires or hires new public employees, thus
keeping the number of public workers constant over time. In the second case, we suppose a
low rigidity of the public sector which adapts the number of public employees to the current
population. This two modes are represented by the parameter χ introduced in section 2.3.6,
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which assumes the value of χ = 0 and χ = 0.5, respectively. Thus, in this first experiment, we
study 20 (10×2) scenarios.
The second experiment (section 2.4.4) is similar to the first one, but we introduce a tech-
nology difference between the two countries of the union. Therefore, the configuration of
this second experiment considers two countries in the union, which differ only in the level of
technology γg (see equation 2.4), and two additional countries which are identical to the two
countries in the union, but isolated. This technological gap between the two countries remains
constant over all the studied scenarios. In the introduction of the paper, we motivated the ratio-
nale for this choice. In the country with higher technology, γH is fixed for every scenario to a
value of 3, while in the country with lower technology, γL increases over the different scenarios,
from a value of γL = 1.5 to a value of γL = 2.9 with a 0.2 step. Thus, we consider eight levels
of the technology gap between the high-tech country and the low-tech country of the union.
Concerning the mobility frictions, we study a range of ρ from 0 to 1, with 0.1 step. Thus, in
this second experiment, we study 88 (11×8) scenarios.
The third experiment (section 2.4.5) introduces a fiscal policy set-up (called “fiscal pool”)
where we try to address the inequality problems emerged in the second experiment (see section
2.4.4) by creating a common pool of liquidity that comes from the surplus of each country of
the union and can be redistributed in the case a country has to finance its budget deficit. The
mechanism has been introduced and explained in details in the section 2.3.7. We, therefore,
compare the performance of the countries in the union with or without the activation of the
“fiscal pool” device.
The general setup of the model, concerning the number and types of agents and regions,
includes four regions where each region hosts 750 households, 16 firms, a single physical
capital producer, one commercial bank, the central bank and the government. For each scenario
presented above, we ran 30 independent Monte Carlo seeds, where each seed consists of 24.000
iterations which in our model stands for 1.200 months or 100 years. In the following, we
present the statistical measures that we use and provide the results.
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2.4.2 Statistical measures
To analyze the outcome of the computational experiments, we make use of several statistical
measures, which allow us to explore the differences between the union and the separate coun-
tries, and also within the countries belonging to the same union. The simulations have been
run for a time span T . We present here a list of the main measures that will be used to show
and comment results of the next section.
The average over seeds
Y t =
1
|S|∑s∈S
Y st (2.34)
where Y can be any economic indicator generated by the simulations, and S is the set of
seeds used in the computational experiment. Note that |S| indicates the cardinality of the set,
which here coincides with the number of elements, i.e., months.
The mean of the sum

Σs12(Y ) =
1
|T| ∑
t∈T
(Y s1,t +Y
s
2,t)
∆Σs12,34(Y ) = Σ
s
12(Y )−Σs34(Y )
(2.35)
Given one random seed s, the statistical measure Σs12(Y ) represents the average value in the
time subset T ⊂ T of the sum of the observed economic indicator Y in the two considered
countries (1 and 2). We often use this measure to compare the value of an economic indicator
in the union with the value of the same indicator in the isolated countries, therefore computing
the difference Σs12,34(Y ). In general countries, 1 and 2 are in the union, while 3 and 4 are the
isolated ones. If Y is real GDP, then Σs12(Y ) will be the average real GDP level in the union
(if countries 1 and 2 belong to the union), and ∆Σ12,34(Y ) will be the difference between the
average real GDP level of the union and the average of the sum of real GDP of the isolated
countries.
For the sake of clarity, sometimes we use the relative difference instead of the difference,
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defined as [Σs12(Y )−Σs34(Y )]/Σs34(Y ). In this way, the gap between the union and the isolated
countries is in relative terms (given in percentage) and can be grasped at first sight.
The mean of the difference

Ψs12(Y ) =
1
|T| ∑
t∈T
(Y s1,t −Y s2,t)
∆Ψs12,34(Y ) =Ψ
s
12(Y )−Ψs34(Y )
(2.36)
Given one random seed, the statistical measure Ψs12(Y ) represents the average value in the
time subset T of the difference of the observed economic indicator Y between the two con-
sidered countries (1 and 2). If the setting is entirely symmetric, i.e., if all the countries are
identical at the beginning, we expect that the mean value of this indicator across seeds should
be around zero.
Polarization, or local divergence

ϒs12(Y ) =
1
|T| ∑
t∈T
|Y s1,t −Y s2,t |
∆ϒs12,34(Y ) = ϒ
s
12(Y )−ϒs34(Y )
(2.37)
Given one random seed, the statistical measure ϒs12(Y ) captures the divergence of two coun-
tries 1 and 2 concerning the observed indicator Y . It is computed as the average value in the
time subset T of the absolute difference of the observed economic indicator Y between the
two considered countries (1 and 2). When the local divergence ϒs12(Y ) is high, it means that
the values of Y in the two countries are different and that the countries tend to “diverge”. In
general, we consider the difference ∆ϒs12,34(Y ) to compare the local divergence of countries in
the union with a reference divergence, which is usually the one observed in the case of isolated
countries, e.g., 3 and 4.
We designed our simulations to study two different regimes, the first one is a capital accumu-
lation regime, while the second is a close-to-steady-state capital per capita regime (of course,
being an endogenous business cycles model, we can have fluctuations, and even crises, also
in the close-to-steady-state regime). In this way, we can analyze two important conditions of
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the economy, and we can try to disentangle the effects of the proposed scenarios on the two
economic regimes. As we will show in this section, the first phase of capital accumulation
is generally characterized by far from the equilibrium and more fragile economies, where en-
dogenous shocks can violently propagate across the markets. On the other hand, the second
phase is more stable but always characterized by business cycles that can become turbulent
in some cases. Figures 2.1a and 2.1b show the average time series of capital per capita and
real GDP for a representative scenario (government flexibility χ = 0.5 and mobility friction
ρ = 1.4). These figures reveal the two regimes of the economies.
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Figure 2.1: Average time series; the statistical measure Y t given in equation 2.34. A scenario with government flexibility χ = 0.5
and mobility friction ρ = 1.4. Panel 2.1a presents the real capital stock per capita; panel 2.1b depicts real GDP. Time series on
both panels exhibit two regimes. The regime in the period of first 400 months is characterized by the capital accumulation and
huge fluctuation in real GDP, while in the period after 400 months the economy enters a stable path.
2.4.3 Identical countries
Result 1.I The union clearly outperforms the isolated/independent countries.
In general, the economic performance of the two countries in the union is better than the perfor-
mance of two separate countries. Figure 2.2 presents a direct comparison between the perfor-
mance of the union and the aggregate performance of the isolated countries, for each considered
scenario. In particular, it plots the statistical measure ∆Σs12,34(Y ) described in equation 2.35,
representing the difference of economic indicators in the union and the two countries out of the
union.
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(c) Real investments.
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(d) Real consumption.
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(e) Real capital stocks.
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(f) Unemployment rate.
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(g) Active firms.
Figure 2.2: The differences between the union and the countries out of the union; the statistical measure ∆Σs12,34(Y ) given in
equation 2.35. Panels a, b, c, d, e, and g show relative differences, while panel f shows differences. C1&C2 denotes countries in
the union, while C3&C4 denotes closed economies. X-axis indicates scenarios with respect to government flexibility χ . Colors
indicate scenarios with respect to mobility friction ρ . The solid lines in the bars represent median while dots denote mean.
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(c) Unemployment rate.
Figure 2.3: Average time series; the statistical measure Y t given in equation 2.34. A scenario with government flexibility χ = 0.5
and mobility friction ρ = 0.8. C1 and C2 are countries in the union, whereas C3 and C4 are independent countries.
Real GDP, real GDP per capita, real investments, real consumption, capital stock, the unem-
ployment rate, and the number of active firms are presented on figure 2.2. The overall picture
shows that the economic activity is significantly higher in the case of the union (around 10%-
20% higher), and that, therefore, belonging to a union constitutes a considerable value-added
for two identical countries. This outcome is explained by the presence of international goods
and labor markets in the union. In particular, the international goods market allows for a better
allocation of products across the two countries, where a potential decrease in the local demand
is compensated by the demand of the foreign country, leading to a more stable path. To un-
derstand this mechanism, we show in figure 2.3 some exemplary times series of one sample
scenario, i.e., with government flexibility χ = 0.5 and an intermediate mobility friction value
(ρ = 0.8), aggregated for all the 30 random seeds. The balance of payment, in figure 2.3a,
shows the continuous activity of import and export between the two countries of the union,
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which eases the sales of firms’ products. A similar dynamics characterizes the labor market,
where countries in the union count on a larger basin of workers, hiring foreigners if needed,
as shown in figure 2.3b, where foreigners are defined as citizens of country A in the union,
who emigrate to country B in the union. This flexibility leads to a lower, and more stable,
unemployment rate, as shown in the boxplots of figure 2.2f and in the aggregated time series
of figure 2.3c. To better characterize the situation, we remind here that the model exhibits en-
dogenous business cycles, as explained in Raberto et al. (2012); Cincotti et al. (2010), which
can show phase differences between countries. Therefore, the union configuration allows for a
more efficient economic adjustment in the cases of excess demand or supply in both the labor
and goods market, finally outperforming the configuration with isolated countries.
Figure 2.2g shows that in the union there is, on average, a higher number of active companies
with respect to the isolated countries (or a lower number of defaulted firms). This result applies
to every scenario and indicates a better stability of the economy of the union, due to the higher
efficiency of the goods and labor markets.
As a final remark, we mention that the performance of the union depends on the considered
scenario, as figure 2.2a, 2.2b, 2.2c, 2.2d, 2.2e clearly show. In particular, it seems that the
advantage of the union, with respect to the isolated countries, becomes weaker when mobility
frictions ρ are very low. This point will be addressed with more attention in Result 2.I.
Corollary 1.2.I Prices and money supply, both in nominal and real terms, are higher in the
union.
Prices, wages, and inflation tend to be higher in the case of countries in the union. Figure 2.4a
shows that the average nominal wage is around 50% higher in the union, while inflation (see
figure 2.4g) is also larger by approximately a percentage point. Real wage, in figure 2.4b, is
also higher in the union, by a 15% on average. Money supply (approximated by total deposits,
as there is no cash in the model), is higher in the union, both in nominal and real terms, as
shown in figures 2.4c and 2.4d.
These observed outcomes are strictly related with the one discussed in result 1.I. The higher
economic activity raises labor demand in the countries of the union, while lower unemploy-
ment rate forces firms to increase nominal wages. Prices, which are set by a mark-up rule, as
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(a) Wage level.
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(b) Real wage level.
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(c) Bank deposits.
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(d) Real bank deposits.
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(e) Total credit in the economy.
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(f) Total real credit in the economy.
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(g) Price growth.
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(h) Interest rate.
Figure 2.4: The differences between the union and the countries out of the union; the statistical measure ∆Σs12,34(Y ) given in
equation 2.35. Panels a-f show relative differences, while panels g and h show differences. C1&C2 denotes countries in the union,
while C3&C4 denotes closed economies. X-axis indicates scenarios with respect to government flexibility χ . Colors indicate
scenarios with respect to mobility friction ρ . The solid lines in the bars represent median while dots denote mean.
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described in equation 2.14, also increase, but less than wages because the other costs for firms
do not rise proportionally. From figure 2.2g, showing a lower bankruptcy rate in the union,
we can argue that the financial statement of firms in the union is more balanced and their unit
financing costs are lower. In this respect, it is very interesting to point out that, although the
total bank credit is higher in nominal terms in the union (see figure 2.4e), in real terms it is
lower (figure 2.4f). This probably means that firms in the union are more able to finance their
production plan with internal resources (we remind here that they follow the pecking order the-
ory) and do not need as much credit as firms in the isolated countries. This, of course, implies
also lower interest payment costs, and therefore, lower prices with respect to the paid wage.
Finally, the stronger economic activity of the union generates both more endogenous money
and more wealth, which is reflected in the level of real deposits in figure 2.4d.
Corollary 1.3.I The monetary policy in the union tends to overshoot inflation target.
Figure 2.5 presents the divergence in the price level between the two countries of the union
compared with the divergence for isolated countries. It is computed using the statistical mea-
sure described in equation 2.37. The figure shows that on average the price coordination is
much better in the union for every considered scenario, which is the consequence of the market
coordination in the union. However, although the coordination helps the union central bank
while setting a common interest rate for the two member countries, the asynchrony in the price
dynamics of the two countries of the union is still present, and it does not allow the union
central bank to reach the target inflation of 2%. Note that the monetary policy follows an
intermediate line, as described in equation 2.31. Inflation tends to be higher than the target,
because the interest rate is set considering an average inflation level, and thus it is less effective
in reducing prices in the country with higher inflation. Figure 2.6 shows that the average gap
between inflation and target inflation in the two union countries tends to be positive for most
scenarios, whereas figure 2.4h shows that the interest rate is on average higher in the union
with respect to the isolated countries.
Corollary 1.4.I The real sovereign debt of countries in the union is lower.
Figure 2.7a shows that the real sovereign debt of countries in the union is on average around
54
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Figure 2.5: The graph shows differences in the local divergence of the price levels of countries in the union C1&C2, and the
local divergence of the price levels of countries out of the union C3&C4. A statistical measure ∆ϒs12,34(Y ) given in equation 2.37.
X-axis indicates scenarios with respect to the values of government flexibility χ . Colors indicate scenarios with different values
of mobility frictions ρ which are given in the legend. The solid lines in the bars represent median while dots denote mean.
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Figure 2.6: Inflation deviation from the target. Left panel shows the inflation deviation from the target of the country in the union
C1, while right panel presents the inflation deviation from the target of the country in the union C2. X-axis indicates scenarios
with respect to the values of government flexibility χ . Colors indicate scenarios with different values of mobility frictions ρ which
are given in the legend. The solid lines in the bars represent median while dots denote mean.
20% lower with respect to countries out of the union. We remind here that the expenditures
of the government are public wages, public transfers (which are per capita transfers, equal
to a fraction of the average wage), unemployment benefits and bonds’ interest payment. We
show all the components of the government expenditure (see figures 2.7b, 2.7c, 2.7d and 2.7e),
to outline that the higher prosperity of the union countries allow the governments to transfer
more resources to the citizens (or to offer more services), but at the same time, the lower
unemployment in the union allows the government to reduce the expenses in unemployment
benefits and to finally accumulate less real debt, and bond’s interest payment.
Until this point we compared the countries belonging to the union with the isolated ones,
getting a clear indication of the better performance of the union’s countries. However, our
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(a) Real sovereign debt.
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(b) Real public wage payment.
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(c) Real bond interest payment.
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(d) Real government transfer payment.
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(e) Real unemployment benefit payment.
Figure 2.7: The relative differences between the union and the countries out of the union; the statistical measure ∆Σs12,34(Y ) given
in equation 2.35. C1&C2 denotes countries in the union, while C3&C4 denotes closed economies. X-axis indicates scenarios
with respect to government flexibility χ . Colors indicate scenarios with respect to mobility friction ρ . The solid lines in the bars
represent median while dots denote mean.
results also showed some differences among the proposed scenarios, which we didn’t take into
account so far. In the following, we analyze these differences.
Lemma 2.1.I As the two countries of the union are identical at the beginning; we do not
observe any systematic difference between them.
Before considering the effect of the proposed scenarios, we need to state that, on average, there
56
are no differences between the two countries in the union. This, of course, is a trivial result
but it is also an important validation check. It is trivial because the two countries are identical,
and therefore there is no reason why one of them should systematically perform better (or
different) than the other; on average, their behavior should be statistically identical. It is an
important check because it allows us to interpret and explain the following result Result 2.I.
To show that there is no systematic difference between the behavior of the two union countries,
we use the statistical measure of equation 2.36, computing the mean of the differences between
the two countries. Using GDP, in figure 2.8a, and the total number of households, in figure
2.8b, as examples, we observe that for every scenario there is no significant difference be-
tween the two countries of the union. We only observe a variable dispersion around the median.
We would like to point out here that Lemma 2.1.I just states that, on average, we don’t
observe any difference between countries, but still we can have cases where one country per-
forms better than the other. For instance, if for a particular random seed, country A of the union
performs better than country B, and for another random seed country B performs better than
country A, we will only observe a higher dispersion in the box-plot, but no difference in the
mean/median. Moreover, if country A performs better for half of the simulation and country B
performs better for the other half, on average we will observe the same performance, and the
box-plots would not reveal this difference at all.
However, as shown for example by Raberto et al. (2012) and Teglio et al. (2012), the Eu-
race model exhibits endogenous business cycles which could affect the economic dynamics of
the union’s countries differently. In other terms, we could think of endogenous idiosyncratic
shocks that affect each country, and that could potentially produce different effects, depending
on the scenario. For instance, a particular scenario could bring about a situation where one
country becomes systematically bigger than the other for some simulation runs or for specific
time intervals. Of course, being country A and country B identical at the beginning, there is no
reason to observe a general dominance of country A with respect to country B (or the other way
around), but we could observe that one of the two countries (no matter which) becomes bigger
than the other. To measure this divergence between countries we use the statistical measure
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(a) Real GDP
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Figure 2.8: The mean of differences of economic indicators between two countries; the statistical measure Ψs12(Y ) given in
equation 2.36. The left panel of the figure 2.8a shows the mean of difference of real GDP between countries C1 and C2 in the
union, while the right panel of the same figure indicates the mean of difference of real GDP between isolated countries C3 and
C4. The left panel of the figure 2.8b shows the mean of difference of the number of households between countries C1 and C2 in
the union, while the right panel of the same figure presents the mean of difference of the number of households between isolated
countries C3 and C4. X-axis indicates scenarios with respect to the values of government flexibility χ . Colors indicate scenarios
with different values of mobility frictions ρ which are given in the legend. The solid lines in the bars represent median while dots
denote mean.
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described in equation 2.37, which assesses if the two countries become polarized, concerning
the observed economic indicator Y .
Result 2.I When mobility frictions are low, the polarization between the two countries of the
union increases, and the economic performance of the union is negatively affected
From figure 2.9 we observe that the number of foreign workers in the union, defined as citizens
of country A of the union who emigrate to country B of the union (or vice-versa), is much
higher when the mobility frictions are low. Moreover, the divergence in the number of house-
holds between the two countries of the union is much higher, as figure 2.10a clearly shows.
It is worth noting again that figure 2.10a plots the statistical measure described in equation
2.37, which emphasizes the local dominance of one country with respect to the other one,
and which is very different from the average difference (equation 2.36) represented in figure
2.8b. Actually, the average difference is always around zero, given the perfect symmetry of the
experiment, while the local dominance depends strongly on the scenario.
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Figure 2.9: Number of foreigners. The differences between the union and the countries out of the union; the statistical measure
∆Σs12,34(Y ) given in equation 2.35. C1&C2 denotes countries in the union, while C3&C4 denotes closed economies. Note that the
sum of foreigners in countries C3&C4 is always zero since there is no labor flow between the isolated countries. X-axis indicates
scenarios with respect to government flexibility χ . Colors indicate scenarios with respect to mobility friction ρ . The solid lines in
the bars represent median while dots denote mean.
In the case of low mobility frictions, the wider gap in population between the two union
countries affects all the aggregate economic indicators like real GDP (figure 2.10b), real con-
sumption (figure 2.10c), or real banks’ deposits (figure 2.10d), which show the dominance of
one country with respect to the other one. At the same time, when the mobility frictions are
very low, we observe a worse performance of the whole union, as we can notice from the lower
59
ll
l
l
l
l l l l l
l
l
l
l
l l
l l l l
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
0
20
0
40
0
60
0
80
0
10
00
12
00
N
um
be
r o
f h
ou
se
ho
ld
s 
di
ffe
re
nc
e
Government flexibility
C1&C2 VS C3&C4
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
MF
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
(a) Number of households.
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(b) Real GDP.
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(c) Real Consumption.
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(d) Real bank deposits.
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(f) Real GDP per capita.
Figure 2.10: The implication of mobility frictions. Differences in polarization or local divergence in economic indicators between
the union and the control states; a statistical measure ∆ϒs12,34(Y ) given in equation 2.37. The graph shows differences in the local
divergence of economic indicators of countries in the union, associated with C1&C2, and the local divergence of economic indi-
cators of countries out of the union, associated with C3&C4. X-axis indicates scenarios with respect to the values of government
flexibility χ . Colors indicate scenarios with different values of mobility frictions ρ which are given in the legend. The solid lines
in the bars represent median while dots denote mean.
GDP and consumption in figures 2.2a, 2.2d. Summarizing, we observe that for low mobility
frictions the two countries of the union diverge and the economic performance of the union
declines.
We can explain these results by considering that the endogenous idiosyncratic shocks af-
fecting the economies, generate more or less immigration depending on the level of mobility
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frictions ρ . When frictions are low, workers tend to abandon their home country more easily,
and they have little incentive to go back, as equation 2.19 shows. In particular, as the simulation
starts from a far from equilibrium amount of capital per capita, at the beginning the economies
are more unstable and subject to stronger shocks and oscillations (as already shown in figures
2.1a and 2.1b). Therefore, it can happen that an economy incurs into a big economic recession
before the other one, and many of the households emigrate to the other country. Later, when
the economies get closer to a medium run equilibrium, business cycles are in general not so
strong to cause large workers flows, and the country that received more workers tends to remain
larger. On the other hand, when mobility frictions are higher, workers prefer to go back to their
countries of origin if the real wage difference is not too high, and we have a reverting mech-
anism that tends to equilibrate the number of workers in the two countries. This mechanism
can be observed in figure 2.11. The figure 2.11a shows that when mobility frictions are higher,
the initial flow of migrants tends to go back to the home country. While the figure 2.11b shows
that when there are no frictions, the initial migration of workers is more consistent, and the
final number of foreign workers stabilizes at a higher value. This difference in the number of
households drives therefore similar gaps in all the economic indicators that depend on workers.
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Figure 2.11: The number of foreigners. Average time series; the statistical measure Y t given in equation 2.34. The left panel
depicts the scenario with government flexibility χ = 0 and mobility friction ρ = 0.4, while the right panel shows the scenario with
government flexibility χ = 0 and mobility friction ρ = 0.
The weaker performance of the union in the case of low mobility frictions mainly depends
on the inefficient use of the capital stock between the two countries. As the model does
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not allow for capital stock displacement, the smaller country does not fully use its available
capital stock, while the larger country has an excess of households concerning the available
capital stock. The Union, in this case, reaches a sort of sub-optimal equilibrium where there
is one small country producing with an excess of capital and one big country producing with
an excess of workers. Figures 2.2e and 2.10 confirm our statement. The interesting point
about this situation is that both countries seem to reach a similar economic performance level,
which consolidates the sub-optimal equilibrium. In fact, the real wage, the GDP per capita,
and the unemployment rate do not show any polarization when the mobility frictions are low
(see figures 2.10e, 2.10f and 2.2f). This means that the two countries of the union (both
inefficient in exploiting production factors) reach a very similar economic state. In particular,
the undercapitalized big country is not able to accumulate more capital because it does not
face enough demand, which is satisfied by both countries. The small country, which has, of
course, a smaller but stable fraction of the market, undergoes a capital depreciation process,
and finally in the union the amount of capital for low mobility friction is quite lower, even
lower than in the isolated countries, as figure 2.2e clearly shows. This finally determines the
lower performance of the Union.
It is also worth noting that, when the government is flexible, there is more immigration because
countries do not keep a constant number of public workers and therefore the fired public em-
ployees are eligible to leave the country too, potentially increasing the migration flows. Figure
2.10a shows a larger gap in population when the government is more flexible.
2.4.4 Different countries
In this section we extend the previous analysis to a setting where the two countries of the
union have a different level of technology, implying a different productivity. The country with
the higher level of productivity (henceforth high-tech country) has a fixed technology level
γH (see equation 2.4 and the explanation below), which remains constant over all the studied
scenarios. The country with lower productivity has the fixed technology level, but it increases
over the different scenarios, from a value of γL = 1.5 to a value of γL = 2.9. Thus, we consider
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eight levels of productivity gap between the high-tech country and the low-tech country of
the union. In the following, we will call this difference both as a productivity gap and as a
technology gap, without distinction.
Figure 2.12 shows the real GDP in the four considered countries. At the top of the figure,
there are countries in the union, while at the bottom there are countries out of the union. On the
left side of the figure, there are high-tech countries, while on the right side there are low-tech
countries. Therefore, for instance, the high-tech country of the union is the sub-figure at the
top left corner. We will present in this section several figures sharing the same format of figure
2.12, but related to other economic indicators. For this reason, it is worth spending a few more
lines to comment its general characteristics.
Every one of the four sub-figures shows eighty-eight box-plots, corresponding to the eight
values of productivity γL, represented in the x axis, and the eleven values of mobility frictions
ρ , represented by a color code. The box-plots display the variation across the different seeds
s ∈ S of the average value of the considered economic indicator (real GDP in this specific case)
over a time span T⊂ T . In the case of figure 2.12, and in general, unless otherwise stated, T
is the second half of the simulation, i.e., the last 50 years.
We can observe very different patterns, by comparing the countries which are in and out of
the union. Let us examine them briefly. In the high-tech country out of the union, we do not
observe any significant variation for all the eighty-eight box-plots. This is due to the fact that
mobility does not affect countries out of the union, and that the technological level is constant
for the high-tech country. In the low-tech country out of the union, we naturally do not observe
any significant variation related to the mobility frictions, as there is no migration, but we see
jumps in the average level of production, generated by the different productivity scenario of the
low-tech country. Finally, in the countries of the union, we can observe patterns that depend
both on the mobility frictions and on the productivity gap.
Together with figure 2.12 we introduce also figure 2.13a, presenting the mean of the real
GDP sums Σs12(Y ), according to equation 2.35. The left side of 2.13a shows the total real GDP
in the union, whereas the right side shows the same indicator for the countries out of the union.
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Figure 2.12: Real GDP by countries. X-axis indicates scenarios with respect to the productivity level of the low-tech country γL.
Colors indicate scenarios with different values of mobility frictions ρ which are given in the legend. The solid lines in the bars
represent median while dots denote mean.
It is worth noting that, given the population in the union constant (and equal to the sum of the
households of the isolated countries), the real GDP per capita indicator is given by the real
GDP divided by the total number of households. Therefore, figure 2.13a could also represent
the GDP per capita pattern over the different scenarios.
Result 3.D The economic performance of the union is always better than the one of the iso-
lated/independent countries.
This result is very similar to Result 3.I, and it can be proven by a simple visual inspection of
figure 2.13a. If we consider aggregated economic indicators as the real GDP (or consumption,
or investments, or any other one), the performance of the union is always better. The expla-
nation of this result recalls the one used for Result 3.I, and it is based on the presence of a
common goods market which allows companies to easily sell their products, thus increasing
GDP. The common labor market can also help, but its role is more complex, and we need to
introduce several distinctions about the labor mobility issue later. In the case of countries with
different technologies, an additional reason for higher overall production in the union is that,
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(a) Real GDP. Mobility frictions in the color code.
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Figure 2.13: The average real GDP level in the union and isolated countries; the statistical measure Σs12(Y ) given in equation
2.35. The left panels show the average of the sum of real GDPs of the countries in the union C1 and C2; the right panels show the
average of the sum of real GDPs of the isolated countries C3 and C4. On the figure 2.13a, x-axis indicates scenarios with respect
to the productivity level of the low-tech country γL. Colors indicate scenarios with different values of mobility frictions ρ which
are given in the legend. On the figure 2.13b, x-axis indicates scenarios with respect to the values of mobility frictions ρ . Colors
indicate scenarios with different productivity levels of the low-tech country γL which are given in the legend. The solid lines in the
bars represent median while dots denote mean.
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whenever a household migrates from the low-tech country to the high-tech country, its produc-
tivity raises, along with the overall production in the union. And Result 4.D shows exactly that
net migration is always toward the high-tech country.
Result 4.D Net migration always flows toward the high-tech country, which becomes more
populated than the low-tech country.
Figure 2.14 proves the result.
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Figure 2.14: The number of households by countries. X-axis indicates scenarios with respect to the productivity level of the
low-tech country γL. Colors indicate scenarios with different values of mobility frictions ρ which are given in the legend. The
solid lines in the bars represent median while dots denote mean.
Corollary 4.1.D The high-tech country is performing better than the low-tech one, especially
when the productivity gap is large and when mobility frictions are small.
Figure 2.15 presents the difference between the real GDP of the high and low tech countries
in the union (along with the same plot about the isolated countries, on the right), according to
equation 2.36. It shows that the real GDP in the high tech country is almost always greater than
the one in the low-tech country, but the difference decreases both with a smaller productivity
gap and with larger mobility frictions. The reasons for the higher production in the high-tech
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Figure 2.15: The mean of differences of real GDP between two countries; the statistical measure Ψs12(Y ) given in equation 2.36.
The left panel shows the mean of difference of real GDP between countries C1 and C2 in the union, while the right panel indicates
the mean of difference of real GDP between isolated countries C3 and C4. X-axis indicates scenarios with respect to the different
productivity levels of the low-tech country γL. Colors indicate scenarios with different values of mobility frictions ρ which are
given in the legend. The solid lines in the bars represent median while dots denote mean.
country can be resumed by two factors: more productivity and more population, as stated in
result 4.D.
Result 5.D When the technology gap is large, workers mobility improves the overall eco-
nomic performance of the union. When the technology gap is small, workers mobility worsen
it.
Figure 2.13b and 2.13a contain the same information, presenting the variation of the real GDP
in the union with respect to mobility frictions and productivity gap with two different graphical
solutions. A visual inspection of the figures clearly demonstrates the result. When the technol-
ogy gap is shallow, the scenario tends to collapse to the two identical countries case, already
presented in the previous section. Therefore, the explanation for the second part of result 5.D,
i.e., when the technology gap is small, workers mobility worsen the performance of the union,
is analogous to the one of result 2.I. We remind it shortly here, by remarking that excessive
workers movement creates a polarized situation where the country with the excess of workers
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is not able to accumulate more capital because it does not attract sufficient demand to justify
new investments. The two countries are in a sort of inefficient but stable equilibrium and the
union’s performance is harmed.
However, in the first part of the result. i.e., when the technology gap is large, whether workers
mobility improves the economic performance of the union depends on the following argument:
if the productivity gap is sufficiently large, the massive inflow of workers in the more pro-
ductive high-tech country allows for a higher production of goods in the union, completely
offsetting any other effect, as the bad use of capital which is the argument of the case of a small
gap.
Until this point we analyzed the differences between the union and the two isolated countries,
considering the characteristics of the union as a whole. However, now we would like to extend
the analysis and to access the performance of each country. So, we study the differences
between similar countries in or out of the union, i.e., the differences between the two high-
tech countries (one in the union and the other out), or low-tech countries. This approach will
allow us to study under which conditions it is convenient for a high-tech (low-tech) country to
join the union. In this phase of the analysis, we will use mainly the statistical measure of eq.
2.36, considering the difference between the high-tech (low-tech) country in the union and the
high-tech (low-tech) out of the union. So, concerning equation 2.36, country 1 is the country
in the union while country 2 is the one out of the union. In particular, we want to investigate
how joining the union affects the per capita economic indicators, and therefore the welfare of
a country; real wage and GDP per capital are good indicators for our scope.
In order to gain some insight into the effects of joining the union for both the high-tech
and low tech countries, we draw special attention to figures 2.16a, 2.16b, 2.17a and 2.17b,
representing respectively, the differences (as in eq. 2.36) in real GDP, real GDP per capita, real
wage, and unemployment rate. These figures allow us to make some remarks.
Result 6.D Joining the union decreases the unemployment rate of both the high and low tech
countries, in almost every scenario. Two main reasons can explain this result. The first one,
and more important, is that the mobility of workers allows for a more efficient allocation of the
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(a) Real GDP.
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(b) Real GDP per capita.
Figure 2.16: The mean of differences of economic indicators between two countries; the statistical measure Ψs12(Y ) given in
equation 2.36. The left panel of the figure 2.16a shows the mean of difference of real GDP between high-tech countries, C1 in
the union and C3 out of the union, while the right panel of the same figure indicates the mean of difference of real GDP between
low-tech countries, C2 in the union and C4 out of the union. The left panel of the figure 2.16b shows the mean of difference of real
GDP per capita between high-tech countries, C1 in the union and C3 out of the union, while the right panel of the same figure
indicates the mean of difference of real GDP per capita between low-tech countries, C2 in the union and C4 out of the union.
X-axis indicates scenarios with respect to the productivity level of the low-tech country γL. Colors indicate scenarios with different
values of mobility frictions ρ which are given in the legend. The solid lines in the bars represent median while dots denote mean.
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(a) Real wage.
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(b) Unemployment rate.
Figure 2.17: The mean of differences of economic indicators between two countries; the statistical measure Ψs12(Y ) given in
equation 2.36. The left panel of the figure 2.17a shows the mean of difference of real wage between high-tech countries, C1 in
the union and C3 out of the union, while the right panel of the same figure indicates the mean of difference of real wage between
low-tech countries, C2 in the union and C4 out of the union. The left panel of the figure 2.17b shows the mean of difference of
the unemployment rate between high-tech countries, C1 in the union and C3 out of the union, while the right panel of the same
figure indicates the mean of difference of the unemployment rate between low-tech countries, C2 in the union and C4 out of the
union. X-axis indicates scenarios with respect to the productivity level of the low-tech country γL. Colors indicate scenarios with
different values of mobility frictions ρ which are given in the legend. The solid lines in the bars represent median while dots
denote mean.
70
labor force. We see in figure 2.17b that, especially in the most critical scenarios, i.e., when the
productivity gap is large, and the GDP per capita of the low-tech country is small (see figure
2.16b), joining the union leads to a lower unemployment rate in both countries. In the low-tech
country, in particular, we see how joining the union decreases the level of unemployment when
the productivity level is very low. This is of course due to the possibility to emigrate and find a
job in a stronger economy. The second reason is that the international goods market, implying
a better allocation of products among the union’s countries, generally enhance the economic
activity, as stated in Result 3.D, therefore creating more employment.
Result 7.D A lack of mobility frictions severely damages the welfare conditions of the low-
tech country in the union, especially in the case of large productivity gap. Joining the union
is not convenient for the low-tech country in this case. In general, the welfare of the low-tech
country is negatively affected by an excessive mobility. The low-tech country is not able to
compete in terms of real wage and a strong migration toward the high tech country occurs.
Workers have no incentive to go back to their countries of origin and the population gap be-
comes persistent, as figure 2.18 shows for a particular scenario (low-tech productivity γL = 2.3,
mobility frictions ρ = 0.2). Figures 2.16b and 2.17a highlight the possible negative effects of
joining the union concerning the welfare of the low-tech countries. For any productivity level,
γL < 2.7, i.e., any productivity gap ∆γ > 0.3, citizens receive lower real wages and the per
capita GDP level is lower with respect to the isolated country case.
Figure 2.19a and 2.19b show the difference in nominal wage and prices between the high and
low tech countries, according to equation 2.36. It emerges that the low-tech country struggles
to be competitive in the union, by keeping a low and competitive price with the high tech coun-
try, but to do so it has to decrease the nominal wage drastically. As a result, real wage and
welfare are negatively affected.
Corollary 7.1.D In the presence of low mobility frictions, the high-tech country has no clear
advantage in joining the union, as the welfare of its citizens does not improve significantly.
Therefore, we conclude that the union needs some mobility frictions between the member coun-
tries to constitute a value-added. This becomes stronger (weaker) in the case of large (small)
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Figure 2.18: Number of foreigners. Average time series; the statistical measure Y t given in equation 2.34. A scenario with
low-tech productivity γL = 2.3 and mobility friction ρ = 0.2.
technology gap. To explain our statement, we need to enter into some details related to the GDP
per capita concept. Figure 2.13a presents the variation of real GDP in the union across the dif-
ferent scenarios. However, it also represents the variation of GDP per capita, as the population
in the union is constant. As stated in result 3.D, GDP per capita in the union is always higher,
and this is because many citizens of the low-tech country emigrate to the high-tech country and
find there a higher living standard. However, the average difference in GDP per capita between
the high-tech and the low-tech country, shown in figure 2.20 (indistinguishable by construction
from figure 2.13a for the countries out of the union), tells us that the union is performing poorly
for low mobility frictions and that the low-tech country is strongly and negatively affected, as
stated in result 7.D. Figure 2.16b shows, under a different perspective, that the low-tech coun-
try should not join the union when the productivity gap is large. In other words, even though
the average welfare (measured as GDP per capita) is higher in the union, the citizens remain-
ing in the low-tech country decrease sharply their life standards (again measured as GDP per
capita). Therefore we can state:
Corollary 7.2.D Too low mobility frictions increase the inequality between the high-tech
country and the low-tech country, especially when the productivity gap is large.
Result 8.D For the low-tech country, it is always convenient to join the union, if there are
sufficient mobility frictions. The same can also be stated for the high-tech country
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(a) Wage level.
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(b) Price level.
Figure 2.19: The mean of differences of economic indicators between two countries; the statistical measure Ψs12(Y ) given in
equation 2.36. The left panel of the figure 2.19a shows the mean of difference of the wage level between countries C1 and C2 in
the union, while the right panel of the same figure indicates the mean of difference of the wage level between countries C3 and C4
out of the union. The left panel of the figure 2.19b shows the mean of difference of the price level between countries C1 and C2
in the union, while the right panel of the same figure indicates the mean of difference of the price level between countries C3 and
C4 out of the union. X-axis indicates scenarios with respect to the productivity level of the low-tech country γL. Colors indicate
scenarios with different values of mobility frictions ρ which are given in the legend. The solid lines in the bars represent median
while dots denote mean.
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Figure 2.20: The average real GDP per capita in the union and isolated countries; the statistical measure Σs12(Y ) given in equation
2.35. The left panel shows the average of the sum of real GDP per capita of the countries in the union C1 and C2; the right panel
shows the average of the sum of real GDP per capita of the isolated countries C3 and C4. X-axis indicates scenarios with respect
to the productivity level of the low-tech country γL. Colors indicate scenarios with different values of mobility frictions ρ which
are given in the legend. The solid lines in the bars represent median while dots denote mean.
This result clearly emerges from figures 2.16b and 2.17a. The welfare of low-tech country
citizens, measured as real wage and per capita GDP, significantly improves when there are suf-
ficient mobility frictions and their country belongs to the union. Interestingly, this improvement
does not depend on the productivity gap. So we can state that, irrespectively of the productivity
gap, the low-tech country improves its welfare by joining the union. Given that there are mo-
bility frictions a similar result holds for the high-tech country, with a distinction: the lower the
productivity gap, the higher the incentive to join the union for the high-tech country. In other
words, the high-tech country seems to have a strong interest in reducing the productivity gap
in order to take full advantage of the union. Figure 2.21, presenting the GDP per capita in the
four countries of our experiment, clearly shows that it is not only the low-tech country in the
union to obviously benefit from a productivity increase but also the high-tech country.
Result 9.D The real sovereign debt per capita in the union increases with low mobility fric-
tions and high productivity gap.
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Figure 2.21: Real GDP per capita by countries. X-axis indicates scenarios with respect to the productivity level of the low-tech
country γL. Colors indicate scenarios with different values of mobility frictions ρ which are given in the legend. The solid lines in
the bars represent median while dots denote mean
Corollary 9.1.D For low mobility frictions the real debt of the union is higher than the real
debt of isolated countries
Corollary 9.2.D The higher the low-tech country productivity, the lower the real sovereign
debt in the union. The opposite holds for isolated countries
We comment result 9.D and its corollaries together in this paragraph. Figure 2.22 compares
the debt in the union (as the sum of member countries’ sovereign debt) with the debt in the
separate countries, and shows several interesting issues. First, when the productivity gap is
large, and the mobility frictions are low, the public debt in the union is much higher than in
the isolated countries. The debt of the union becomes lower than the debt of the isolated coun-
tries only when the productivity gap and the mobility of workers are reduced. We explain this
result by highlighting that when the technological gap is high, and mobility frictions are low,
we observe a strong migration from the low-tech to the high-tech country, as stated in result
4.D. The dimension of the public debt of the low-tech country, before the migration, is com-
mensurate with the population of the country pre-migration, which is in turn, proportional to
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Figure 2.22: The average real sovereign debt in the union and isolated countries; the statistical measure Σs12(Y ) given in equation
2.35. The left panel shows the average of the sum of real sovereign debt of the countries in the union C1 and C2; the right panel
shows the average of the sum of real sovereign debt of the isolated countries C3 and C4. X-axis indicates scenarios with respect
to the productivity level of the low-tech country γL. Colors indicate scenarios with different values of mobility frictions ρ which
are given in the legend. The solid lines in the bars represent median while dots denote mean.
the isolated low-tech country. However, when the migration takes place, the low-tech country
is not able to reduce its debt because, despite a sharp decrease in public expenditures, it also
faces a sharp decrease in tax income, which is proportional to the GDP, and the public debt
does not decrease, but actually it even increases due to the unsustainable burden of interest
on public debt. From figure 2.23a, presenting the difference in total public spending between
countries in or out of the union, we can notice that the low-tech country in the union reduces
its public expenditures with respect to the isolated low-tech country drastically. However, it is
not able to reduce sovereign debt, which is even higher with respect to the isolated low-tech
country, as figure 2.23b proves. The problem is the per capita interest payment on the outstand-
ing debt, represented in figure 2.24, which is overwhelming for a country that experienced a
significant contraction in population. This component of the government expenditure prevents
any reduction of public debt, even though the other expenditure components are reduced.
Therefore, the higher debt of the union with respect to the isolated countries in the case of
large productivity gap, as shown in figure 2.22, can be explained by an increase in the debt of
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(a) Real government expenditures.
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(b) Real sovereign debt.
Figure 2.23: The mean of differences of economic indicators between two countries; the statistical measure Ψs12(Y ) given in
equation 2.36. The left panel of the figure 2.23a shows the mean of difference of real government expenditures between high-tech
countries, C1 in the union and C3 out of the union, while the right panel of the same figure indicates the mean of difference of real
government expenditures between low-tech countries, C2 in the union and C4 out of the union. The left panel of the figure 2.23b
shows the mean of difference of real sovereign debt between high-tech countries, C1 in the union and C3 out of the union, while
the right panel of the same figure indicates the mean of difference of real sovereign debt between low-tech countries, C2 in the
union and C4 out of the union. X-axis indicates scenarios with respect to the productivity level of the low-tech country γL. Colors
indicate scenarios with different values of mobility frictions ρ which are given in the legend. The solid lines in the bars represent
median while dots denote mean.
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the high-tech country, that is significantly increasing its GDP due to a massive immigration,
which is not compensated by a decrease of debt in the low-tech country, due to the reasons that
have been just formulated.
Concerning Corollary 9.2.D, when countries are isolated, the total real sovereign debt in-
creases with total GDP, as in figure 2.22. So, when the low-tech country becomes more produc-
tive, raising its real GDP, the total debt also increases. However, in the union, the mechanism
is more complex. It is true that, as for the isolated countries, when the productivity of the low-
tech country in the union grows, total real GDP of the union grows as well (see again figure
2.13a). Nonetheless, some other aspects should be kept into account. First, raising the pro-
ductivity of the low-tech country mitigates the problem of sustainability concerning its public
debt (the problem is solved when the gap is low). Second, the virtuous mechanism of markets
interaction in the union improves the employment conditions in the private sector (see figure
2.25), reducing the number of people that receive unemployment benefits, while increasing the
number of taxpayers.
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Figure 2.24: The mean of differences of the real bond interest payment between two countries; the statistical measure Ψs12(Y )
given in equation 2.36. The left panel of the figure shows the mean of difference of the real bond interest payment between high-
tech countries, C1 in the union and C3 out of the union, while the right panel indicates the mean of difference of the real bond
interest payment between low-tech countries, C2 in the union and C4 out of the union. X-axis indicates scenarios with respect to
the productivity level of the low-tech country γL. Colors indicate scenarios with different values of mobility frictions ρ which are
given in the legend. The solid lines in the bars represent median while dots denote mean.
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Figure 2.25: The average number of employees in private sector in the union and isolated countries; the statistical measure
Σs12(Y ) given in equation 2.35. The left panel shows the average of the sum of employees in private sector of the countries in
the union C1 and C2; the right panel shows the average of the sum of employees in private sector of the isolated countries C3
and C4. X-axis indicates scenarios with respect to the productivity level of the low-tech country γL. Colors indicate scenarios
with different values of mobility frictions ρ which are given in the legend. The solid lines in the bars represent median while dots
denote mean.
We will finally examine qualitatively some average time series representing some specific
scenarios, in order to better explain our results. The economic indicator that we present in the
following figures is the one of equation 2.34. In figure 2.26a and 2.26b we present consumption
and production for one of the eighty eight scenarios where mobility frictions ρ are at median
value (ρ = 0.4) and the technology gap is high ∆γ = 1.1, with the technology of the high-tech
country γH = 3 and the technology of the low-tech country γL = 1.9. The figures show how the
majority of the goods are produced in the high-tech country, while part of them is consumed
also in the low-tech country. The balance of payments in figure 2.26c reflects this configuration
of net exports. We can also notice in figure 2.26d that the high tech country is able to attract
workers from the low tech country and consequently achieve its higher total production as
it is reflected in figure 2.26b. Figure 2.27a displays the real wage in the four countries. It
is interesting to notice that the difference in real wage between the two isolated countries is
almost constant and it does not converge at all. However, the presence of common markets
allows the real wage of the two countries in the union to be more close and to converge slowly.
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This convergence of the real wage is an essential element in our analysis because when the real
wage converges, the economy reaches a sort of equilibrium in the labor market.
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(a) Real total sale.
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(b) National real output.
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(c) Balance of payments.
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
25
0
30
0
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
25
0
30
0
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
25
0
30
0
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
25
0
30
0
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
25
0
30
0
Months
N
um
be
r o
f f
or
ei
gn
er
s
Countries
High−Tech(Union) Low−Tech (Union) High−Tech Low−Tech
(d) Number of foreigners.
Figure 2.26: Average time series; the statistical measure Y t given in equation 2.34. A scenario with the government flexibility
χ = 0.5, productivities γH = 3 and γL = 1.9, and mobility frictions ρ = 0.4.
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(a) Real wage level. A scenario with the government flexibility
χ = 0.5, productivities γH = 3 and γL = 1.9, and mobility fric-
tions ρ = 0.4.
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(b) Real wage level. A scenario with the government flexibility
χ = 0.5, productivities γH = 3 and γL = 1.9, and mobility fric-
tions ρ = 0.2.
Figure 2.27: Average time series; the statistical measure Y t given in equation 2.34.
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Figure 2.28: Number of foreigners. Average time series; the statistical measure Y t given in equation 2.34. A scenario with the
government flexibility χ = 0.5, productivities γH = 3 and γL = 1.9, and mobility frictions ρ = 0.2.
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(a) Real wage level. A scenario with the government flexibility
χ = 0.5, productivities γH = 3 and γL = 2.3, and mobility fric-
tions ρ = 0.4.
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(b) Balance of payments. A scenario with the government flexi-
bility χ = 0.5, productivities γH = 3 and γL = 2.9, and mobility
frictions ρ = 0.4.
Figure 2.29: Average time series; the statistical measure Y t given in equation 2.34.
For lower levels of mobility frictions, the real wage is no more able to converge. See for
instance figure 2.27b where the mobility frictions changes from ρ = 0.4 to ρ = 0.2. The effect
is that the real wage is no more able to converge, and the emigration of workers from the
low-tech to the high-tech country is more massive, as depicted in figure 2.28. Contrary, if the
productivity of the low-tech country is increased to γL = 2.4 (decreasing the technology gap
to ∆γ = 0.7), the real wage converges earlier and in a more stable way, as figure 2.29a clearly
shows. The population of the two countries is also much more balanced, but it persists a biased
balance of trade due to the higher productivity of one country that has, therefore, positive net-
exports. In order to see more balanced net exports we have to raise further the productivity of
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the low-tech country (γL = 2.9), see figure 2.29b, where the high-tech country is still generally
a net exporter, but the situation is much more balanced.
2.4.5 The fiscal pool
To analyze the effects of the fiscal pool in the union, we need to discuss the two following
types of plots briefly.
Figure 2.30 shows the statistical measure ∆Σs12,34(Y ), presented in equation 2.35, where Y is
the real GDP. The left part of the figure presents the difference between the sum of real GDP
of the countries in the union with a fiscal pool (countries 1 and 2 in Σs12(Y )) and without the
fiscal pool (countries 3 and 4 in Σs34(Y )). The part on the right presents the difference between
the sum of real GDP of the isolated countries with the fiscal pool (countries 1 and 2 in Σs12(Y ))
and without the fiscal pool (countries 3 and 4 in Σs34(Y )). Of course, we should observe no
difference for the isolated countries as the mechanism of fiscal pool only concerns the union.
In other words, figure 2.30 compares the real GDP in the union when the fiscal pool mechanism
is enabled with the real GDP in the union when the fiscal pool mechanism is not enabled. If
we observe a positive (negative) value, it means that the real GDP is higher (lower) when the
fiscal pool is activated.
Figure 2.31 shows the statistical measure ∆Ψs12,34(Y ), presented in equation 2.36, where Y
is the real GDP. The left part of the figure presents the difference between the gap in real GDP
between the high-tech country and the low-tech country in the union with fiscal pool (countries
1 and 2 in Ψs12(Y )) and the same gap without fiscal pool (countries 3 and 4 in Ψ
s
34(Y )). The
part on the right presents the same indicator for the isolated countries. Of course, again, we
should observe no difference for the isolated countries as the mechanism of fiscal pool only
concerns the union.
In other words, figure 2.31 compares the inequality (or gap) in real GDP between the high-tech
country and the low-tech country in the case of the active and inactive fiscal pool. If we observe
a positive (negative) value, it means that the inequality in real GDP is higher (lower) when the
fiscal pool is enabled.
82
ll
l
ll
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
llll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
lllll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
lll
l
l
l
ll
lll
l
ll
1.5 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.9
−6
00
0
−4
00
0
−2
00
0
0
20
00
R
ea
l G
D
P
Low−Tech productivity
C1&C2 (Union)
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
llll
l
l
l
l
l
llll
l
l
l
l
l
1.5 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.9
−2
00
0
−1
00
0
0
10
00
20
00
R
ea
l G
D
P
Low−Tech productivity
C3&C4
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
M−Friction
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Figure 2.30: The differences of real GDP between the setups with and without the fiscal pool; the statistical measure ∆Σs12,34(Y )
given in equation 2.35. The left panel shows the difference of the sum of real GDP in countries C1 and C2 in the union with the
fiscal pool and the sum of real GDP in countries C1 and C2 in the union without the pool. The right panel shows the difference of
the sum of real GDP in isolated countries C3 and C4, with the fiscal pool and the sum of real GDP in isolated countries C3 and
C4 without the pool. X-axis indicates scenarios with respect to the productivity level of the low-tech country γL. Colors indicate
scenarios with different values of mobility frictions ρ which are given in the legend. The solid lines in the bars represent median
while dots denote mean.
Result 10.P The total, and per capita, level of real GDP in the union is reduced by the
activation of the fiscal pool, when mobility frictions are low, especially for a large technology
gap. In the other scenarios, the fiscal pool does not affect total production.
Figure 2.30 proves this result.
Result 11.P The inequality between real GDP in the high-tech and low-tech countries is
reduced by the activation of the fiscal pool, when mobility frictions are low, especially for a
large technology gap. In the other scenarios, the fiscal pool does not affect this inequality.
Figure 2.31 proves this result.
So, from our experiment, it seems that the activation of the fiscal pool gives conflicting
results. On the one hand, it reduces the inequality between the high and low tech countries,
highlighted in corollary 7.2D, on the other hand, it decreases the total production in the union.
However, we need to know if this reduction of inequality is given by an improvement in the
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Figure 2.31: The difference in setups with and without the fiscal pool of the mean of differences in Real GDP between two
countries; the statistical measure Ψs12(Y ) given in equation 2.36. The left panel shows the difference between countries C1 and
C2 in the union, while the right panel shows the difference in isolated countries C3 and C4. X-axis indicates scenarios with
respect to the productivity level of the low-tech country γL. Colors indicate scenarios with different values of mobility frictions ρ
which are given in the legend. The solid lines in the bars represent median while dots denote mean.
GDP of the low-tech country or by a decrease in the GDP of the high-tech country, or both. In
order to give an answer to this question, we present figure 2.32a, based on the same statistical
indicator ∆Ψs12,34(Y ).
Figure 2.32a shows the statistical measure ∆Ψs12,34(Y ), presented in equation 2.36, where Y
is the real GDP. The left part of the figure presents the difference between the gap in real GDP
between the high-tech country in the union with fiscal pool and high tech country out of the
union. The part on the right presents the difference between the gap in real GDP between the
low-tech country in the union with fiscal pool and low-tech country out of the union.
In other words, figure 2.32a compares the real GDP of the high-tech (low-tech) country in the
union in the case of an active fiscal pool with the real GDP of the high-tech (low-tech) country
in the case of an inactive fiscal pool. If we observe a positive (negative) value, it means that the
real GDP of the high-tech (low-tech) country is higher (lower) when the fiscal pool is enabled.
Corollary 11.1.P The fiscal pool increases real GDP in the low-tech country, whereas it
decreases GDP in the high-tech country, when mobility frictions are low, especially for a large
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technology gap. In the other scenarios, the fiscal pool does not affect real GDP.
Figure 2.32a proves this result. The main reason for this result is that the fiscal pool, given the
mobility frictions, manages to reduce the migration from the low-tech country to the high-tech
country, as figure 2.32b clearly shows.
Corollary 11.2.P The fiscal pool increases the welfare in the low-tech country, whereas it
slightly decreases it in the high-tech country, when mobility frictions are low, especially for a
large technology gap. In the other scenarios, the fiscal pool does not affect welfare.
Figures 2.33a, showing the real wage, 2.33b, showing per capita consumption, and 2.32a, show-
ing the per capita GDP, prove this result.
The previous results show that the fiscal pool can reduce the gap between the high and low
tech countries in the union. The cost is a lower immigration to the more productive high-
tech country, and therefore a loss in the overall production in the union. However, concerning
welfare, the loss of real wage in the high-tech country, due to the activation of the fiscal pool,
seems less significant than the gain for the low-tech country. So, we could comment that
the fiscal pool can be useful if the target is reducing inequalities among the union countries,
whereas it is not useful if the goal is raising the total production in the union, for instance in
the perspective of competing with other foreign countries or unions.
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(a) Real GDP.
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(b) Number of households.
Figure 2.32: The difference in setups with and without the fiscal pool of the mean of differences between two countries; the
statistical measure Ψs12(Y ) given in equation 2.36. On the figure 2.32a the left panel shows the difference in real GDP between
high-tech countries C1 in the union and C3 out of the union, while the right panel shows the difference in real GDP of low-tech
countries C2 in the union and C4 out of the union. On the figure 2.32b the left panel shows the difference in the number of
households between high-tech countries C1 in the union and C3 out of the union, while the right panel shows the difference in the
number of households of low-tech countries C2 in the union and C4 out of the union. X-axis indicates scenarios with respect to
the productivity level of the low-tech country γL. Colors indicate scenarios with different values of mobility frictions ρ which are
given in the legend. The solid lines in the bars represent median while dots denote mean.
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(a) Real wage level.
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(b) Real consumption per capita.
Figure 2.33: The difference in setups with and without the fiscal pool of the mean of differences between two countries; the
statistical measure Ψs12(Y ) given in equation 2.36. On the figure 2.33a the left panel shows the difference in the wage level of
high-tech countries C1 in the union and C3 out of the union, while the right panel shows the difference in the wage level of
low-tech countries C2 in the union and C4 out of the union. On the figure 2.33b the left panel shows the difference in the real
consumption per capita of high-tech countries C1 in the union and C3 out of the union, while the right panel shows the difference
in the real consumption per capita of low-tech countries C2 in the union and C4 out of the union. X-axis indicates scenarios with
respect to the productivity level of the low-tech country γL. Colors indicate scenarios with different values of mobility frictions ρ
which are given in the legend. The solid lines in the bars represent median while dots denote mean.
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2.5 Conclusions
In this work, we designed an extension of the Eurace agent-based economic model, which
allows for the inclusion of multiple countries. This extension has been devised in a very flexi-
ble way, in order to embrace a broad spectrum of economic integration among countries. The
model can include isolated countries and cluster of countries that have different degrees of in-
tegration, sharing the goods market and/or the labor market and/or the financial market. In this
way, we created a flexible instrument, which are able to mimic several real-world configura-
tions. We start our analysis in this thesis with a simple configuration two by two, where we
have two countries in a fully integrated union and two countries that are isolated control states.
Nevertheless, this simple setting allows us to get several interesting insight.
Our work has been inspired by the current economic and political challenges related to the
increasing integration of the leading economies and, in particular, by the European Union.
Among these challenges, we can remind the economic and financial integration, the inequality
issues, immigration and the sovereign debt crises. We used our specific approach to investigate
how the economies can better deal with these current problems, trying to examine also strate-
gies for a long-term sustainable path.
We performed a first experiment, where all countries are identical, finding that it is always con-
venient for identical countries to join in a union. Not only the union as a whole outperforms the
independent countries, but also each state in the union is better off with respect to the isolated
version. However, an excess of workers mobility can weaken the performance of the union and
even create persistent inequality between countries. Furthermore, the monetary policy of the
union central bank can deteriorate if the difference between countries growth and in general it
tends to overshoot the inflation target. This is because, although there is a better price coordi-
nation among countries in the union, the business cycles are not completely synchronized and
the central bank is less efficient in reducing prices in the country with higher inflation. Finally,
we find that the real sovereign debt in the countries of the union is always lower.
When the two countries differ in productivity, the union on aggregate performs again better
than the sum of the isolated countries counterparts. However, taking into account the welfare
in both countries of the union, it is not always convenient to form the union. The performance
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of the union is strongly affected by the level of labor market frictions and the size of the pro-
ductivity gap among countries. Results suggest that, when the technology gap is large, workers
mobility improves the overall economic performance of the union; while when the technology
gap is small, the labor mobility worsens it. The main idea is that the high technology country
tends to attract workers when the mobility is high, and the union benefits by a more productive
employment of the labor force. However, a lack of mobility frictions can damage the welfare
conditions of the low-tech country, increasing inequality. The real sovereign debt per capita in
the union increases with low mobility frictions and high productivity gap.
Concerning the sustainability of the union, especially in the critical case when mobility fric-
tions are low and the technology gap between countries is significant, we found that a stronger
fiscal integration reduces inequality between countries, allowing the low-tech country and,
hence, the total union to sustain even with a higher mobility of workers. This, however, comes
at the cost of harming the overall output of the union, because it limits the emigration from the
low-tech to the high-tech country. In particular, the fiscal pool increases real GDP and welfare
in the low-tech country whereas, slightly reduces real GDP and well-being of the high-tech
country, mainly when mobility frictions are small, and the productivity gap is big. To sum up,
our results suggest that a better fiscal integration would be useful if the policy target in the
union is reducing inequalities among the countries, whereas it would not be beneficial if the
goal is to maximize the overall production of the union. This raises some interesting political
and ethical issues about the kind of development strategy that a union (with particular refer-
ence to the European Union) want to pursue. Our study seems to underline that the objective
of maximizing the economic growth is not always in harmony with the objective of reducing
inequality and preserving the structural and cultural difference that exist among countries. We
personally consider that a wise mixture between these two lines should be adopted.
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Chapter 3
The role of bank credit allocation:
evidence from the Spanish economy
3.1 Introduction
In this study, we try to understand the role that bank credit to firms played during the Spanish
boom between 2000 and 2007 and during the following financial and economic crisis. It is
well known that Spanish companies finance their production and investments mainly through
bank loans1, suggesting that the channeling of bank loans into the economy is a critical issue
that deserves attention. Our background question is to understand if bank loans have been
distributed to companies in such a way to ensure growth and stability of the whole economic
system, or, conversely, it has been created a distortion which eventually undermined growth and
stability. In this work, we are moving our first steps in this direction by studying the Spanish
boom and crisis period under the perspective of bank debt allocation.
We are interested in the macroeconomic effects of bank loans distribution, but our method-
ology is grounded on the “micro” observation of medium to large Spanish companies. We
1See for instance the recent study “Financial systems in Europe and the United States: Structural differences
where banks remain the main source of finance for companies” by the European Savings and Retail Banking Group
(ESBG); http://www.wsbi-esbg.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/EU-US.study.ESBG%20May.2016.pdf
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consider the balance sheet evolution of these companies over time (in particular their liability
structure) along with other account statement items, to study the relation between credit dis-
tribution among firms and the overall economic performance. We summarize here the main
outcomes of our study to allow the reader to move with more agility through the paper.
The first interesting aspect is that a huge part of bank debt (long-term debt in particular) be-
longs to a relatively small number of big firms. We know this is true for many size measures of
firms, like employees, sales, or total assets, which follow fat-tailed distributions (Axtell, 2001;
Alfarano et al., 2012). However, bank debt is even more concentrated than all these measures,
and this higher concentration proves to be very stable and persistent during the whole studied
period, i.e., before, during, and after the crisis (1999−2014). This evidence may suggest that
access to credit is easier for large companies and that the diversification of banks’ investment
portfolio is small. Analyzing bank debt to total assets ratio, we observe that large enterprises
are characterized by a higher percentage of bank debt in their balance sheet, meaning that large
firms are relatively more indebted with banks.
Our second step consists in exploring what happens in the different sectors of the economy.
We, therefore, identify six industries, observing that the share of bank debt across sectors is
rather constant over time with the notable exception of a crowding out effect between con-
struction and manufacturing. In 1999 both sectors had a share of around 30% of the total bank
debt, but at the end of the boom, in 2007, the construction sector was holding 55% of the to-
tal bank debt while the manufacturing sector was left with a 15%. Moreover, the bank debt
over total assets ratio shows that large enterprises in the construction industry hold a very high
fraction of total bank debt.
Given this picture, we try to understand the economic reason for such a concentration of
bank debt, observing that the indicators of profitability were not particularly favorable for the
construction sector, while the leverage of the whole industry was worrisomely rising. More-
over, the concentration of bank debt in the hands of the largest companies in the construction
sector continuously increased until the crash of the economy. We argue that this outcome has
emerged due to questionable policy incentives for banks, as explained by Illueca et al. (2016).
We also conjecture the importance of the peculiar power of banks in controlling the housing
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price, given their capacity to affect both the demand side (by granting mortgages to households)
and the supply side (by granting loans to construction firms).
We finally design an econometric selection model that confirms the descriptive analysis of
the first part of the paper and also give some quantitative insights. We try to explain the allo-
cation of new bank loans that firms receive every year. We show that big and risky companies
(measured by total assets and leverage ratio respectively) are favored for new bank loans, es-
pecially in the construction sector.
Overall, our analysis suggests that the criteria for the distribution of bank debt to companies
seems to undervalue elements related to risk and systemic risk and to favor elements related
to the dimension of the firms. The Spanish case under study suggests the existence of a link
between the concentration of bank debt to the large and risky companies in the construction
sector and the stability of the whole economic system, which experienced a deep crisis. Re-
garding policy implications, we think there is room for considering regulations able to incite a
more efficient allocation of bank credit in the economic system.
3.2 Literature review
In the previous section we emphasized the focus of our investigation and made a short
overview on our main findings. In the following section, we present the related literature and
clarify why the distribution of bank loans may be an important factor for economic stability.
In particular, we identify a channel through which the inequality of bank loan allocation can
undermine the economic system.
The economic and financial literature has recognized the close relation between the measure-
ment of inequality and the measurement of risk (Breitmeyer et al., 2004). While economists
claim that income inequality cannot increase with a transfer from rich people to the poor
(Pigou-Dalton transfer principle), similarly finance researchers nowadays coincide that a mea-
sure of risk must respect the diversification principle, that is, risk cannot increase when port-
folios are combined (Persky and Bassett, 2006). In addition, Artzner et al. (1999) in their
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fundamental axiom state that diversification should never increase risk, suggesting that risk
measures, among other things, should be sub-additive. Yet, the classical finance theory argues
that diversification should be a way to reduce the risk within investment portfolios (Haugen,
2001). In fact, the first step in our investigation is related to the inequality/diversification mea-
sure. We show that banks concentrate their investments to a small group of large companies
in the construction sector, which imply low diversification of their investment portfolios and
significant exposure to risk.
However, not all finance scholars agree that the diversification should be a straightforward
way to reduce the risk. On the one hand, the traditional portfolio theorists such as Markowitz
(1952) advocates that banks should diversify the portfolio to achieve the best risk/return trade-
off. The rationale of the theory is that banks face firm-specific idiosyncratic risk and systemic
risk, where the diversification minimizes only the former one, while the later one is compen-
sated with higher expected return. The largest gain from diversification is realized for the least
correlated assets. Therefore the banks have to invest globally and through different sectors.
On the other hand, the theory on financial intermediation argues that banks can gather ex-
pertise if they concentrate lending on particular sectors (Jahn et al., 2013). Namely, it is well
known that the financial market runs with frictions and that its efficiency is not always guar-
anteed and straightforward. For example, in the presence of asymmetric information, funds do
not always flow to agents with profitable investment opportunities (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).
Moreover, the market price is not only the result of demand and supply but also incorporates
borrower’s risk which forces creditors either to increase the price or to restrict the amount of
granted loans, especially to young and small companies (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). Lenders
may choose to reduce credit supply instead of increasing the interest rate mainly because of
two reasons: a higher price either attracts riskier companies - the adverse selection effect - or
stimulates borrowers to go for riskier projects - the moral hazard problem (Stiglitz and Weiss,
1981; Akerlof, 1970). To deal with the information asymmetry creditors monitor and screen
their borrowers, which should help them to channel loans toward the best firms. They use a va-
riety of lending technologies to access the information about borrower’s creditworthiness. The
commonly used technologies are relationship lending (based on soft information), and several
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transaction lending technologies (based on hard information) such as financial statement lend-
ing, small business credit scoring, asset-based lending, factoring, fixed-asset lending, etc. In
this regard, many authors studied how the lending technologies improve the information asym-
metry. Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Petersen (1999) found that the lending relationship can
generate useful information for small firms, with significant effects on their access to credit and
with minor effects on credit price. They argue that banks increase the availability of credit as
firms spend more time in the relationship. Results suggest that a borrower increases ties to a
lender by expanding a number of financial services over time, which in fact enables the lender
to better screen and monitor its borrower and consequently to reduce the information asym-
metry. Later works such as Cole et al. (2004); Berger and Udell (2005); Berg and Schrader
(2012); Cotugno et al. (2013); Dewally and Shao (2014); Cenni et al. (2015) use a similar
approach showing that the lending technologies improve the credit availability for small and
medium-sized enterprises even in credit crunch periods.
Evidently, banks face the trade-off between monitoring benefits and the risk of the concen-
tration of their investment portfolio. However, the question whether the expertise gained from
the investment portfolio concentration outweighs diversification benefits is rarely addressed
in the empirical and theoretical literature, and we believe it deserves a further discussion and
contribution. The theory advocates that given asymmetric information in financial market the
diversification is likely to moderate the cost of financial intermediation (Diamond, 1984) and
rises the incentive to monitor (Cerasi and Daltung, 2000). It also increases profit efficiency, re-
duces banks’ realized risk and has a positive impact on banks’ capitalization (Rossi et al., 2009).
However, recent studies have questioned the benefits of banks’ portfolio diversification. DeY-
oung and Roland (2001), Stiroh (2004) and Stiroh and Rumble (2006) define diversification as
the mix of income sources arguing that higher volatility of non-interest income induced by the
diversified investment portfolio outweighs diversification benefits. Considering diversification
across industries Acharya et al. (2006) show that diversification worsens the effectiveness of
monitoring resulting in lower bank returns and riskier loan portfolios for high-risk banks.
Nevertheless, the concentration of bank lending to the biggest companies in the construction
industry was continuously rising in the pre-crisis period in the Spanish economy, reaching its
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peak in conjunction with the crisis of 2008. This shed some light on the connection of the
allocation of bank credit and the crash of the entire economy. In general, the implication of
financial frictions and the credit allocation on the macroeconomic performance has been stud-
ied for many years. Financial frictions can affect the real economy through many channels.
One way to look at this issue is the theory of Gurley and Shaw (1955) and the balance sheet
approach. The authors state that borrowers’ balance sheet and their ability to absorb debt is
a key determinant of financial stability. They advocate that intermediaries play an important
role in determining the economic fluctuations since they can extend borrowers’ financial ca-
pacity. In this regard, we argue that the intermediaries have extended the borrowing positions
of the biggest companies beyond their financial capacity undermining the whole economic sys-
tem. Provided that banks were continuously granting/concentrating loans to the big and risky
companies, increasing their leverage even more, we focus our study on understanding the de-
terminants of the credit allocation. In particular we examine whether the main indicators of
profitability and leverage have played any role in the credit granting process.
The modern macroeconomic literature with financial frictions represented by Bernanke and
Gertler (1989); Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), and later by Bernanke et al. (1999); Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997) and others2, studied the propagation effect of negative shocks using macroe-
conomic models with financial frictions. They show that a shock to entrepreneurs’ net worth
persists, amplifies, and finally causes long-run instability due to incomplete financial markets.
Our work addresses this topic from a different perspective. We use a balance sheet approach
and a bottom-up analysis, emphasizing that financial frictions led to the erroneous allocation of
credit and capital, making industries more fragile and subject to long-run instability. While our
results are supported by the modern macroeconomic literature mentioned above, our approach
is closer to the another stream of the literature that considers heterogeneous agents (Gabaix,
2011). Gabaix’s "granular" theory states that idiosyncratic shocks of a few large firms can ex-
plain an important part of the aggregate movements, given that the distribution of firm sizes
is fat-tailed. We also observe fat-tail distributions in our sample, following the literature that
deals with the fat-tail properties (Alfarano et al., 2012; Axtell, 2001; Cirillo, 2010; Fagiolo
et al., 2008, 2009). We contribute to this literature pointing out that analyzing the distribution
2See Brunnermeier et al. (2012) for detailed literature on macroeconomics with financial frictions.
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of different income statement and balance sheet items, in particular on the liability side of the
balance sheets, can provide valuable insights for predicting economic instability. In line with
Gabaix, we show the central role played by the largest firms in the construction sector during
the Spanish financial crisis.
Intermediaries are also an important link in the transmission of the conventional and uncon-
ventional monetary policy. On the one hand, the conventional monetary policy, which did not
prove to be very useful in the aftermath of the crisis, might be weakened due to the failure
of the credit market since intermediaries not only expand borrowers’ balance sheets but also
create new money in the economic system (Keen, 2014; Jakab and Kumhof, 2015; Caiani et al.,
2015). On the other hand, Acharya et al. (2015, 2016) show how unconventional monetary pol-
icy can be ineffective due to the credit market failure. The concentration of bank lending to the
big companies strengthens ties between banks and large enterprises. Banks reduce information
asymmetries, however at the same time they become more depended on their borrowers and
exposed to the idiosyncratic shocks. If the central bank aims to recapitalize the financial sec-
tor the policy might not reach the real sector since lenders will be forced to primarily finance
existing low-quality borrowers, so called zombie companies, to avoid bigger losses (too big to
fail). In addition, zombie loans are usually extended at the favorable interest rate distorting the
market competition and affecting the overall economic performance. In our paper, we show
that in the period of the Spanish banking sector recapitalization by the European intervention
(started in 2012), banks have concentrated funds to the largest companies disregarding their
profitability and leverage.
Another threat to the economy can be an excessive market power of banks in controlling
credit demand and supply which was observed in Spain 1999−2008 (Luis et al., 2012)3. In the
third quarter of 2003 bank loans supplied for households house purchase exhibited an outstand-
ing growth compared to loans supplied to the non-financial private corporations, and especially
construction firms. The gap continued to rise to the middle of 2004 showing that banks were
aggressively financing housing unit demand, creating disequilibrium in the housing market and
3The annual report of Banco de España. Page 26, chart 1.9; available at:
http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/SES/Secciones/Publicaciones/
PublicacionesAnuales/InformesAnuales/12/Files/inf2012e.pdf
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pushing price up. The growth of housing prices created profitable investment opportunities for
construction companies, which increased their demand for credit, driving the interest rate4 from
3% to 6%. This process led to an inflationary spiral in the credit and housing markets, and to
the concentration of bank loans in the construction sector as we show in the paper.
Finally, following Illueca et al. (2016) we argue that inadequate policy regulations can lead to
an excess of bank credit concentration. The importance of accurate banking regulation policies
is therefore crucial to avoid high levels of systemic risk that could undermine the stability of
the economic system, as happened in Spain. We consider that policies should encourage banks
not to concentrate their investments to few big players, promoting a more balanced allocation
of financial resources for a safer growth path.
3.3 Data
All firm-level data are obtained from Bureu Van Dijk (Sabi) database5. We collect a large
panel with yearly balance sheets and income statements. The panel includes medium and large
companies in Spain over the period 1999− 2014. The threshold for the medium and large
size is defined according to The Consolidated Spanish Companies Law and European Union
Legislation. We select the companies with the average book value of total assets greater than
e2.85 million and the average amount of annual sales larger than e5.7 million which at the
same time ensures audited financial statements6 and therefore more reliable data.
We focus only on medium and large firms since they account for the greatest part of the
activity in the Spanish economy. For instance, in our sample the sales of the top 100 firms
account for 31% of Spanish GDP and the sales of the top 500 firms are 49% of GDP on av-
4See the annual report of Banco de España. Page 33, chart 2.1.
5Available at: https://sabi.bvdinfo.com/version-2016119/home.serv?product=sabineo
6According to The Consolidated Spanish Companies Law all corporations, except for those authorized to present
abridged financial statements, must have their financial statements audited. Moreover, according to the European
Union legislation, companies are allowed to have abridged financial statements only if at least two of the following
thresholds are fulfilled: (1) total assets of e2.85 million or less; (2) annual revenue of e5.7 million or less; and (3)
average number of employees during the year of 50 or fewer.
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Table 3.1: Distribution of sample firms and shares by industry; average amounts over years.
Number of Asset size* Annual sale** Employees*
Industries firms* (billion EUR) (billion EUR) (thousands)
Mining & 170 30.4 44.8 26.9
Energy 0.8% 2.9% 4.8% 0.8%
Construction & 4042 273.7 98.2 299.5
Real Estate 17.9% 26.3% 10.6% 9.0%
Manufacturing
6563 265.2 272.8 893.8
29.1% 25.5% 29.4% 26.9%
Transportation & 1404 130.7 83.1 321.4
Communication 6.2% 12.6% 9.0% 9.7%
Wholesale & 7526 187.9 338.4 887.1
Retail Trade 33.4% 18.0% 36.5% 26.7%
Services
2863 153.3 86.2 893.9
12.7% 14.7% 9.3% 26.9%
All industries 22568 1041.2 923.4 3322.6
* The percentages of number of firms, asset size and employees are shares to the sum of
total number of firms, total assets and total number of employees in the sample, respectively.
**The percentages of annual sales are shares to GDP.
erage over 16 years, as it is shown in figure 3.1. In addition, considering the whole economy,
the largest 10% of firms, having the book value of total assets e3.7 million or more, possess
91.3% of total long-term bank credit and 93.3% of total short-term bank credit on average (see
table B.1 in the appendix). Thus using the selection criteria discussed above we sample the
largest 15% of firms in the Spanish economy considering their book value of total assets. We
exclude from our analysis public administration companies, agricultural sector and financial
corporations because they are not relevant for this study. We use the four-digits SIC code and
classify all firms into six industry groups such as: mining & energy, construction & real estate,
manufacturing, transportation & communications, wholesale & retail trade, and services. The
industry distribution of firms (see table 3.1 or table B.2 in the appendix) reflects that the whole-
sale & retail trade is the largest sector according to the number of firms. It has 7,526 firms and
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Figure 3.1: The share of sales to GDP.
the share of 33.4% on average over years. Manufacturing and construction are the second and
third industries having on average 6,563 and 4,042 firms with the share of 29.1% and 17.9%
respectively.
Table 3.1 shows that the construction sector is the largest according to the asset size with
the share of 26.3% of total assets, while the manufacturing and trade sectors have a share of
25.5% and 18% respectively. The greatest contribution to total sales comes from the trade
sector, which also includes the highest number of companies. Its annual sales contribute with
e338.4 billion to the Spanish GDP, that is 36.5%. On the other hand the highest amount of
total assets is located in the construction sector which does not consist of many firms and does
not contribute so much to total sales. The number of employees serves as a measure of size
as well; services and manufacturing together employ the 53.8% of the total workforce in our
sample. Trade, transportation and construction sectors have a share of 26.7%, 9.7% and 9%
respectively.
Our sample counts 22,568 firms on average per year over the period 1999− 2014, which
in total sums up to 362,004 observations. In the following sections, we present and discuss
results from the descriptive and econometric analysis.
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3.4 Results and discussion
Section 3.4.1 introduces and describes the main elements that are relevant to the paper, fo-
cusing on some distributional properties of our data. Section 3.4.2 presents a more quantitative
analysis, based on a Heckman selection model and on a semi-parametric estimator, which con-
firms and enriches results of section 3.4.1.
3.4.1 Descriptive analysis
In the following we show a general picture of the allocation of bank debt7 among the Spanish
companies described in section 3.3. We measure the concentration of bank debt by using the
Gini index, which is mathematically based on the Lorenz curve. The Lorenz curve of figure 3.2
plots the proportion of the total outstanding bank debt that is cumulatively owned by the bottom
x% of the companies in 2007. The figure shows that the smallest 97% of firms owned 37% of
total bank loans in 2007, while the only 3% of the biggest companies owned the rest 63%. This
results can be summarized by a Gini index of 0.88, which is calculated as one minus the ratio of
the area under the Lorenz curve and the area below the line of 45 degree - the line of equality.
Thus, the Gini index of value 1 would indicate that all bank loans are owned by one company,
while the Gini index of value 0 would refer to the total equality of bank loan allocation. Figure
3.3 shows the Gini index of bank debt (dashed line) from 1999 to 2014, which is close to 0.9,
and almost constant during all the period. Interestingly, the strong business cycle fluctuations,
with a boom until 2007 and a crash afterwards, do not seem to affect the concentration of bank
debt.
To have a basis for comparison, figure 3.3 shows the Gini index for several balance sheet
items and for other size measures of companies. What emerges is actually that the concentra-
tion of bank debt is persistently higher than any other considered magnitude. This is especially
true for long term bank debt8. In particular, bank debt is more concentrated than total assets
7In the paper we use “bank debt” or “bank credit” as synonyms, indicating the aggregate amount of credit
available to a company from banking institutions
8The long term bank debt is the amount of bank debt of a company with a maturity higher than one year
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Figure 3.2: Lorenz curve of bank debt in 2007, including all industries.
and, on the liability side, it is more concentrated than equity and trade credit. Finally, bank
debt is also much more concentrated than other standard measure of size, as sales or number
of employees.
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Figure 3.3: Gini Index, including all industries.
It is worth noting the regularity of the Gini coefficients along the 15 years considered. Only
after the crisis, some indexes show a positive trend, in particular sales, employees and total
assets. We conjecture that this positive trend could be explained by the high number of firms
defaults or strong contractions during the crisis, and by the consequent rise in unemployment.
Firms withstanding the crisis have been able in the following years to reinforce their market
share, possibly hiring new workers and therefore raising the concentration level of these quan-
tities in the economy, following a sort of survival of the fittest mechanism.
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In figures 3.4 and 3.5 we examine the distribution of bank debt by organizing it in ten deciles,
according to the book value of total assets. Figure 3.4 shows that the 10% largest firms hold
around the 70% of total bank debt, while firms in the second decile hold another 10% of debt,
(and so on. . . ). Figure 3.5 shows instead how the ratio between bank debt and total assets is
distributed among the different deciles. If bank debt was held by companies in proportion to
their total assets, we should observe the overlapping of all the deciles lines. Figure 3.5a shows
that, in general, large firms hold more bank debt with respect to their size. It is worth noting the
overall growth of bank debt with respect to total assets during the boom of the Spanish econ-
omy, and the deleveraging process afterwards, when bank debt over total assets ratio converges
to a common value for the different deciles. This circumstance could be again explained by
the bankruptcy of fragile firms which had excessive banks debt with respect to their size. This
severe deleveraging process leads to a more homogeneous balance sheet structure where the
ratio of bank debt to total assets converges to a value close to 15%. Figure 3.5b shows that
long-term bank debt is mainly concentrated in the hands of few large firms.
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Figure 3.4: The share of firms’ bank debt by the deciles of the book value of total assets, including all industries.
So far our analysis suggests some evidence that larger firms hold a higher percentage of bank
debt, especially between the end of the boom and the beginning of the crisis. However, we
need to explore the situation with a lower level of aggregation by analyzing different economic
sector. Figure 3.6 shows how total bank debt is distributed among firms belonging to the main
economic sectors. In general, the overall time span considered in our study can be divided
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Figure 3.5: The distribution of firms’ bank debt to total assets ratio by the deciles of the book value of total assets, including all
industries.
into two periods: the first one from 1999 to 2007, corresponding to the well-known boom of
the Spanish economy, and the second one from 2008 to 2014, corresponding to the Spanish
economic crisis. At the beginning of the Spanish boom, in 1999, bank credit was mainly
owned by companies belonging to the manufacturing and construction sector, holding a 30%
of total debt each. Wholesale and retail followed with less than a 20%9. We observe in figure
3.6 a crowding out effect between the manufacturing and construction sectors, with the former
decreasing to almost 15% of total bank debt and the latter increasing to approximately 55%,
while the other sectors don’t exhibit comparable changes. On the other hand, after 2007 we
observe a progressive fall in the share of bank debt in the construction industry, going back
to the initial value of 30%, or lower, and a weak recovery of the manufacturing share. These
results encourage us to focus mainly on these two specific sectors.
In particular, we want to understand how bank credit is distributed not only between these
two sectors but also within them. In this respect, figure 3.7 shows the bank-debt-to-total-assets
ratio, i.e., a measure of firm leverage, in the two considered sectors. The companies of each
sector are classified into deciles according to their total assets, as described for figure 3.5. The
picture gives two main insights. First, the leverage of the construction sector is raising during
the boom period and declining during the crisis, while in the manufacturing industry the trend
is less evident. Second, and more important for this study, large firms in the construction sector
9Due to the negligible share of bank credit in the Mining & Energy sector, we will remove it from the following
plots for the sake of readability and compactness.
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Figure 3.6: The share of bank credit over industries, showing the crowding out effect.
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Figure 3.7: The distribution of firms’ bank debt to total assets ratio by the deciles of the book value of total assets, including
Construction and Manufacturing industries.
have a higher bank-debt-to-total-assets ratio with respect to small ones. In particular, large
construction firms double this ratio from less than 0.2 in 1999 to 0.4 in 2008, while in the
manufacturing sector the ratio doesn’t move significantly from the initial 0.2. Therefore, figure
3.7 suggests that the high concentration of bank debt in the hands of large firms is mainly due
to the construction sector. Considering long-term bank debt leads to similar results.
Although we show that the leverage of firms is rising with their size (figure 3.5), and mainly
in the construction sector (figure 3.7), it may not be clear whether it also exceeds some eco-
nomically acceptable level. Therefore, we complement our findings using the financial lever-
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age ratio as an another measure of risk, and provide evidence that the leverage of firms is also
increasing above its sustainable level. To show this, we first define what would be an acceptable
or sustainable value of the leverage ratio for the Spanish companies. We find in the literature
that an adequate level of financial leverage ratio may vary over industries (see Lawrence J Git-
man, 2009). For example, the maximum acceptable level of risk measured in terms of financial
leverage ratio for the manufacturing sector is10 around 1.8, while for the construction industry
is around 3. To keep the consistency in the analysis and to account for the specificity of the
Spanish economy in the given time span, we do not use the values from the previous literature,
but rather, calculate them using the available Spanish data. Thus, we compute the threshold
(maximum acceptable) level of the financial leverage ratio as a median value of firms’ leverage
ratio within an industry and over the entire time span. Further, we assign the companies that
are below the threshold as non-risky while the companies that have a value above the threshold
as risky ones. The calculated thresholds for risky (non-risky) companies are given in table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Median financial leverage ratio over years by industry.
Industries Median financial leverage ratio
Construction & Real Estate 3.32
Manufacturing 1.49
Wholesale & Retail Trade 2.04
Services 1.82
All industries 1.95
The values in table 3.2 indicate that the threshold of the construction industry, which is 3.3, is
somewhat higher with respect to the findings from the previous literature while the threshold for
the manufacturing sector of 1.49 is lower. However, we continue our analysis using the values
presented in table 3.2 which allow us to account for the peculiarity of the Spanish economy,
and examine what the allocation of bank loans concerning risky and non-risky companies was.
10See also RMA Annual Statement Studies, 2001–2002 (fiscal years ended 4/1/00 through 3/31/01) (Philadel-
phia: Robert Morris Associates, 2001). Copyright c© 2001 by Robert MorrisAssociates.
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Figure 3.8 presents the qualitative distribution of bank loans over years and deciles of total
assets including all industries. Each plot on the graph represents the distribution of bank loans
over the deciles of total assets for the particular year. The distribution is indicated with bins
and the values on the y-axis. However, each bin not only shows the share of bank loans for
a given decile but also demonstrates the share of loans that are held by risky and non-risky
firms within the given decile, which is presented by percents on the top of the bins. In fact,
the distribution of bank loans over the deciles of total assets, which we have presented in the
previous analysis, is confirmed. The biggest companies hold the highest share of bank debt
over all years which is denoted on the y-axis. However, now we can indicate the qualitative
dimension of the distribution, showing for example, that the largest part of the bank loans is
allocated to the biggest and risky companies. Light color on the graph denotes the share of risky
firms, while the dark color denotes the share of non-risky firms. Therefore, for instance, in 2007
the biggest 10% of companies were holding around 70% of the total bank loans (indicated on
the y-axis), while 71% of those companies were the risky ones. The share of risky companies
was increasing along with the debt-to-total-asset-ratio, that is presented on figure 3.5, which
confirms that the overall leverage was significantly rising above its economically acceptable
level in the pre-crisis period. The detailed evidence over industries is provided in the appendix
on figures B.1, B.2, B.3; where we show that this finding hold in all industries over the time
span.
To summarize, we find in general a concentration of bank debt in the hands of the large
Spanish companies. This concentration is mostly driven by the construction sector and raises
substantially during the boom period. We have therefore an entire industry that is increasing
its leverage, with the large firms of this sector that are increasing it even more. In principle,
if a company has a high long-term bank debt to total asset ratio it suggests that the firm has
a relatively high degree of risk, and eventually, it may not be able to repay its debts. This
should make lenders more skeptical about loaning the business money, but this did not happen
in Spain. Coherently with our observations, Illueca et al. (2016, 2014) point out that, after the
changes introduced in the Spanish banking regulation in 2000, banks lend significantly more to
borrowers with lower accounting quality, and lend more to borrowers that exhibit higher loan
growth. In retrospect, we could argue that this concentration of bank debt has been harmful
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Figure 3.8: The qualitative distribution of bank loans by years and deciles of total assets including all industries. Each plot
represents the distribution of bank loans over the deciles of total assets for the particular year. Each bin on the plot shows the
share of bank loans in a given decile which is indicated on the y-axis, as well as it demonstrates the share of bank loans that is
held by the risky and non-risky firms within the given decile, which is indicated with percents on the top of the bins. Light color
denotes the share of risky firms, while the dark color denotes the share of non-risky firms.
to the Spanish economy. The default of several large construction companies, deteriorating
banks’ equity capital, contaminated the whole Spanish banking system, freezing lending for
many years11, as the post 2008 deleveraging process clearly shows (see pictures 3.7 and 3.5).
This is an ex-post argument, but we would like to investigate, ex-ante, how bank debt has been
allocated to Spanish firms.
To a first approximation, the observed concentration of bank debt could be explained by
a higher profitability of the construction sector and, in particular, of the large firms in the
construction sector. This higher profitability could compensate the higher risk, given by the
continuously raising leverage of these firms. Therefore in the further analysis we examine
11See for instance the report on Spain of the European Construction Sector Observatory of the European Com-
mission, published in March 2016; http://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/construction/observatory_en
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whether we can find some empirical evidences for this higher profitability. We present in figure
3.9 below, firms’ profitability by industry:
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Figure 3.9: Return on assets by industry.
The figure shows that the profit rate in the construction sector is not higher than the one in
the manufacturing sector. In general, it is lower with respect to other sectors during the boom,
and it is by far the lowest after 2007.
We also show in figure 3.10 the trend of the operating margin per sector, calculated as:
1− operating expencessales . The changes of this ratio are driven by the variation in the nominal market
prices, and it might be a good indicator for profitable investment opportunities. For example,
the margin increases if prices of final products increase relatively more than the operating
expenses (such as labor force). Figure 3.10 shows that the operating margin was outstandingly
higher in the construction industry in the pre-crisis period compared to the other industries.
In particular, the upper graph presents the aggregate operating income to sales ratio for each
industry. The construction sector exhibits the highest ratio up to 2006 while in subsequent
periods the ratio declines. The lower graph shows the value of the ratio of a medium firm by
industry. The highest ratio is found again in the construction sector until 2008. This result is
presumably driven by the exceptional increment of the housing price in the reference period.
We argue that investors used the price expansion as a signal for profitable investments. How-
ever, ex-post we know that this has been a misleading signal. Considering the supply side, i.e.
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Figure 3.10: Operating margin by industry.
banks’ behavior, Luis et al. (2012) show the increase in the interest rate in Spain from 3% in
2005 to 6% in 2008 as well as the growth in credit given to households for purchasing housing
units in the same period. This was also followed by the expansion of bank loans to construction
firms, with a lag of around one year with respect to mortgages expansion, which increased the
pressure on housing units market prices, pushing their level up. The inflation spiral on both
credit and real estate market created an apparently positive environment for firms’ investments.
We conjecture that construction firms’ revenues due to the housing units price expansion were
compensated by the increasing interest bill, thus justifying the constant profit rate in the con-
struction sector with the remarkable increase in leverage. Following this line of thinking, the
peculiar capacity that banks have to affect both the supply and the demand side in the housing
market could have played a primary role in the crisis. In the end, this positive cycle has been
interrupted when banks were not able anymore to sustain the housing unit demand, mostly
given by the frozen international capital market. The lack of demand pushed the price level
down which made large firms unable to repay their credit liabilities since they already were
over-indebted.
To conclude this part, we have shown that the allocation of bank credit during the Span-
ish boom rewarded large firms, the construction sector, and especially big companies in the
construction industry. We claim that this might have introduced distortions in the economic
system, opening the way for the crisis. In the following section, we focus our attention on the
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econometric analysis providing the evidence how new loans were channeled into the Spanish
economy.
3.4.2 Econometric analysis
In this section, we design and estimate an empirical model to study the determinants of bank
loan allocation. In particular we investigate (1) whether companies receive credit according to
their size, in our case the size of total assets, and/or according to their financial stability (mea-
sured by the leverage ratio) or profitability (measured by returns on assets); and (2) whether
companies receive credit more than proportionally to their size which could explain why we
observe that the biggest amounts of bank loans were accumulated over years in the hands of the
larger companies. In the econometric analysis, we focus on the three most important sectors of
the Spanish economy: manufacturing, construction, and wholesale and retail trade (see table
3.1). As we already presented in figure 3.6, construction, and manufacturing sectors had the
same fraction of bank credit in 1999, however, the situation changed during the boom period
with an exceptional redistribution of credit toward the construction industry. The wholesale and
retail trade sector is taken as a reference one in our regression since it exhibited the constant
share of bank debt over the years as well as it is significant concerning the all size measures
(see table 3.1).
Therefore we investigate the rationale for banks to concentrate their investments to the large
firms of a particular sector. We suspect that banks and companies were following a positive
price signal on the housing market, without paying sufficient attention to risk indicators. They
were looking for profitable investments pushing the economy into a positive accelerating mech-
anism which finally resulted in a big crash. To enrich and consolidate the results of section 3.4.1
we present here the outcomes of our econometric analysis.
We design our empirical model following the model of determinants of firm’s debt ratio
described in Petersen and Rajan (1994). This model estimates firms’ debt ratio directly running,
inter alia, the logarithm of the book value of total assets on debt-to-total-assets-ratio. The
coefficients are estimated using the one-sided Tobit model since the debt ratio is censored to
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zero. Besides, the authors suggest that the regression suffers from a simultaneous equation
bias since the debt ratio is simultaneously determined from both demand and supply sides.
However, we argue that not only the debt ratio is censored from below to zero, but also it is
censored from above since, by its construction, it cannot be larger than one. Therefore, we
avoid to use a ratio as a dependent variable but the logarithm of new loans which do not have
an upper bound. Nonetheless, firms may have no new loans with banks either because they
are rationed - supply side effect - or because they have little need for external capital - demand
side effect. To address this issue, we consider two estimation strategies. In the first one, we
treat the observations of new loans for those firms that did not raise new credit as zero values.
In this case we deal with a censoring at zero using a standard Tobit model similar to Petersen
and Rajan (1994). In the second one, we simply do not observe new bank loans for those
companies that did not take new credit. Thus, we treat them as missing values using a sample
selection approach. In this regard, we recall the Keynesian “state of confidence” theory which
explains the investment behavior classifying two states. The first state is “borrower’s beliefs”
about profitable investments while the second is “the state of credit” which is governed by
lender’s confidence in financing borrowers (Gertler, 1988). Therefore, concerning the second
estimation strategy we define the credit granting process using the Keynesian rationale, i.e.
firms select themselves to apply for new loans, and they are chosen by banks to make credit
contracts. To account for the present selection mechanism we use two-steps selection models.
In the first step, we consider “Keynesian states” jointly estimating the probability that a firm
receives new loans. In the second step, we estimate our main equation where we control for the
selection mechanism using the predicted probabilities from the first stage. In particular we use
parametric and semi-parametric estimations: Heckman sample selection model and Matching
on Unobservables technique, see Ahn and Powell (1993) and Engberg et al. (1996).
In this section we have presented two estimation strategies that we use to estimate our em-
pirical model of the determinants of bank loans allocation. There may be also other estimation
methodologies available, for instance quantile regression, however, we do not use them for
mainly two reasons. The first reason is that it is difficult to interpret the coefficients of quantile
regression since companies may change quantiles over time and the results may be misleading
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due to the inter-quantile movements; the second reason is the sample selection (or censored at
zero) that we have discussed above.
In the following we present parametric and semi-parametric estimation results.
Parametric estimations: models and variable choice
We design an empirical model to estimate the elasticity between the book value of total assets
at time (t-1) and new bank loans issued to firm i in industry g at time t. The model is given as:
log(NewLoan)it = β1 · log(TotalAssets)igt−1+ InterectionTermsθ
+β3 · log(Equity)igt−1+β4 ·ReturnOnAssetsigt−1
+β5 ·OperatingMarginigt +β6 ·MarketPowerigt−1
+β7 ·RiskyFirmigt−1+ εigt ,
(3.1)
where the balance sheet items that might induce a reverse causality are considered with one
year lag. The model also accounts for firm specific variables such as the level of equity and
return on assets. Further, it includes an industry specific market power calculated as the ratio
of firm sale to total industry sales. Operating margin accounts for the market price change,
while risky firm is a dummy variable equal to one if firms’ financial leverage is above the
threshold and zero otherwise (see the previous section 3.4 for details). The selection equa-
tion additionally includes firm age and the average standard deviation of return on assets
in the last four years (see the Probit estimation output in table B.3). Our main variable
of interest is log(TotalAssets); however, to trace out the heterogeneity of the estimated co-
efficient over industries and periods before and after the crisis, we create a set of interac-
tion terms such as: Industry× log(TotalAssets), Dummy2008× log(TotalAssets), as well as
Industry×Dummy2008× log(TotalAssets) and estimate a vector of coefficients θ .
We run the Heckman selection model using MLE with firm ID clustered standard errors and
one-sided (censored at zero) Tobit model. The detailed estimation results are presented in table
3.3. All estimations also include industry-year fixed effects. In the table, columns (1), (2), and
(3) are the outputs of the Heckman selection model while column (4) presents the output of the
Tobit model. The model presented in column (1) excludes from the main equation both firm
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Table 3.3: The coefficient estimates are from the Heckman selectoin MLE model and the one-sided (censored at zero) Tobit model.
Each regression includes industry-year fixed effects and constant. Heckman estimations also contain selection term. The selection
equation additionally includes firm age and the average standard deviation of return-on-assets in the last four years (see table
B.3).
Heckman (1) Heckman (2) Heckman (3) Tobit (4)
log(New Loan) log(New Loan) log(New Loan) log(New Loan)
log(TotalAssets)it−1 0.895∗∗∗ 0.887∗∗∗ 0.896∗∗∗ 1.145∗∗∗
(33.17) (33.07) (33.06) (18.78)
log(TotalAssets)it−1 ×Manu f acturingIndustryi -0.0792∗∗∗ -0.0781∗∗∗ -0.0793∗∗∗ -0.388∗∗∗
(-2.89) (-2.86) (-2.89) (-6.58)
log(TotalAssets)it−1 ×ConstructionIndustryi 0.259∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗ 0.515∗∗∗
(9.66) (9.46) (9.66) (8.05)
log(TotalAssets)it−1 ×Manu f acturingIndustryi × DummyYearit ≥ 2008 0.102∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.667∗∗∗
(3.01) (3.10) (3.01) (8.20)
log(TotalAssets)it−1 ×ConstructionIndustry × DummyYearit ≥ 2008 -0.0915∗∗ -0.0893∗∗ -0.0911∗∗ -0.177∗
(-2.55) (-2.48) (-2.53) (-1.95)
log(TotalAssets)it−1 × DummyYearit ≥ 2008 -0.0325 -0.0349 -0.0326 -0.844∗∗∗
(-1.32) (-1.42) (-1.33) (-14.51)
DummyYearit ≥ 2008 0.0281 0.0658 0.0296 7.286∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.29) (0.13) (13.37)
DummyYearit ≥ 2008 ×Manu f acturingIndustryi -0.962∗∗∗ -0.986∗∗∗ -0.962∗∗∗ -6.429∗∗∗
(-3.06) (-3.14) (-3.06) (-8.34)
DummyYearit ≥ 2008 ×ConstructionIndustryi 0.546 0.528 0.542 0.784
(1.59) (1.54) (1.58) (0.88)
log(Equity)it−1 -0.199∗∗∗ -0.175∗∗∗ -0.200∗∗∗ -0.456∗∗∗
(-11.02) (-9.56) (-11.02) (-10.60)
ReturnOnAssetsit−1 -0.208∗ -0.315∗∗∗ -0.217∗ -1.279∗∗∗
(-1.81) (-2.73) (-1.91) (-5.37)
OperatingMarginit 0.193∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.0718
(4.15) (4.01) (4.16) (0.72)
MarketPowerit−1 -0.568∗∗∗ -0.540∗∗∗ -0.568∗∗∗ -0.334
(-3.49) (-3.37) (-3.48) (-1.59)
DummyRiskyFirmit−1 0.184∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.600∗∗∗
(8.60) (8.28) (8.62) (9.80)
Firm aget -0.00551∗∗∗ -0.000881
(-8.49) (-0.60)
σ(return on assets) 0.153 -10.27∗∗∗
over the last 4 years (0.77) (-21.16)
N 168356 168356 168356 168356
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
age and the average standard deviation of return on assets, assuming the exclusion restriction.
The model in column (2) additionally includes in the main equation firm age, while the model
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in column (3) additionally includes the average standard deviation of return on assets. The
Tobit estimation in column (4) includes all presented variables.
Our main variable of interest log(TotalAssets) indicates the relation between new loans and
firm size. The interaction terms associated with the vector of parameters θ capture the average
difference in the main coefficient between industries and periods before and after 2008. All
estimated models in 3.3 confirm our previous findings that banks allocate new loans toward the
larger firms in the construction sector and yet more than proportionally to firm size. However,
this does not hold in the other industries. To make the analysis easier, we summarize the results
of the columns (1) and (4) on the graph 3.11, presenting the value of the coefficient of interest
for both the Heckman and Tobit estimations.
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(b) One-sided Tobit estimation.
Figure 3.11: The elasticity coefficient by industry for the period before and after 2008.
The panel 3.11a presents the summary of the Heckman estimation given in the column (1)
of table 3.3. It shows that the average elasticity coefficient in the period before 2008 in the
construction industry was 1.154 while in other two industries was below one, indicating the
un-proportional distribution of bank loans only in the construction sector. In the period after
2008, the coefficients in the construction and manufacturing industry slightly changed in the
opposite direction, however still providing similar results. The panel 3.11b presents the sum-
mary of the Tobit estimation given in the column (4) of table 3.3. It confirms that the average
elasticity coefficient in the period before 2008 in the construction industry was far above the
unit elasticity, 1.66 and also indicates the un-proportional distribution of bank loans in the trade
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sector with the elasticity coefficient of 1.145. In the period after 2008, the Tobit model does
not find the un-proportional distribution of bank credit in any of sectors.
Concerning the other observables considered in the table 3.3, we see that the risky firms
were attracting significantly higher amounts of bank loans. Given the effect of total assets,
companies with higher sales (market power) and ROA rely more on internal funding and have
a liability structure characterized by a lower amount of bank debt. The negative coefficient
related to equity reflects the trade-off between bank debt and equity capital. Furthermore, the
positive operating margin suggests that credit allocation follows an active market price signal.
Nevertheless, to better account for the heterogeneity of our parameters, especially in the
time dimension, as well as to perform a robustness check of our results we perform a semi-
parametric estimation. It is worth noting that in the Heckman parametric estimation presented
above we have made several assumptions: (1) a particular functional form of the selection term
(see Kyriazidou (1997) for the discussion); (2) an exclusion restriction for σ(return on assets)
and firm age; and (3) the homogeneity of the coefficients of our control variables over industries
and years. While the first two assumptions concern technical issues regarding the efficiency and
consistency of our estimates, releasing the third assumption may give us deeper insights into
the analysis since it will allow us to observe the evolution of the coefficients over time and
industries. Therefore in the following subsection we derive a semi-parametric estimator and
estimate a Matching on unobservables model releasing the first and the second assumptions
mentioned above.
Semi-parametric estimator: robustness check
To build a semi-parametric estimator we use a two steps matching approach following Ahn
and Powell (1993) and Engberg et al. (1996). We first define our main model such as:
yigt = X igtβ gt + εigt , (3.2)
where y is new bank loans, and X is a vector of explanatory variables that we have defined in
section 3.4.2. We assume digt = 1{xigtγgt +υigt > 0}, yigt2 = yigt · digt , and that f (εigt ,υigt) is
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independent of xigt . Since we do not want to assume a particular distribution f , in the first step
we run a probit model and estimate the probabilities that firms obtain new loans such as:
digt = Z igtγ gt +υigt , (3.3)
where d is an indicator equal to 1 if a firm gets new bank loans at time t; and Z is a vector of
explanatory variables in the first step selection equation.
In the second step we choose firm i and j in industry g at time t such that from equations 3.3
we have the equality Z igt γˆ gt = Z jgt γˆ gt , i.e we match firm i and firm j within an industry and
year with the same probability of receiving new bank loans and subtract one firm from another.
In particular using model 3.2 we do the following transformation:
yigt − y jgt = (X igt −X jgt)β gt + λˆgt(Z igt γˆ gt)− λˆgt(Z jgt γˆ gt) = (X igt −X jgt)β gt . (3.4)
In practice we assume the second order Gaussian kernel function. We calculate and assign the
kernel weights to each possible pair of companies within the industry and year, i.e. we use an
estimator such as:[
∑K
(
(Z igt −Z jgt)γˆ gt
n
)
(X igt −X jgt)(X igt −X jgt)′
]−1
×[
∑K
(
(Z igt −Z jgt)γˆ gt
n
)
(X igt −X jgt)(Y igt −Y jgt)′
] (3.5)
The data dependent bandwidths are chosen by generalized cross-validation over a crude grid
of possible values. Using the same approach we also recover the intercept terms from the main
models that were lost due to the transformation.
To sum up, we match similar companies i and j in industry g at time t with the same proba-
bility of receiving new bank loans. We then subtract one firm from another in order to eliminate
any industry or year unobservable effect and to estimate our coefficients for each industry and
each year separately. This process finally releases the third homogeneity assumption.
The detailed output for the three industries that are considered in the parametric estimation
is provided in tables B.4, B.5, and B.6) in the appendix. While, the results of our coefficient of
interests is summarized and given on figure 3.12
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Figure 3.12: The elasticity coefficient estimated by industry over years. The estimates are from semi-parametric estimation.
The results on the figure 3.12 confirms our previous finding and justifies our heterogeneity
assumption. The graph shows wider fluctuations of the estimated coefficient since now the
independent variables do not control for the average effects across industries and years but
each industry and year separately. The elasticity coefficients are significantly different over the
years exhibiting an interesting pattern. The significant drop of the coefficient in the construction
sector at the beginning of the crisis is entirely lost in the previous estimation. Further, another
increase of coefficient in 2012 and 2013 that confirm the previous findings of Acharya et al.
(2016) is again completely missing. On the other hand, this model managed to capture a
significant increase in the elasticity coefficient in the manufacturing industry in the period after
2008 which became greater than one. The other firms’ observables in the appendix also confirm
the previous estimation results.
3.5 Conclusions
The aim of our study is to understand if the way bank credit has been allocated among Span-
ish firms during the economic boom, from 1999 to 2007, played a relevant part in determining
the subsequent crisis of 2007. We find empirical evidence that bank credit is accumulated by
the largest Spanish firms; in particular, the level of concentration of bank debt is higher than
all other firms’ size measures, like sales and employees, and than any other balance sheet item.
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We also find that the construction sector exhibits the highest ratio of bank credit to total as-
sets, and it is clearly the sector where large firms have been able to raise more loans during
the boom. Moreover, the outstanding concentration of bank credit is quite constant over time
and independent of the business cycle, persisting also when the leverage of large firms (par-
ticularly in the construction sector) becomes extremely high. We estimated parametric and
semi-parametric models to discover the determinants of bank credit allocation. We find that
bank credit is distributed to firms according to their size rather than their financial stability,
such as the leverage, and that firms receive credit more than proportionally to their size, imply-
ing that the bank-credit-over-total-assets ratio increases with total assets.
This empirical evidence raises questions about the way funds from financial institutions are
distributed among companies. We think that the Spanish case shows a questionable scenario
where bank credit has been delivered to large firms, often characterized by an unreliable fi-
nancial condition, especially in the construction sector. We conjecture that the unbalanced
allocation of bank credit might have increased the fragility of the economic system, therefore
fostering the advent of the crisis. This situation has been possible because of a controversial
governance on risk-taking in the financial industry which favored large, already indebted com-
panies. This mechanism has been particularly critical in the construction sector, where the
price expansion in the housing market created apparent investments opportunities, attracting
massive amounts of new loans.
Finally, we think banks credit allocation is central in modern capitalistic economies and
should be further investigated. We also foresee its potential policy relevance in the field of
macro-prudential banking regulation.
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Concluding remarks
The main contribution of this thesis is the application of the “bottom-up” methodology to
address some of the most urgent macroeconomic issues that are nowadays emerging in some of
the main developed countries, and in particular in the European Union. In the recent past, the
main stream macroeconomic theory has been criticized by several scholars, which claimed
that the theory has a significant limitation, making it unfit to provide answers to many of
these emerging issues. We discussed these limitations in the main body of the thesis, but
they can be summarized here as the neglect of considering some important economic features
as agents’ interaction, agents’ heterogeneity, the granularity of the economy, endogenous eco-
nomic shocks. The “bottom-up” approach characterizing this thesis keeps these aspects into
account and could, therefore, constitute a valid support for scholars and policy makers.
The first part of the thesis investigates the conditions under which it can be convenient for two
countries to join a union, sharing the currency and common goods, labor and financial markets.
The main results show that joining a union has in general very positive effects, increasing pro-
duction, decreasing the unemployment rate, improving the real wage and any other indicator
of welfare. We also show that monetary policy is not very efficient within the union but this
limitation is entirely offset by the benefits of sharing common markets. However, we mention
in the thesis also some potential dangers of joining a union when the productivity of the two
countries is very different and when the mobility of workers has no, or minimal limitation. The
positive effect of having a wider basin of workers for the companies of the two countries, and
the, therefore, lower unemployment rate, can become a drawback for the union when massive
migration flows undermine the stability of the countries, especially if the public sector exhibits
significant rigidities. In this case, we show that inequality between the countries raises and
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the performance of the union is negatively affected. We can add here that this situation would
certainly generate political problems, which are not considered in the model. We find that cre-
ating a common pool of resources, called “fiscal pool” in our work, can be helpful to reduce
the inequality problems by improving the robustness of the weaker country in the union, and
therefore limiting the massive emigration, however at the expense of reducing well-being of the
bigger country. This results suggest that a deeper fiscal integration would be beneficial if the
policy target in the union is reducing inequalities among the countries, while it would not be
favorable if the goal is to maximize the overall production of the union. This raises some inter-
esting political and ethical issues about the development strategy that a union (with particular
reference to the European Union) want to pursue. This study seems to underline that the ob-
jective of maximizing the economic performance is not always in harmony with the objective
of reducing inequality and preserving the structural and cultural difference that exist among
countries. A policy message would be that a wise mixture between these two lines should be
adopted.
We would like to point out here that the flexibility of the model that has been designed in
this work allows for hundreds of different computational experiments, and for the very nature
of these type of models, which are not specialized but very general, a broad spectrum of re-
search questions can be addressed. We state this to deliver the idea of the big potential of this
approach, which can be used to give alternative answers to classic (or recently emerged) eco-
nomic problems. In our case, we tried to compare our outcomes with the main outcomes that
are found in the literature on trade and monetary unions.
Of course, we are aware of the need to improve the robustness of our approach by rethinking
validation techniques and by calibrating the models more precisely. These are challenging is-
sues that we are already addressing, and that is becoming more compelling in our agenda.
Concerning the second part of the thesis, we try to understand if the way banks allocate their
loans to the different companies has a relevant role in the business cycle and if it can give rise
to destabilizing bubbles. We analyzed a very significant case, which is the Spanish case, in the
period around the crises of 2007-2008. We found that, in general, banks tend to finance bigger
firms, despite their apparent level of risk. The most evident proof of this behavior can be found
in the years that preceded the crisis, when banks concentrated their loans to large enterprises
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in the construction sector, regardless of the increasing signals of risk. Certainly, we do not
have an ultimate explanation for this behavior, but we think that we raised sufficient elements
to suggest a careful reflection on the monitoring policies of the loan activity of commercial
banks, trying to encourage a proper and transparent allocation of the financial resources.
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Appendix A
Eurace open
A.1 From a single to multi-country setting
In this section we present an example of one possible configuration of the model. The figure
A.1 shows, for instance, that we can create a global economy that includes one labor union that
integrates two heterogeneous countries which differs in terms of the number of households,
the number of firms, and the number of banks; one monetary union with labor mobility and
the international goods market, which integrates three heterogeneous countries; and finally one
isolated country.
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Figure A.1: A multi-country setting.
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Table A.1: Balance sheets
Agent Assets Liabilities
Household Liquidity: Mh Equity: Eh
abbrev.: HH Equity Shares: ES f ,k,bh
index: h = 1, . . . ,NHH Gov Bonds: GBgh
Consumption Goods Producers Liquidity: M f Debt: D f = ∑b Dbf
abbrev.: F Capital goods: K f Equity: E f
index: f = 1, . . . ,NF Inventories: I f
Capital Goods Producers Liquidity: Mk Equity: Ek
abbrev.: KP
index: k = 1, . . . ,NKP
Bank Liquidity: Mb
Deposits (Liquidity of HH, F and
KP): Db = ∑h, f ,k Mbh, f ,k
abbrev.: B Loans: Lb = ∑ f Dbf
Standing facility with the Central
Debt: Db
index: b = 1, . . . ,NB Equity: Eb
Government Liquidity: Mg Bond Debt: BDg
abbrev.: GOV Loan Debt: LDg
index: g Equity: Eg
Central Bank Liquidity: Mcb Outstanding fiat money: FMcb
abbrev.: CB
Loans to the government and banks:
Lcb = LDg +∑b Db, where cb = g
Deposits (Liquidity of the GOV and
B): Dcb = Mg +∑b Mb
index: cb Standing facility with the UCB: Dc
Equity: Ecb
Union Central Bank Liquidity: Mucb Outstanding fiat money: FMucb
abbrev.: UCB
Loans to the Central Banks, Lucb =
∑cb Dcb
Deposits (Liquidity of the CB):
Ducb = ∑cb Mcb
index: ucb Equity, Eucb
Table 2. The balance sheets of agents populating the Eurace economy. Balance sheet entries in the table are
named with capital letters. A subscript character is the index of the agent that the variable refers to, while the
superscript refers to other agents’ balance sheets. For instance, D f refers to the total debt of firm f (liability),
and Lb refers to the total loans of bank b (asset), while Dbf (L
f
b ) refers to the debt (loan) that firm f (bank b) has
with bank b (firm f ). Hence, there is the identity: D f = ∑b Dbf and Lb = ∑ f L
f
b .
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Table A.2: The description of parameters and symbols - Firms
FIRMS
Symbol Name Description
n f Labor force
The number of workers used in the production
process.
n˜ f Desired labor force.
K f Capital The capital stock of firm f .
K˜ f Desired Capital The desired capital stock of firm f .
γ f Productivity parameter The productivity of firm’s physical capital.
edu General skill level The education degree of households (workers).
A f The productivity factor
The productivity parameter used in the Cobb
Douglas production function.
q f Consumption good quantity
The amount of homogeneous consumption
good that is produced by firm f .
t Time
The counter of the basic time unit in the model
which is day or iteration.
ξ Physical capital depreciation rate Monthly physical capital depreciation rate
i f Investment
The amount of money that firms invest to buy
new physical capital.
iãf Investment grid The grid of visible investment values.
Et [q f .t+1] Expected demand
The quantity of goods that the firm f expects to
be demanded next month.
I f Inventories
The quantity of the current inventories of firm
f .
q˜ f Planned production quantity Planned production quantity for the next month.
s¯ f Average workers’ specific skill
rb,tf Interest rate
Interest rate associated to the loan of bank b
taken at time t.
pK Capital price The price of one unit of physical capital.
τct Corporate tax The corporate tax rate.
τvat Value-added tax The Value-added tax rate.
Continued on next page
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Table A.2 – Continued from previous page
Symbol Name Description
∆q f ,m Additional monthly production
The additional amount of monthly production
given including the new capital investment i f ,ã.
λ f ,g Market specific weights
Et P Expected price level
Pg,t Price level The price level in the country g at time t.
Et [pig,t+1] Expected inflation
p˜it Target inflation
The inflation target announced by the Central
Bank at time t.
m
The future month of discounting the
NPV
θ The trust factor
It shows how much agents believes in the Cen-
tral Bank’s announcements.
D f Total debt Firms’ balance sheet item.
A f Total assets Firms’ balance sheet item.
δ Debt write-off parameter
It determines the amount of debt that will be
written-off during the bankruptcy procedure.
E f Total equity Firms’ balance sheet item.
ε Target leverage ratio parameter
It determines the leverage ratio level of the new
company in the bankruptcy procedure.
µ Murk-up parameter Mark-up rate in the firms’ price setting.
c f Firms’ unit production costs
Table A.3: The description of parameters and symbols - Households
HOUSEHOLDS
Symbol Name Description
sh,edu Specific skill The specific skill level of households.
Continued on next page
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Table A.3 – Continued from previous page
Symbol Name Description
ζ (edu) Specific skill adjustment parameter
The parameter (function) determines the speed
of the improvement of specific skill level. It is
an increasing function of the general skill level
edu.
w f ,edu Wage offer
w¯ f ,edu Households’ reservation wage
ρ Mobility friction rate
yh Total household’s gross income
The sum of total dividend payments, total bond
coupons payments, the unemployment benefit
or wage and the government transfer.
wh Wage Monthly wage payment.
uh Unemployment benefit Monthly payment of the unemployment benefit.
yGT Government lump-sum transfer
nB
g
h The number of bonds
The number of bonds from country g that is
owned by household h.
cBg Bound coupon payment The bond coupon payment by country g.
e An equity share issuer
Can be a firm, a bank or the physical capital
producer.
neh
The number of equities held by the
household h
de The dividend payment per equity e
mτ h Total tax payment The sum of all tax payments.
τw Wage tax rate The tax rate on wages.
τc Capital tax rate The tax rate on the received dividend payments.
yNET h Total net income Household’s total net income in the.
¯yNET h Quarterly average total net income
Household’s average total net income in the last
three months.
Continued on next page
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Table A.3 – Continued from previous page
Symbol Name Description
Wh Households’ wealth
The sum of asset portfolio valued at the most re-
cent market prices and liquidity on Households’
payment account.
B Households’ consumption budget.
Re The total return of assets e.
φ c Carrol consumption parameter It sets the adjustment of speed and it is constant.
ωh Current wealth to income ratio
It is the ratio of current household’s wealth to
average total net income.
ω¯ Target wealth to income ratio It is the constant target wealth to income ratio.
Table A.4: The description of parameters and symbols - Commercial Banks
COMMERCIAL BANKS
Symbol Name Description
σb
The spread sensitivity to the credit
worthiness of the firms.
A¯b
The risk-weighted loan portfolio of
banks.
The sum of all loans of bank b weighted by
firms’ probability of default.
ψ The capital requirement.
The equity capital Eb must be at least as large
as the percentage ψ of the risk-weighted assets
portfolio A¯b.
˜`f The loan request of firm f .
`
f
b
The loan granted by the bank b to the
firm f .
η(.) The dividend rate step function.
ab
The parameter in the likelihood func-
tion.
κb
The parameter in the likelihood func-
tion.
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Table A.5: The description of parameters and symbols - The Central Bank
THE CENTRAL BANK
Symbol Name Description
pi Inflation The yearly inflation rate.
p˜i Desired (target) inflation The desired rate of inflation.
υ The unemployment rate Monthly unemployment rate.
υ˜ The natural rate of unemployment.
Table A.6: The description of parameters and symbols - The Governments
THE GOVERNMENTS
Symbol Name Description
G Public expenditures.
W Public wage expenditures.
UB Unemployment benefit expenditures.
GT Transfer expenditures
χ Government flexibility parameter
ν
The share of public workers to total
population in the country
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Figure B.1: The qualitative distribution of bank loans by years and deciles of total assets in the construction industry. Each plot
represents the distribution of bank loans over the deciles of total assets for the particular year. Each bin on the plot shows the
share of bank loans in a given decile which is indicated on the y-axis, as well as it demonstrates the share of bank loans that is
held by the risky and non-risky firms within the given decile, which is indicated with percents on the top of the bins. Light color
denotes the share of risky firms, while the dark color denotes the share of non-risky firms.
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Figure B.2: The qualitative distribution of bank loans by years and deciles of total assets in the manufacturing industry. Each
plot represents the distribution of bank loans over the deciles of total assets for the particular year. Each bin on the plot shows
the share of bank loans in a given decile which is indicated on the y-axis, as well as it demonstrates the share of bank loans that
is held by the risky and non-risky firms within the given decile, which is indicated with percents on the top of the bins. Light color
denotes the share of risky firms, while the dark color denotes the share of non-risky firms.
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Figure B.3: The qualitative distribution of bank loans by years and deciles of total assets in the wholesale & retail trade industry.
Each plot represents the distribution of bank loans over the deciles of total assets for the particular year. Each bin on the plot
shows the share of bank loans in a given decile which is indicated on the y-axis, as well as it demonstrates the share of bank loans
that is held by the risky and non-risky firms within the given decile, which is indicated with percents on the top of the bins. Light
color denotes the share of risky firms, while the dark color denotes the share of non-risky firms.
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Table B.1: Shares of long-term and short-term bank debt by the deciles of the book value of total assets, including all firms in the Spanish economy.
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Deciles of Long-term Short-term Deciles of Long-term Short-term Deciles of Long-term Short-term Deciles of Long-term Short-term Deciles of Long-term Short-term
Total Assets bank bank Total Assets bank bank Total Assets bank bank Total Assets bank bank Total Assets bank bank
(th EUR) debt debt (th EUR) debt debt (th EUR) debt debt (th EUR) debt debt (th EUR) debt debt
0 - 39 0.04% 0.00% 0 - 41 0.03% 0.00% 0 - 50 0.03% 0.00% 0 - 40 0.04% 0.04% 0 - 37 0.04% 0.04%
39 - 85 0.10% 0.00% 41 - 89 0.09% 0.00% 50 - 105 0.09% 0.01% 40 - 86 0.08% 0.11% 37 - 81 0.08% 0.11%
85 - 143 0.21% 0.00% 89 - 152 0.18% 0.00% 105 - 177 0.18% 0.01% 86 - 149 0.16% 0.19% 81 - 140 0.15% 0.19%
143 - 224 0.36% 0.00% 152 - 239 0.32% 0.00% 177 - 276 0.31% 0.01% 149 - 236 0.28% 0.31% 140 - 223 0.26% 0.30%
224 - 340 0.58% 0.00% 239 - 367 0.52% 0.00% 276 - 423 0.50% 0.02% 236 - 366 0.47% 0.47% 223 - 346 0.45% 0.46%
340 - 520 0.91% 0.00% 367 - 565 0.83% 0.00% 423 - 649 0.79% 0.03% 366 - 568 0.76% 0.73% 346 - 537 0.73% 0.70%
520 - 834 1.40% 0.01% 565 - 911 1.32% 0.01% 649 - 1041 1.29% 0.06% 568 - 914 1.26% 1.20% 537 - 864 1.23% 1.15%
834 - 1494 2.35% 0.03% 911 - 1639 2.23% 0.03% 1041 - 1873 2.12% 0.13% 914 - 1654 2.09% 2.16% 864 - 1565 2.03% 2.04%
1494 - 3489 4.64% 0.82% 1639 - 3868 4.48% 0.93% 1873 - 4436 4.41% 1.47% 1654 - 3909 4.26% 5.08% 1565 - 3741 4.12% 4.81%
3489 < 89.41% 99.14% 3868 < 90.01% 99.03% 4436 < 90.29% 98.25% 3909 < 90.61% 89.70% 3741 < 90.92% 90.18%
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Deciles of Long-term Short-term Deciles of Long-term Short-term Deciles of Long-term Short-term Deciles of Long-term Short-term Deciles of Long-term Short-term
Total Assets bank bank Total Assets bank bank Total Assets bank bank Total Assets bank bank Total Assets bank bank
(th EUR) debt debt (th EUR) debt debt (th EUR) debt debt (th EUR) debt debt (th EUR) debt debt
0 - 39 0.04% 0.05% 0 - 36 0.04% 0.08% 0 - 32 0.06% 0.09% 0 - 31 0.06% 0.06% 0 - 34 0.07% 0.06%
39 - 84 0.08% 0.10% 36 - 79 0.07% 0.10% 32 - 71 0.08% 0.10% 31 - 70 0.07% 0.10% 34 - 74 0.07% 0.11%
84 - 144 0.15% 0.18% 79 - 136 0.14% 0.17% 71 - 124 0.14% 0.16% 70 - 122 0.13% 0.15% 74 - 128 0.13% 0.19%
144 - 228 0.26% 0.35% 136 - 217 0.24% 0.26% 124 - 200 0.23% 0.27% 122 - 197 0.23% 0.23% 128 - 203 0.23% 0.29%
228 - 351 0.44% 0.42% 217 - 335 0.41% 0.47% 200 - 312 0.40% 0.35% 197 - 307 0.39% 0.37% 203 - 311 0.37% 0.44%
351 - 542 0.71% 0.64% 335 - 520 0.66% 0.62% 312 - 486 0.65% 0.59% 307 - 476 0.62% 0.60% 311 - 478 0.60% 0.69%
542 - 868 1.17% 1.02% 520 - 833 1.10% 0.98% 486 - 782 1.06% 0.86% 476 - 765 1.01% 0.92% 478 - 761 0.95% 1.08%
868 - 1575 1.98% 1.83% 833 - 1519 1.79% 1.80% 782 - 1424 1.74% 1.57% 765 - 1396 1.64% 1.63% 761 - 1370 1.47% 1.98%
1575 - 3765 3.87% 4.33% 1519 - 3631 3.54% 4.29% 1424 - 3435 3.48% 3.90% 1396 - 3381 3.20% 4.20% 1370 - 3246 2.82% 4.98%
3765 < 91.29% 91.08% 3631 < 92.00% 91.22% 3435 < 92.15% 92.13% 3381 < 92.64% 91.73% 3246 < 93.28% 90.18%
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Table B.2: The number of firms in the sample and shares by industry
Years
Average
Industries 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Mining & 190 192 190 187 191 187 188 185 172 166 169 165 152 152 134 94 170
Energy 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.8% 0.7% 0.7% 0.8%
Construction & 3753 4103 4389 4708 4982 5161 5407 5553 5027 4253 3999 3640 3122 2708 2273 1592 4042
Real Estate 16.8% 17.5% 18.2% 19.2% 19.9% 20.5% 21.3% 21.6% 20.6% 18.5% 17.6% 16.4% 14.8% 13.5% 12.1% 12.3% 17.9%
Manufacturing
6982 7200 7258 7254 7229 7176 7133 7101 6775 6526 6469 6334 6149 5924 5620 3873 6563
31.2% 30.7% 30.1% 29.6% 28.9% 28.5% 28.0% 27.6% 27.8% 28.3% 28.4% 28.6% 29.1% 29.4% 29.9% 30.0% 29.1%
Transportation & 1356 1431 1465 1483 1503 1515 1501 1499 1461 1424 1437 1408 1382 1356 1314 931 1404
Communication 6.1% 6.1% 6.1% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 5.9% 5.8% 6.0% 6.2% 6.3% 6.4% 6.5% 6.7% 7.0% 7.2% 6.2%
Wholesale & 7500 7793 7920 7986 8116 8132 8143 8221 7910 7678 7666 7597 7376 7098 6720 4566 7526
Retail Trade 33.5% 33.2% 32.9% 32.5% 32.5% 32.3% 32.0% 32.0% 32.4% 33.3% 33.7% 34.3% 34.9% 35.3% 35.7% 35.4% 33.4%
Services
2586 2736 2876 2927 2986 3017 3062 3164 3037 2983 3002 2998 2951 2886 2743 1851 2863
11.6% 11.7% 11.9% 11.9% 11.9% 12.0% 12.0% 12.3% 12.5% 13.0% 13.2% 13.5% 14.0% 14.3% 14.6% 14.3% 12.7%
All industries 22367 23455 24098 24545 25007 25188 25434 25723 24382 23030 22742 22142 21132 20124 18804 12907 22568
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Table B.3: The coefficient estimates are from the Probit model. Depended variable Dummy New Loan is equal to one if a firm
raises new loans at time t, and zero otherwise. Each regression includes industry-year fixed effects and constant. The marginal
effects are calculated at means.
Probit Probit ∂y(.)∂x
Dummy New Loan Dummy New Loan
log(TotalAssets)it−1 0.118∗∗∗ 0.0455∗∗∗
(12.24) (12.24)
log(TotalAssets)it−1 ×Manu f acturingIndustryi -0.0623∗∗∗ -0.0240∗∗∗
(-6.66) (-6.66)
log(TotalAssets)it−1 ×ConstructionIndustryi 0.0470∗∗∗ 0.0181∗∗∗
(4.48) (4.48)
log(TotalAssets)it−1 ×Manu f acturingIndustryi × DummyYearit ≥ 2008 0.104∗∗∗ 0.0398∗∗∗
(8.05) (8.05)
log(TotalAssets)it−1 ×ConstructionIndustry × DummyYearit ≥ 2008 -0.00807 -0.00311
(-0.55) (-0.55)
log(TotalAssets)it−1 × DummyYearit ≥ 2008 -0.135∗∗∗ -0.0518∗∗∗
(-14.66) (-14.66)
DummyYearit ≥ 2008 1.196∗∗∗ 0.460∗∗∗
(13.93) (13.93)
DummyYearit ≥ 2008 ×Manu f acturingIndustryi -1.002∗∗∗ -0.386∗∗∗
(-8.22) (-8.22)
DummyYearit ≥ 2008 ×ConstructionIndustryi -0.0374 -0.0144
[1em] log(Equity)it−1 -0.0595∗∗∗ -0.0229∗∗∗
(-8.70) (-8.70)
ReturnOnAssetsit−1 -0.183∗∗∗ -0.0704∗∗∗
(-4.94) (-4.94)
OperatingMarginit -0.00179 -0.000690
(-0.12) (-0.12)
MarketPowerit−1 -0.0158 -0.00610
(-0.47) (-0.47)
DummyRiskyFirmit−1 0.0813∗∗∗ 0.0313∗∗∗
(8.34) (8.33)
Firm aget 0.000273 0.000105
(1.18) (1.18)
σ(return on assets) -1.564∗∗∗ -0.602∗∗∗
over the last 4 years (-20.68) (-20.68)
N 168356 168356
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table B.4: The dependent variable is the logarithm of new loans that is taken by firms in the current year. The coefficient estimates are from a semi-parametric estimation (Matching on
Unobservables), for the construction industry and for each year separately.
Independent variable 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
ln(total assets)t−1 1.156*** 1.238*** 1.291*** 1.114*** 0.994*** 0.830*** 0.658*** 0.789*** 1.040*** 1.091*** 1.033***
(3376.483) (1400.632) (1825.345) (4034.592) (1970.384) (1542.699) (1653.985) (583.539) (1182.287) (1260.691) (844.601)
DummyRiskyFirmt−1 0.205*** 0.128*** 0.007*** 0.281*** 0.092*** 0.073*** 0.244*** 0.107*** 0.098*** -0.739*** -0.296***
(1650.404) (408.010) (26.981) (2751.920) (495.617) (386.095) (1720.980) (232.135) (366.915) (-2627.831) (-919.299)
Return on assetst−1 -0.345*** -0.814*** -1.234*** -0.290*** -2.829*** -1.536*** 0.155*** -1.636*** -0.187*** -0.590*** -0.574***
(-17009.784) (-15110.405) (-28768.673) (-15277.493) (-98905.523) (-48527.047) (7387.861) (-19607.557) (-4555.698) (-9622.622) (-6975.634)
ln(equity)t−1 -0.228*** -0.290*** -0.268*** -0.148*** -0.142*** 0.053*** 0.163*** 0.041*** -0.154*** -0.456*** -0.414***
(-568.287) (-279.563) (-330.299) (-454.404) (-237.296) (92.844) (371.247) (28.442) (-160.368) (-496.566) (-314.084)
Firm aget -0.012*** -0.053 -0.014** -0.005** -0.054 -0.064 -0.023 -0.018 0.00004 0.0008 -0.005
(-3.963) (-0.701) (-2.347) (-2.273) (-1.146) (-1.411) (-0.626) (-0.142) (0.005) (0.095) (-0.481)
Market powert−1 -1.301*** -1.638*** -1.392*** -0.249*** -1.173*** -0.189*** -0.253*** 0.181*** 0.126*** 0.548*** 1.552***
(-67815.923) (-35861.793) (-22774.335) (-15327.516) (-30763.985) (-2623.960) (-7236.625) (944.625) (915.655) (5456.646) (13368.133)
σ(return on assets)t 2.540*** 0.821*** 0.715*** 0.511*** 3.773*** -0.751*** -1.389*** -2.122*** 0.398*** -2.074*** -1.118***
over the last 4 years (269348.903) (18626.864) (34019.527) (53341.648) (243863.390) (-40951.539) (-101474.756) (-43310.670) (16027.942) (-74449.679) (-30209.472)
Operating margint 1.289*** 0.814*** 1.086*** 0.146*** 0.470*** 0.136*** 0.106*** -0.061*** -0.065*** 0.264*** 0.091***
(21152.629) (4626.032) (6694.351) (2674.902) (3817.053) (882.028) (1080.980) (-110.201) (-160.210) (979.897) (209.829)
R2ad j. 0.376 0.355 0.443 0.418 0.361 0.397 0.344 0.3219 0.430 0.248 0.245
N 1368 1583 1773 1734 1307 850 855 718 421 409 341
t-statistics in parentheses
∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
149
Table B.5: The dependent variable is the logarithm of new loans that is taken by firms in the current year. The coefficient estimates are from a semi-parametric estimation (Matching on
Unobservables), for the manufacturing industry and for each year separately.
Independent variable 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
ln(total assets)t−1 0.976*** 0.997*** 0.938*** 0.907*** 1.079*** 0.976*** 1.028*** 0.941*** 0.971*** 1.231*** 1.255***
2040.172 5103.071 4878.067 1884.518 3571.845 2928.033 1608.790 3761.216 3084.530 2472.882 3688.651
DummyRiskyFirmt−1 0.159*** 0.256*** 0.229*** 0.312*** 0.196*** 0.034*** 0.017*** 0.235*** 0.167*** -0.039*** 0.104***
758.952 3064.025 2837.921 1546.492 1657.419 258.750 65.932 2227.104 1386.537 -201.110 788.593
Return on assetst−1 -0.321*** -0.392*** -0.028*** 0.334*** -0.906*** 0.289*** 0.222*** 0.135*** -0.410*** -0.205*** -0.934***
-9204.389 -26722.264 -1747.612 9277.571 -42696.811 9894.563 4021.056 6397.376 -18695.595 -5226.504 -31410.395
ln(equity)t−1 -0.352*** -0.300*** -0.260*** -0.223*** -0.351*** -0.265*** -0.344*** -0.183*** -0.226*** -0.474*** -0.546***
-613.588 -1283.246 -1152.980 -404.413 -1014.128 -733.913 -472.815 -652.729 -643.313 -865.879 -1442.629
Firm aget -0.010 -0.007** -0.003 -0.002 -0.005 -0.002 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.007 -0.001
-1.357 -2.518 -1.308 -0.315 -1.379 -0.361 0.155 -0.675 -0.285 -1.000 -0.262
Market powert−1 -0.928*** -2.009*** -1.020*** -1.715*** -0.830*** -1.576*** -1.304*** -1.688*** -1.809*** -0.957*** -0.549***
-27290.523 -120122.366 -105505.097 -50912.266 -36592.525 -57973.351 -30409.846 -120739.252 -100396.169 -25028.602 -26567.893
σ(return on assets)t -1.576*** -2.255*** -1.839*** -0.598*** -0.484*** -0.225*** -1.488*** -0.238*** -1.107*** -5.048*** -4.410***
over the last 4 years -113236.520 -420898.127 -276727.919 -39513.907 -59519.187 -17891.554 -61200.754 -19509.514 -90709.073 -264839.608 -320234.593
Operating margint -0.038*** -0.516*** -0.620*** -0.394*** 0.319*** -0.668*** -0.017*** -0.469*** 0.118*** -0.831*** 0.108***
-1220.331 -39899.695 -49049.806 -12414.796 12091.448 -16537.075 -336.538 -23167.781 4039.017 -19898.128 3174.040
R2ad j. 0.156 0.172 0.176 0.162 0.211 0.165 0.190 0.199 0.199 0.213 0.212
N 2674 2776 2870 2823 2469 1647 1933 1756 1458 1501 1245
t-statistics in parentheses
∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table B.6: The dependent variable is the logarithm of new loans that is taken by firms in the current year. The coefficient estimates are from a semi-parametric estimation (Matching on
Unobservables), for the wholesale and retail trade industry and for each year separately.
Independent variable 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
ln(total assets)t−1 0.878*** 0.772*** 1.030*** 1.037*** 0.888*** 0.637*** 0.732*** 0.711*** 0.714*** 0.634*** 0.951***
848.383 5046.432 3621.775 6011.887 4144.114 2435.436 1111.437 2277.627 2463.0167 1470.686 2071.760
DummyRiskyFirmt−1 0.098*** 0.356*** 0.068*** 0.241*** 0.143*** 0.171*** 0.269*** 0.256*** 0.197*** 0.331*** -0.020***
200.932 4458.133 532.518 3049.847 1580.409 1578.448 960.648 1902.392 1848.842 1932.626 -113.406
Return on assetst−1 0.003*** -0.828*** -0.241*** -0.220*** -1.016*** -1.064*** -0.146*** 1.286*** -0.784*** 0.452*** 0.924***
32.795 -56336.184 -10416.243 -16501.270 -63173.467 -47152.795 -2932.454 57448.117 -35200.570 15693.766 31976.623
ln(equity)t−1 -0.261*** -0.031*** -0.323*** -0.194*** -0.188*** -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.062*** -0.169*** -0.006*** -0.387***
-206.250 -155.437 -932.855 -914.201 -743.395 -47.419 -20.331 -167.133 -524.642 -11.105 -722.302
Firm aget -0.009 -0.010*** -0.008** -0.009*** -0.006*** 0.0001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.007** -0.009* -0.006
-0.660 -5.199 -2.268 -4.217 -2.640 0.049 -0.238 -0.929 -2.228 -1.843 -1.261
Market powert−1 -1.104*** -0.518*** -0.191*** -1.879*** 0.047*** -0.442*** -0.781*** 0.240*** -0.076*** 1.047*** -0.056***
-19915.156 -42823.305 -6414.106 -266265.623 1845.299 -23615.571 -12743.955 5619.551 -2086.180 44671.884 -1688.471
σ(return on assets)t 0.009*** 0.171*** 0.379*** -0.826*** 0.935*** -0.484*** 1.465*** -2.597*** 0.306*** -1.227*** -3.067***
over the last 4 years 256.556 29833.902 36649.139 -123727.806 104752.320 -49698.364 59710.086 -219157.732 30287.983 -85165.365 -252856.709
Operating margint 0.768*** 0.073*** 0.725*** 0.527*** 0.798*** 0.019*** -1.492*** -0.470*** 0.828*** -0.284*** -0.390***
16567.023 8442.894 54390.089 51610.375 44422.216 967.229 -40192.789 -24276.952 50195.685 -9950.889 -16825.808
R2ad j. 0.111 0.158 0.167 0.203 0.175 0.137 0.169 0.146 0.115 0.140 0.125
N 2771 2953 3133 3053 2630 1864 2320 2107 1790 1794 1628
t-statistics in parentheses
∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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